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‘The present volume makes a significant scientific contribution to our knowledge about 
how to improve a society’s resilience against natural hazards in general and flooding in 
particular.’ Ola Svenson, Professor emeritus at Stockholm University
‘Intelligent analysis and the perception of risks along with exploring the emotional page  
of the society when perceiving threats make this book my number one specialist literature.’  
Veit Stutz, CEO of Allianz Poland
‘By offering thoughtful insight into the ways people deal with highly improbable big  
impact events, this noteworthy book will be of exceptional importance to policy makers  
and entrepreneurs.’ Tomasz Modzelewski, CEO of Paged
This volume contains studies of one particular category of risky situations, namely, those 
involving highly negative consequences with low probabilities. Situations of this type involve 
both natural and man-made disasters (e.g. floods, technological hazards, economic crises, 
epidemics, etc.). Such risks are characterized by two features: (1) they occur relatively 
rarely (the probability of their occurrence is very low) and (2) they have extremely negative 
consequences (they are catastrophic). Such events generally cannot be prevented, but one 
can both try to anticipate them and undertake actions aimed at ameliorating their negative 
consequences. Consequently, the first part of the book is devoted to risk perception issues. 
It includes studies devoted to the following questions which arise when people have to deal 
with probabilities, and small probabilities in particular: How can probabilistic information be 
communicated effectively? What is the impact of emotions on perceptions of, and reactions 
to, probabilistic information? Other relevant issues are also discussed. The second part of the 
book is devoted to protection and insurance against risk. Thus, it includes studies answering 
the following questions: What determines a person’s willingness to take preventive actions in 
areas susceptible to severe flooding? How do people form their own risk estimates?
Research presented in the book extends our knowledge of human behavior in situations 
characterized by large risks and low probabilities, leading to better comprehension of 
the functioning of cognitive and affective processes in perception and decision making in 
situations where uncertainty and risk are accompanied by highly negative consequences.
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This important and unique volume is about the interaction between humans and 
their natural environment. Specifically, it concerns low probability risks with 
major negative consequences and focuses on environmental risks that people can 
control, manage or eliminate. The book is also about how to integrate behavioural 
and natural science perspectives on environmental hazards. Particular attention is 
given to the natural hazard of flooding, exemplified by flooding in Poland, and the 
volume represents an excellent contribution to this field.
The first chapter, by Tyszka and Zielonka who are also the editors of the volume, 
introduces the reader to the problem area and the natural science perspective on 
risk information, estimated and measured by, for example, probabilities, and the 
behavioural perspective describing how this information is interpreted by people. 
The authors also describe problems with linking subjective interpretations of 
information to behaviour, for example, the evacuation of an area when there is a 
risk of flooding.
The second chapter asks the fundamental question as to whether or not 
people are interested in knowing about the probabilities of natural risks and their 
consequences. Do, and can, people use probability information in the appropriate 
way? To illustrate, in an empirical study the authors investigate the effect of the 
presence or absence of a sense of control over a risky outcome and its severity 
(e.g., the possibility or otherwise of ameliorating the consequences of a hazard) on 
people’s interest in knowing about risk probabilities.
The third chapter considers interpretations of probability information, in 
particular small probabilities. When is a small probability of a disaster occurring 
overestimated and when is it underestimated? Based on a review of earlier 
Preface
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
xii Large Risks with Low Probabilities
research in the field, the authors list factors that can influence the interpretation of 
probability information and over- and underestimation. These factors include the 
size of a potential loss, experience, information search and the emotions elicited.
Given the problems with human interpretations of small probabilities, the 
authors of Chapter 4 take the next logical step and investigate how to overcome 
problems in communicating probabilistic information to people. Following a 
literature review, they investigate a new way of presenting small risk probabilities, 
including the use of a combination of graphical and experience-based information 
about small probabilities.
From a natural statistical perspective, natural risks involve both a negative 
event and the probability of that event. When people become aware of a risk 
they perceive it subjectively. This has been called risk perception and involves 
factors that determine the subjective size of a risk, for example, voluntariness 
and the controllability of consequences. The fifth chapter discusses this theme, 
and investigates and extends it in an empirical study comparing, for example, 
psychological reactions (e.g., feelings of affect, such as disgust, fear, and anger) to 
natural environmental risks and risks created by humans.
Even if low probability risk information has been communicated so that people 
understand it correctly, this does not guarantee that they will adopt adequate 
protective behaviours and the authors of Chapter 6 ask what determines willingness 
to take preventive actions in areas prone to flooding. In an empirical field study, they 
start with risk perceptions and link these, the presence of defences (the existence 
of protective levees or otherwise), residents’ prior experience with flooding, and 
social norms, to residents’ actions in mitigating or avoiding the negative effects of 
flooding.
Chapter 7 extends the coverage of actions taken in response to natural hazards, 
examining the buying of insurance to mitigate the negative consequences of a 
risk. In particular, the authors study the importance of cognitive, perceptual and 
emotional factors, such as, probabilities, experience and worry as determinants of 
purchasing insurance against a disaster.
Chapter 8 investigates the influence of social factors (peer decisions) on risk 
protection: the purchasing of insurance when participants have been exposed to, 
and experienced, real risks.
The authors of Chapter 9 study the illusion of safety that is often an obstacle 
to adopting rational protective behaviours. In a field study, they ask a number 
of respondents living close to the river Vistula about things including personal 
background factors such as experience, insurance, and their subjective judgements 
of the probability of a flood and worries. They describe how, for example, 
experience, cognitions, worry, risk perceptions and other factors are interrelated 
and related to protective behaviour.
Finally, Chapter 10 arrives at the crucial issue of education. How can we 
eliminate false feelings of safety, and how can we design and disseminate adequate 
risk information in forecasts and in concurrent messages to the public in the case of 
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a flood? How can we teach the public in advance about how to respond when they 
experience a flood; how can they be taught how to avoid and manage the hazards 
posed by a flood?
In summary, the present volume makes a significant scientific contribution to our 
knowledge about how to improve a society’s resilience against natural hazards in 
general and flooding in particular. It presents results from applied and fundamental 
research of great importance to administrators, policymakers and politicians and 
also to scientists who want to decrease a society’s vulnerability to natural hazards. 
I recommend that they all read this book as soon as possible.
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1.1  WHY STUDY PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS?
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Let us start with some excerpts from ‘Expertise developed for the Parliamentary 
Committee on Environmental Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry’ by 
Eryk Bobiński and Janusz Żelaziński (1997).
… Flooding was caused by heavy rain in the south of the country [Poland] on 3–8 
July. […] A special feature of this atmospheric situation was high intensity rainfall 
of long duration over a great territorial range covering Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Austria and Slovakia.
Flood waves from mountain tributaries reached the [River] Oder. Tanks on the Nysa 
Kłodzka [tributary of the River Odra], which were intended to stop the wave on the 
river so that it reached the Oder after passing its peak, did not accomplish the task. 
[…] In result, [a town] Nysa was submerged, and then, by the overlapping waves, 
Wroclaw.
Negative events such as the flood described above generally cannot be prevented. 
This applies not only to floods but also many other natural hazards such as 
hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. Risks of this type are characterized by two features: 
(a) they occur relatively rarely (the probability of their occurring at a given time is 
low); and (b) their negative consequences are great (they are catastrophic). Indeed, 
in the flood described above, the highest observed water levels in a hundred years 
were exceeded. Some of the causes of the floods were said by the authors of the 
above report to be as follows:
Almost all of the flood control structures and technical equipment – embankments 
and reservoirs on the mountain tributaries of the Oder – failed. Embankments 
were breached in many places throughout the length of the Oder. On some sections 
of the Oder, water simply poured through shafts, including those built in recent 
years. The large reservoirs on the Nysa Kłodzka proved useless, even during the 
first flood. Lowering bandwidth contributed to an increase in the flooded area of  
the city.
Important elements of the former German infrastructure, such as flood polders 
and canal reliefs built in the communist era and following years, were utilized 
incorrectly with respect to their intended purposes. Polders were settled or utilized 
for agricultural purposes. Obstructions occurred in the relief channels. As a result, 
these structures did not fulfil their task.
It can be assumed with high probability that if the structures had been operational 
and in use at the right time the extent of the damage would be smaller. However, 
the flooding of these cities could not have been avoided because the maximum 
flow of the Oder was much greater than that assumed in the planning of these 
structures.
Moreover … in the past 50 years there has been a sharp increase in building and 
investment in areas of increased flood risk.
Evidently, employers, households and local governments in the Oder region, and 
central government, news media, etc., were unaware of the flood risks and lacked 
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knowledge of potential losses, the probability of floods on such an enormous scale, 
and what they could do to limit the threat to life, health and property.
The long-term absence of floods not only led to a diminished fear of the threat, 
but also a belief developed that dikes and reservoirs provided effective protection 
against flooding. According to the authors of the report, some people began to 
consider this state of affairs as a beneficial effect of hydrological investments. 
There was an illusion that ‘we already know how to prevent floods, and thanks to 
this we can put buildings on floodplains’.
As previously mentioned, many natural hazards cannot be prevented. However, 
we can try to anticipate them and take action aimed at reducing their negative 
consequences, and the above report reveals several problems that need to be solved 
before, during and after floods. Three of such problems mentioned in the report are:
… The system of warnings, information and evacuation of affected populations 
turned out to be defective, worked too late, and in the first days of the floods was 
chaotic. A particularly acute problem was lack of communication in the areas 
flooded, because communication was based mainly on a network of landlines …
… Residents of threatened towns and villages generally did not respond to calls for 
evacuation. The reason for this was either a disbelief in the warnings or a fear for 
unattended property left behind. When homes were flooded evacuation was very 
difficult, as it required the use of boats, amphibious craft or helicopters …
… When considering flood protection programmes one should start by establishing 
priorities: whether they are the protection of large cities or something else. Protection 
of agricultural land increases the flood risk of large cities and vice versa. At the same 
time, there is no way to protect everything. After establishing a hierarchy of objectives, 
quasi-optimal solutions limiting losses in other places should be considered.
In order to minimize possible losses for this type of hazard one needs to: (1) 
accurately identify the dangers; and (2) adequately react in the case of disaster. 
Nowadays we are increasingly aware that reduction of flood risk and mitigating 
the effects of floods are not problems which can be solved solely by engineers 
and other experts. The engagement of threatened residents, local government and 
other administrative entities plays a crucial role in these processes. To efficiently 
motivate people to undertake adequate preventive actions, the following issues 
need to be considered:
(1) How to inform people of the possibility of floods and flood damage so that 
they are aware of the risks, including knowledge of the probability of floods 
and the likely scale of their consequences.
(2) How to make people aware that there are actions that can be taken to limit 
the threat to their life, health and property.
Thus, studying risks of this type involves considering the answers to two related 
questions. First, how do people estimate low probabilities? Second, when and why 
are people willing to protect themselves against risks with low probabilities and 
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high stakes? The present book is devoted to answering these questions, examining 
evidence concerning: (1) how laypeople perceive the threat of floods; and (2) how 
they make different types of decisions to protect themselves against risks with low 
probabilities and high stakes.
In our approach, we refer to the multistage Protective Action Decision Model 
(PADM) created by Lindell and Perry (2012). These authors describe several 
phases of the protective action decision-making process, which starts with an 
individual observing environmental and social cues. This leads to the perception 
of a threat. In turn, the perception of a threat associated with the probability of a 
disaster and its consequences motivates people to solve several decision problems 
in order to take protective action. In the book, we focus on the key psychological 
processes described by the PADM, considering people’s behavioural responses 
to environmental disasters in general and flood hazards in particular. Previous 
research devoted to these key psychological processes is reviewed and some of our 
own research devoted to the study of these processes is covered. The book does not 
offer ready-made formulas as to what to do, but presents valuable knowledge that 
can, and must, be used when formulating a plan to manage flood hazards and to 
mitigate the effects of floods.
1.2  ENVIRONMENTAL CUES, SOCIAL CUES, WARNINGS, 
AND PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION SEARCH
Environmental cues, social cues and warnings of environmental disaster are signals 
of threat, arising either from the environment (in the case of flood hazards these are 
meteorological, hydrological, etc.), from observations of others’ behaviour, or from 
messages intentionally transmitted to recipients (communication of information 
being via a variety of different channels). There is much research on the perception 
of environmental and social cues. For example, Kakimoto and Yamada (2014) 
studied factors determining evacuation rates in the Tatsuda area of Japan and 
found that two main determinants of the decision to evacuate were whether or not 
a household independently checked river conditions (an environmental cue) and 
the advice of neighbours in making a decision (a social cue).
Typically, perceptions of the intensity of severe weather conditions act as 
short-term environmental cues signalling flooding. Key environmental factors 
contributing to flooding are rainfall intensity and its duration. Thus, disaster 
education centres alert endangered people to the possibility of a flood in cases 
where it has been raining hard for many hours or raining steadily for several 
days. Rainfall intensity and duration are relatively easily observed by laypeople, 
however, it is more difficult for them to observe long-term environmental factors 
contributing to flooding, such as topography, soil conditions and ground cover. 
Disaster education centres provide such information and training.
Social cues arise from observations of other people’s behaviour. Even when peers 
do not explicitly transmit warning messages, their behaviour can serve as a social 
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Psychological reactions to environmental hazards 5
cue to take protective action. For example, when neighbours are seen packing their 
cars in preparation for evacuation, people in the risk area observing this behaviour 
can be alerted to the need to consider feasible protective actions (Huang et  al. 
2012). MacKay (1841/1932) noted that Londoners imitated the behaviour of their 
neighbours and left the city in panic after a series of minor earth tremors in 1561. 
People are also likely to consider certain actions as a result of reading or hearing 
about the protective behaviour of others.
Social cues are particularly powerful in conditions of high uncertainty, when 
people are unsure of how they should behave; natural disasters are one such 
situation. As noted by Cialdini (2009), in such situations people believe that they 
are less likely to behave inappropriately if they follow the actions of other people 
surrounding them. For instance, friends and neighbours often influence a person’s 
decision as to what to do in the case of evacuations. Other factors positively influencing 
evacuation decisions are membership of a strong social network (Gruntfest, 1997), 
and being responsible for children (Fischer et al. 1995) or people with medical needs 
(Bateman & Edwards, 2002). Finally, people are also made aware of when it is 
appropriate to evacuate by listening to the recommendations of relevant authorities.
Risk communication researchers (e.g., Mileti, 1995; Glik, 2007) have 
enumerated several conditions influencing people’s responses to hazard warnings. 
The first is the reception of a warning signal. Studies show that even when signals 
are highly visible people may not pay attention to them – a phenomenon known as 
inattentional blindness. Simons and Chabris (1999) demonstrated this in a study 
known as the Invisible Gorilla Test. Subjects were asked to watch a short video 
of a basketball game. A group of people were passing a basketball around. Some 
players were wearing black, and others white, T-shirts. The subjects were told to 
count the number of passes made by the white-shirted team. During the action a 
person walked through the scene wearing a gorilla suit. After watching the video 
the subjects were asked if they noticed whether anything strange had taken place. 
In the original experiment, and in most replications, about 50% of the subjects 
did not notice the gorilla. The failure to perceive it is attributed to engagement in 
the difficult task of counting the number of passes of the ball made by the team in 
white shirts. Simons and Chabris concluded that people only perceive objects and 
details that receive their focused attention.
After a signal is received a person must understand it, and there are many 
reasons why people misunderstand information they receive. In 1960, during a 
flood in Lamar, Prowers County the police were attempting to warn people and 
to help them evacuate the area throughout the night. The police chief later noticed 
that inhabitants had not understood the warning signals he had been giving: ‘A lot 
of people told me that they heard the siren on the police cars as they drove down 
the street and they got up to see who they were chasing, paid no attention to the 
water and went back to bed. The next thing they knew they were floating.’
Many potential obstacles can prevent a message from successfully reaching a 
recipient in the form a sender intends. In the above example the sender intended to 
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convey a warning about the approaching flood but the recipients (mis)understood 
that the police were chasing criminals. It may be said that this was a result of poor 
encoding on the part of the message’s sender, which led recipients to decode the 
meaning of the message in a way different from that intended by its sender.
Several authors (e.g., Mileti & Sorenson, 1990) emphasize that the response 
to a signal strongly depends on its perceived credibility. In turn, credibility is 
determined by features such the consistency, accuracy and clarity of a message.
• The consistency of a message determines both its ease of understanding and 
belief in the warning it contains. A message is inconsistent when it contains 
contradictory elements. Worth and McLuckie (1977) give the example of 
an inconsistent message to a flood threatened community which came from 
a sound truck. The recording of the flood warning alert was mixed with 
a previously used standard advertisement for a movie theatre, thus: ‘An 
all-time record flood is going to inundate the city. You must evacuate the 
city immediately. (Pause) The Theatre is presenting two exciting features 
tonight.’
• Even when substantive signals are not contradictory, people may feel 
emotional inconsistency, fluctuating between different psychological states 
such as sadness and happiness (Frijda, 1986). For such reasons, it is difficult 
to treat a flood warning seriously when the weather is good, and hard to start 
to evacuate when your neighbours are still at home. So people may wait to 
evacuate until they see the weather start to deteriorate or their neighbours 
start to evacuate.
• Another determinant of warning credibility is message accuracy: is it correct 
and precise? It is not always easy to avoid errors in the accuracy of warnings. 
Errors are easily made when a situation evolves and information is not 
updated.
• A warning’s clarity is yet another factor underlying its credibility. A message 
is unclear if it can be interpreted or perceived in more than one way. A clear 
message is free of ambiguity and potential for misinterpretation. The 
following case, reported by Lachman et  al. (1961), is highly instructive: 
When a tsunami struck Hilo, Hawaii on May 22–23, 1960, several inhabitants 
reported that they did not interpret the siren warnings before the tsunami 
as warnings to evacuate their homes immediately, rather, they waited for 
further information, including another warning.
When people face a decision problem which needs to be solved they usually 
start by looking for relevant information. Quite often, the immediately available 
information is insufficient and people therefore search for additional information. 
Research shows that in situations of risk and uncertainty people exhibit little 
interest in information about the probabilities of possible outcomes (e.g., Tyszka & 
Zaleśkiewicz, 2006; Huber, 2007). In particular, Huber and his colleagues (Huber 
et al. 1997; Huber et al. 2001; Huber & Huber, 2008; Huber et al. 2011) have performed 
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intensive studies of people’s behaviour in so-called naturalistic decision scenarios, 
where a decision-maker receives a minimal description of a decision task and has 
to ask questions to obtain the additional information that they think is necessary 
to make a decision. Their main finding is that only a minority of individuals are 
interested in the probabilities of the aversive consequences of decision alternatives. 
Instead, they look for information about what Huber terms risk defusing operators 
(RDOs). These are actions which can defuse the possible negative consequences of 
a choice. If, for example, we consider a decision about the location of a technical 
facility such as a power plant, specific positive consequences (e.g., accessibility and 
network connections) and negative consequences (e.g., citizens’ resistance) may 
occur in different locations. Natural disasters involve specific types of risky negative 
consequences that vary vastly in their probability and severity across alternatives, 
ranging from minor incidents to catastrophic hazards. Here, risk defusing measures 
impact both final security levels and project costs. Thus, actions which can defuse 
the possible negative consequences of our choices are often rational behaviours. 
However, biased choices can occur when probability information is not sought out 
and, in consequence, not taken into account.
Huber and his colleagues have concentrated mainly on naturalistic situations 
in which the decision-maker has control over the occurrence of risky events (cf. 
Huber et al. 1997). In Chapter 2 of the present volume we present experimental 
research where we tested the hypothesis that, when dealing with natural hazards 
(where the occurrence of a risky event cannot be influenced), people may pay more 
attention to probabilities. This hypothesis was supported: we found that in such 
cases people tend to acquire more information about probabilities. Moreover, this 
interest increases with the importance of the decision problem.
We speculate that even when people do not ask for probability information it 
may be worthwhile providing it to them. Inhabitants of areas exposed to natural 
disasters (including floods) may use and benefit from information about the 
likelihood of such catastrophic events.
There is anecdotal evidence that likelihood information may actually be 
employed in some catastrophic circumstances. Angelina Jolie Pitt, who lost 
her mother, grandmother and aunt to cancer, has said that she decided to have 
a preventive double mastectomy immediately subsequent to a blood test where 
doctors gave her an estimated 87% risk of developing breast cancer (Angelina Jolie 
Pitt: Diary of a Surgery, New York Times, March 24, 2015).
1.3  PERCEPTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS
1.3.1  The difference between expert and  
lay conceptions of risk
Environmental cues, social cues and warnings direct people’s attention to an 
environmental threat. But how do people perceive risks? Much research effort has 
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been devoted to understanding the factors that determine beliefs about perceived 
risks and vulnerabilities, and to understanding the relationship between perceived 
risks and protective behaviour. Generally, risk is described as a combination of 
the perceived probability and perceived severity of a hazard’s consequences. For 
some hazards (e.g., car accidents, fires, etc.) statistical data are available so that 
we can determine their frequencies and severity. In such cases experts may use 
quantitative measures of the riskiness associated with a given hazard, such as 
expected fatalities.
However, research shows that laypeople’s perceptions of risk are not highly 
correlated with measures of probability and the severity of negative consequences 
(Covello & Johnson, 1987; Slovic, 2000). Evidently, other factors must influence 
people’s understanding of risk. Personal experience, memory and other cognitive 
and emotional factors may influence the way people perceive different risks. In 
practice, individuals and societies seem to select particular risks for attention and 
tend to exaggerate them, while other risks are minimized.
Together with many collaborators, Slovic has studied different risks, asking 
laypeople to assess them on a long list of dimensions. For example, Fischhoff 
et  al. (1978) found people’s judgments of riskiness to be correlated with 
several characteristics, such as novelty versus familiarity, controllability versus 
uncontrollability, catastrophic versus chronic risks, immediate versus delayed effects, 
and several others. Specifically, findings from such research efforts are as follows:
• Novelty: People are more afraid of risks which are novel than risks which 
are old and familiar. Familiarity means that an individual affected by a risk 
knows about the risk and its consequences. People are accustomed to old 
risks. Perceptions of a risk that has been present for a long period become 
attenuated due to habituation, even if the risk remains unchanged.
• Controllability: Risks perceived to be under one’s own control are more 
acceptable than risks perceived to be controlled by others or not controllable 
at all. Floods and other natural hazards cannot be avoided by personal skill 
or diligence, they are uncontrollable, and thus are commonly perceived as 
highly risky.
• Catastrophic risks: People are less sensitive to risks that kill people one at a 
time (chronic risks) than to risks that kill large numbers of people in a single 
episode (catastrophic risks). Floods and other natural hazards often have a 
catastrophic character, and so are perceived as highly risky.
• Immediacy of effects: People are more afraid of the risk of immediate death 
than of death that may occur at some later time. Thus, the risk of putting a 
home in a flood-prone area is not perceived as high as it actually is.
Further analysis of people’s judgements of riskiness leads to the identification 
of two basic qualitative factors in risk perception: ‘unknown risk’ and ‘dread 
risk’ (Slovic, 2000). The former refers, among other things, to a hazard’s 
familiarity/unfamiliarity, observability/lack of observability, and whether it has 
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Psychological reactions to environmental hazards 9
delayed consequences. The latter factor refers among other things to a hazard’s 
controllability, evocation of fear, and effect on future generations. This factor 
seems to be strongly related to the emotions evoked by the hazard.
1.3.2  Risk and emotion
Apart from the above-described dimensions, when personally experiencing, or 
even when reading about, natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, etc., we 
may feel threatened, worried, angry, sad or experience other similar emotions. 
Thus, perceptions of environmental threats are not limited to cognitive reactions. 
Increasingly, research shows that emotions are a particularly important factor 
affecting perceptions of environmental risk.
There is a long line of psychological research showing how emotions influence 
human judgement and decision-making. For example, Forgas (1995) proposed 
the affect infusion model in which emotionally loaded information influences 
cognitive processes, and interferes with a person’s thoughts and may change them. 
According to Forgas, the more complex and unusual a situation is, the stronger the 
affective infusion. In well-known, typical, uncomplicated situations, people are 
more likely to choose decision strategies that are immune to affective infusion.
The role of affect in decision-making was vividly presented by Antonio Damasio 
in his 1994 book ‘Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain’. As 
a neurologist, Damasio observed patients with damage to the ventromedial frontal 
cortex of the brain. Such damage does not impact upon cognitive processes such 
as memory, capacity for logical thought, etc., but it impairs emotions. Damasio 
hypothesized that this type of brain damage may destroy an individual’s ability to 
make rational decisions.
He tested the hypothesis in a decision-making experiment using the Iowa 
Gambling Task. Subjects were asked to select cards from any of four decks. 
Selecting a card resulted in a gain or loss of a certain amount of money. Decks of 
cards differed in terms of the size and frequency of losses and gains they generated. 
Two of the four decks contained higher cash prizes compared to the other two 
decks, but they simultaneously generated very high losses, making use of these 
decks unprofitable and producing an overall loss. The two other decks involved 
relatively lower losses and their use resulted in the task being completed with a 
positive balance. Thus, the first two decks were relatively unsafe and harmful in the 
long run, while the two other decks were relatively safe and beneficial in the long 
run. Damasio found that normal subjects learned to avoid the harmful decks, but 
people with frontal lobe damage did not, and lost a great deal of money. Damasio 
concluded that the brain’s emotional systems not only influence risk perception, 
but also that their malfunctioning may lead to deterioration in decision-making.
Major societal events such as natural disasters may strongly influence people’s 
feelings. In the face of such events, people tend to react emotionally, making 
emotion-laden decisions (Lerner et al. 2003), and also express generalized anxiety 
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and depression (Lau et al. 2006). Indeed, after the 2004 tsunami disaster which 
affected parts of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand. Västfjäll et al. (2008) 
tested how the affect elicited by thinking about this disaster influenced risk 
perceptions and future time perspectives in Swedish people not directly affected 
by the disaster. It was found that participants reminded about the tsunami (they 
were asked to write down the first three images that came to mind when hearing 
the word ‘tsunami’) considered their life as more finite and saw fewer opportunities 
than participants in a control condition who were not reminded about the tsunami. 
Moreover, participants reminded of the tsunami reported more pessimistic risk 
estimates than participants in the control condition.
In addition to the above, Slovic et  al. (2007) have shown that positive or 
negative affective feelings can provide powerful guidance to human judgement and 
decision-making. People may use their affective reactions to a target to evaluate 
it, and affect may serve as a cue for judgements. For example, if someone sees a 
house which has been abandoned during a natural disaster ransacked by looters, 
the very term ‘evacuation’ may have negative connotations for many years to come. 
Slovic et al. termed the phenomenon whereby people make a judgement based only 
on emotions the affect heuristic, and this heuristic makes it possible to perceive a 
thing as good or bad quickly without further consideration.
In Chapter 5 of the present volume we report research on the different emotions 
which accompany risky events. In particular, it is shown that human judgement 
and decision-making is strongly influenced by affective feelings when risks or 
potential damage are attributable to humans. When human action is seen as the 
cause of harm, a situation is perceived as more dangerous, damage is considered 
to be more severe, and higher compensation is recommended for victims. Other 
research shows that human-made risks are seen as less acceptable than naturally 
occurring risks. People seem to believe that damage caused by humans can be 
avoided by more cautious behaviour or by having better knowledge. Moreover, 
emotional responses to human-made hazards are generally stronger than those 
evoked by natural hazards.
As we will see, negative feelings such as fear and worry are not only associated 
with risk perceptions but also with risky decision-making. Two chapters in the 
present volume report research on how negative feelings influence self-protective 
behaviour (Tyszka & Konieczny, 2016) and purchasing insurance (see Chapter 7).
1.3.3  Problems with the perception of probabilities
A significant body of research over the last several decades has demonstrated 
numerous problems with people’s perceptions of probabilities, which are an 
important component of risk evaluations.
Numerous studies (see, e.g., Tyszka & Sawicki, 2011) have demonstrated 
that most people, even educated people, cannot comprehend and/or properly 
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understand information about numerical values of probabilities. For example, 
when Yamagishi (1997) asked respondents to evaluate the risk of death due to 
different causes he found that judgements of the degree of riskiness were affected 
by the number of deaths, rather than by the proportion of fatal cases, caused by 
a given disease. People perceived the risk as higher when the proportion of fatal 
cases was given as 1286 out of 10,000 infected cases than when it was given as 
12.86 out of 100.
Another problem is that people are insensitive to changes in the magnitude 
of probabilities. Perception of probabilities, and of differences in probabilities, 
depends on the way information about probabilities is transmitted. The most 
serious limitation is people’s insensitivity to changes in the magnitude of small 
probabilities. Kunreuther et  al. (2001) tried to overcome this insensitivity by 
comparing various ways to improve sensitivity to very low probabilities. They 
claimed that the best way of communicating probabilities to laypeople is to make 
scenarios which allow comparisons to be available, which allows people to judge 
differences between probabilities.
As previously mentioned, a characteristic feature of natural hazards such 
as floods is that they occur relatively rarely and therefore their probability of 
occurrence at any given time is very low. People have problems in understanding 
and reacting to such low probabilities. As shown by Kunreuther et  al. (2001) 
and many others (e.g., Lave & Lave, 1991), people either overestimate or, to the 
contrary, ignore very low probabilities. One example of ignoring low probabilities 
is the Oder flood disaster described in Section 1, where water levels reached a 
level not seen in over one hundred years. Lack of recent personal experience of 
negative events seems to be one of the most critical factors responsible for people 
ignoring ‘unlikely threats’. On the other hand, the recent occurrence of an event 
increases the subjective likelihood that the same event will be repeated in the 
near future. This makes people particularly vulnerable to specific (emotionally 
loaded) threats of future events associated with recently occurring events. For 
example, although millions of birds have been infected with the avian influenza 
virus since its discovery in 1878, only a few hundred people have died from it 
according to the World Health Organization (August 10, 2012). Nevertheless, in 
periods after a few people have died from avian influenza, millions of people 
panic and behave as though the probability of becoming infected is very high (this 
is mainly due to the enormous media interest). The same effect can be observed 
for natural disasters: immediately after a flood people often overestimate the 
likelihood of the next one.
Chapters 3 and 4 of the book are devoted to studies of people’s reactions to small 
probabilities. Chapter 3 focuses on situations when people tend to underestimate 
(or completely ignore) and overestimate small probabilities. In particular, 
Hertwig et  al. (2004) introduced an important distinction between decisions 
from descriptions and decisions from experience. In decisions from descriptions, 
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people are explicitly provided with probability distributions of potential outcomes, 
while in decisions from experience people must learn these distributions through 
sampling. Hertwig et al. (2004) and others (e.g., Fox & Hadar, 2006) have shown 
that decisions from experience and decisions from description can lead to different 
probability assessments of rare events. In decisions from descriptions people tend to 
overestimate small probabilities, but in decisions from experience decision-makers 
typically underestimate the probability of rare events. The chapter reviews further 
research showing several reasons why people may underestimate (or completely 
ignore) and overestimate small probabilities.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the issue of how probabilistic information should be 
communicated effectively to laypeople. The problem is that laypeople are not 
familiar with the very concept of probability. Different formats have been used, 
including numbers (e.g., frequencies and percentages), pictures (e.g., pie charts, 
pictograms and graphs) and verbal descriptions. The authors, however, propose a 
new format where probability information is presented in the form of a sequential 
display of frequencies. A sequence of pictures is displayed where people can 
observe how often a particular type of event has occurred in a given time period or 
space. The chapter reports two experiments showing that such a format can be very 
useful in communicating probabilities of very rare hazards such as floods.
1.4  DECISION-MAKING
Before, during, and after a flood there are numerous decision problems to be solved 
by individuals, households, and local and central governments. The focus of this 
volume is on the flood-related decision-making of households and individuals. 
Four types of decisions are prototypical:
(1) An individual may consider whether to remain in, or relocate to, a floodplain. 
In contemplating the choice between the localization of one’s new house or 
business on a floodplain versus a completely safe place, one may compare 
the pros and cons of both alternatives. Choosing the floodplain may have 
advantages (e.g., lower price, an attractive landscape), but also may have 
disadvantages (e.g., possible damage to health and/or property).
(2) Then, one may be concerned with the question of whether to purchase 
flood insurance. Purchasing flood insurance provides peace of mind and 
in the event of a flood allows the recovery of some losses, but, on the other 
hand, it requires payment of insurance premiums, which are an unwelcome 
expense (especially when a flood does not occur).
(3) One may also need to answer the question ‘do I need to take protective 
action?’ Several protective actions (e.g., the construction or improvement 
of a levee), and their costs and benefits may be considered.
(4) During a flood one may be warned to evacuate from a dangerous place, 
the choice being to comply with the warning, not comply with the warning 
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at all, or postpone evacuation. The possibility of losing one’s life if one 
does not comply with the warning will be a consideration, along with the 
possibility of losing property (due to looting) if one does comply with the 
warning, and many more probable consequences may also be considered.
Of course, there is a large variety of complex decision problems to be considered 
before, during, and after a flood: often an individual faces not just one decision 
problem but a series of decisions. For example, when the question ‘do I need to take 
protective action?’ is answered positively, one is motivated to engage in a search 
for protective actions, and after establishing that at least one protective action is 
available one has to search for the most satisfactory method of protection.
When an individual receives a signal concerning an environmental threat the 
first natural question is: ‘Is there really a threat that I need to pay attention to?’ 
Research shows that the answer to this question is quite often negative. People try 
to avoid facing undesirable realities and therefore tend to see positive outcomes as 
being more likely than negative outcomes. Thus, in the context of natural hazards, 
people may try to view the environment as safe, even in the face of evidence to the 
contrary. Such a tendency is known as unrealistic optimism (overestimating the 
likelihood of positive events and underestimating the likelihood of negative events). 
This is a well-documented psychological phenomenon. People are optimistic in 
assessing whether they will be the victim of a disaster (Camerer & Kunreuther, 
1989). Even when they reside in a flood-prone area, they tend to believe that they 
will not be the victim of a flood (Krasovskaia et al. 2001). Unrealistic optimism 
may be just one reason why people are under-prepared for hazards and why the 
take-up rate of insurance is generally observed to be too low (Dixon et al. 2006); it 
is low even when it is highly subsidized in order to encourage take-up. Houses are 
built on floodplains even when the probability of serious flooding is quite high, and 
people refuse to evacuate, even when there is a risk to life.
Of course, unrealistic optimism is not the only reason why people fail to take 
mitigating measures against flooding. When one decides to buy insurance or take 
mitigating measures one experiences definite and immediate costs. On the other 
hand, the potential benefits – the reduction of losses in the event of a disaster – 
are both uncertain and delayed. As is known from prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, 1992) and from numerous studies (e.g., Wu & Gonzales, 1996; 
Abdellaoui, 2000), people are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking 
in the domain of losses. Thus, they may tolerate even huge potential losses if these 
are not certain. Moreover, the reluctance to worry about potential losses from 
floods or other natural hazards may be affected not only by the fact that they are 
uncertain, but also by the fact that they are delayed. As shown by much research on 
delayed gains and losses, people care strongly about immediate payoffs and much 
less about delayed payoffs (Kunreuther et al. 2013). When offered a choice between 
two positive payoffs, people prefer a smaller immediate gain to a larger later gain. 
Conversely, when offered a choice between two negative payoffs, people usually 
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prefer a larger later loss to a smaller immediate loss. The tendency to prefer the 
present makes people rather reluctant to care about future losses. In combination, 
uncertainty and the delaying of potential losses may result in the perception that 
a threat is not worth considering. People are often myopic and take into account 
only the short-term and certain consequences of their actions (Kunreuther, 2006).
Finally, let us mention yet another possible reason why people ignore potential 
losses. Agencies responsible for risk management make various efforts to protect 
the public against hazards. Such activity may lead to the so-called safety illusion, 
that is, to a diminution of people’s concerns about residual risks. For example, 
owners of properties behind levees may ignore the residual risks. Some researchers 
(e.g., Wilde, 1982) claim that people have a level of risk with which they feel 
comfortable, and they tend to adjust the riskiness of their behaviour to this level. 
For example, people tend to drive faster when they have airbags and other newly 
introduced safety measures. In such situations people behave less cautiously and 
risks return to their previous level. This is referred to as the risk homeostasis theory. 
The safety illusion phenomenon is discussed in Chapter 9 where a relevant field 
study is presented. Subsequently, Chapter 10 raises the issue of how to make people 
aware that dikes and other flood protection measures are never 100% effective: 
they are never sufficient to counter extremely rare events.
1.4.1  Determinants of protective actions and 
insurance decisions
1.4.1.1  Threat perception: the probability and  
severity of consequences
It is tempting to use the decision theory approach in describing human flood risk-
related decision-making. This approach assumes that a decision-maker considers a 
range of possible outcomes for each alternative course of action and the likelihood 
associated with each outcome. Thus, when an individual is considering whether to 
purchase flood insurance, on the one hand, they should take into account both the 
magnitude and the probability of potential losses in the event of a flood, and, on the 
other hand, they should consider the insurance premium. When one is making a 
decision about evacuation, one should identify the possible harms to one’s life that 
may occur by remaining at home, how probable theses harms are, etc.
To illustrate the main idea of this approach, imagine that you have a choice 
between buying a more expensive house located in a safe place or a cheaper house 
on a floodplain. According to decision theory, when the decision-maker is risk 
neutral they may use the criterion of maximizing expected value. The expected 
value is the overall value of a risky option as given by multiplying the value of 
each of its outcomes by the probabilities associated with each outcome and then 
summing these products. Let us assume that the price of a house located on the 
floodplain is $100,000 as compared with the $120,000 price of a house in the safe 
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Psychological reactions to environmental hazards 15
location. The probability of a serious flood in one’s life-time equals 20% (according 
to insurance experts). In such a situation paying the extra $20,000 for the safe 
location of the house is equal to the expected value of a lottery in which one can 
lose $100,000 with a 20% probability. The expected value of a loss is the same: 
$20,000 (0.20 × $100,000). According to this analysis, if the price of the house on 
the floodplain is greater than $100,000 it will not be profitable to buy it.
Modern decision theory suggests that a decision-maker can be risk averse and 
prefer a certain to an uncertain outcome even when the expected value of the risky 
alternative is greater than that of the certain alternative. The theory assumes that 
people actually maximize expected utility rather than expected value by including 
attitude towards risk. The most popular theory of decision-making under risk is 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. According to this theory, the 
overall value of a risky option is given by the sum of the subjective values of 
outcomes multiplied by the decision weights associated with the probabilities of 
the outcomes.
Irrespective of the specific model involved, the decision theory approach 
assumes that the probabilities and severities of consequences are prime 
determinants of attitudes towards precautionary behaviours. In a study presented 
in Chapter 6 of this volume Tyszka and Konieczny compared both perceptions of 
flood threat and self-protective behaviour between residents of two types of region: 
one being protected by flood levees and the other being unprotected. Differences 
in perceptions of flood threat and self-protective behaviour were found between 
these regions. Surprisingly though, there was no support for the hypothesis that 
perceived probability of damage and perceived magnitude of damage caused by 
floods influence willingness to take protective actions. Thus, despite the common 
presumption and some empirical findings (see Lindell & Perry, 2012) that 
perceptions of risk are an important factor influencing the taking of protective 
actions, this idea is not supported by Tyszka and Konieczny’s research. The 
finding that residents’ flood risk perceptions were not related to the number of 
protective actions taken is not exceptional: Horney et al. (2010) failed to find a 
correlation between residents’ risk perceptions and evacuation from the path of 
Hurricane Isabel in North Carolina in 2003. So the expectation that perceptions of 
high risk of property damage or injury are a sufficient condition for precautionary 
decisions is not justified. This supports Camerer and Kunreuther’s (1989) claim 
that economic decision theory does not provide an adequate account of insurance-
related behaviour and leaves room for education and intervention by policymakers 
and relevant authorities.
One problem with the decision theory approach is that even when an individual 
analyses the consequences and probabilities of alternative actions, and forms 
the intention to take protective action, impediments may exist to implementing 
these intentions. The implementation of our intentions is conditioned upon several 
situational facilitators and/or impediments in the physical and social environment. 
A person can decide that they should evacuate, but the lack of a safe place or safe 
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route can impede the implementation of such action. Also, a person may decide 
to purchase insurance but lack the financial means to follow through on their 
intention, etc.
Research shows that many different factors influence people’s decisions to take 
protective actions and purchase flood insurance. Some of these involve individual 
differences. For example, Schade et al. (2012) found that tendency to worry (measured 
as a personality variable) influenced willingness to pay for protective measures. 
Also, Michailova and Tyszka (2016) found that individual rates of discounting were a 
negative predictor of people’s decisions to insure themselves against flooding, that is, 
the more impatient a person was, the less inclined they were to buy flood insurance. 
At the same time, they found that risk aversion in the domain of losses was a positive 
predictor of the decision to acquire flood insurance, that is, the more risk averse a 
person was, the more inclined they were to buy flood insurance.
The above said, personality traits are not the only determinants of willingness 
to pay for protective measures; various situational factors can also be crucial. Two 
of the most commonly cited situational factors are personal experience and peer 
influence (social norms). The second part of the book reports studies focused mainly 
on these two factors, addressing both the issue of how they influence a person’s 
willingness to take preventive actions in areas susceptible to severe flooding, and 
how they influence the purchasing of insurance against flooding.
1.4.1.2  Personal experience
Several research efforts show that one of the most crucial factors determining both 
threat perceptions and preventive decisions is previous personal experience of a 
disaster (see Weinstein, 1989; for a review). This research shows that experience 
of flood damage leads to greater fear, higher subjective probabilities of future 
disaster, more frequent purchasing of insurance, and to higher willingness to take 
preventive actions. However, it is not completely clear why personal experience 
is so important. Different mechanisms for the above effects can be considered. 
For example, Zaalberg et  al. (2009) showed that the relationship between self-
protective behaviour and personal experience may be mediated by beliefs about the 
effectiveness of protective measures. Why would one adopt a protective measure 
that one considers to be inefficient?
Perhaps the most powerful mechanism determining whether personal 
experience has an influence on mitigating behaviour is negative affect. Siegrist 
and Gutscher (2008) compared people who were affected by a severe flood disaster 
with people who were not affected but who also lived in flood-prone areas. They 
found that people who had not experienced flooding underestimated the negative 
affect associated with flooding. This finding was tested further in an experiment 
by Sobków et al. reported in Chapter 7 of this book. The authors confirmed two 
hypotheses in laboratory experiments. First, personal experience of a disaster 
increased the amount people paid to insure themselves against a natural hazard. 
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Second, emotional feelings of worry, rather than cognitive evaluations of subjective 
probabilities, mediated the relationship between personal experience of disaster 
and the amount paid to buy insurance. Thus, increases in the amount people are 
prepared to pay to buy insurance, and taking preventive actions in general, seem 
to be affected by personal experience via anticipation of the negative emotional 
consequences of natural disasters.
Despite the above, we agree with the conclusion of the PADM’s originators that, 
despite extensive theorizing and data collection, the factors that motivate people to 
take protective action are still not entirely clear. After all, some people do not take 
any mitigating measures even after experiencing severe floods.
1.4.1.3  Social norms
There are many studies of the impact of social norms on human behaviour during 
life-threatening situations. One such study is that of Susan Cutter and Kent Barnes 
(1982). On March 28, 1979 on Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania there was a 
nuclear power plant accident: a partial meltdown of one of the two reactors. Cutter 
and Barnes studied people’s propensity to voluntarily evacuate after the accident. 
In addition to such obvious motivators as obtaining appropriate information and 
being close to the site of the incident, the decisions of neighbours, relatives and 
friends were identified as an important factor in evacuation decisions.
In Chapter 6, Tyszka and Konieczny report research identifying social norms 
as the most important factor determining willingness to take preventive actions 
against floods. Here, people positively answering the question ‘do your neighbours 
undertake any preventive actions against the consequences of floods’ tended to 
take preventive actions themselves.
Additionally, Krawczyk et al. report an experiment in Chapter 8 where they 
studied peer effects in insurance take-up choices. Here, the authors analyse and 
discuss various possible mechanisms of peer influence. They confirm that not only 
observing one’s own losses, but also observing others’ losses, may affect decisions 
to purchase insurance. However, observing another person’s loss has a weaker 
influence upon behaviour than experiencing a loss oneself. It may be said that a 
decision-maker puts too little weight on relevant information emanating from other 
people. In their experiment the authors did not find support for another possible 
peer effect in that people were not directly affected by others in their decisions to 
buy insurance. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there are many observations of 
the working of such a mechanism across many situations.
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Chapter 2
Are people interested in 
probabilities of natural 
disasters?
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Analysis of the decision-making of individuals facing risk or uncertainty is one of 
the core research issues in the domain of decision theory. Since Blaise Pascal, all 
decision theorists assume that, when faced with a number of possible actions, two 
things are important for a decision-maker (DM): the utilities of possible outcomes 
and their probabilities (Lowenstein et al. 2001). However, several empirical studies 
show that people generally have problems in understanding and using probabilistic 
information (Tyszka & Sawicki, 2011), and when facing risky decisions they are 
often not interested in receiving information about probabilities (Huber et al. 1997; 
Huber et al. 2001; Lion et al. 2002; Tyszka & Zaleskiewicz, 2006; Amelung & 
Funke, 2015).
In particular this is the finding from the studies of naturalistic decision-making 
that apply active information search (AIS) as a method of information seeking 
and decision process tracing. This method, originally proposed by Engländer and 
Tyszka (1980) and further developed by Huber and colleagues (Huber, 1997; Huber 
et al. 1997), relies on the following procedure: a DM gets a minimal description of 
the decision task, presented in the form of a pseudo-realistic scenario, and has to 
ask questions to obtain the additional information that they think is necessary to 
make a decision. The main purpose of this method is to analyze real-life decision 
problems as opposed to artificial choices among gambles – a traditional method of 
testing decision theory where a DM receives complete information consisting of 
the outcomes of each gamble and their probabilities. The most pervasive finding 
of Huber and colleagues is that for pseudo-naturalistic scenarios only a minority 
of individuals are interested in probabilities. Instead, they look for risk defusing 
operators (RDOs), which are actions planned in addition to a choice alternative in 
order to defuse possible negative consequences (Huber et al. 1997; Huber et al. 
2001; Huber & Huber, 2008; Huber et al. 2011). The existence of RDOs changes 
the perceived riskiness of available options, which in turn influences the final 
decision (Amelung & Funke, 2015).
Huber (1997) attributes differences between lottery-type tasks and naturalistic 
decision-making to differences in the controllability of the occurrence of the risky events 
at issue. While in gambles the outcomes are completely beyond the DM’s control, in 
many naturalistic situations the DM either has (at least partial) control or believes they 
have control over the situation. Such control permits precautions to be taken against 
the occurrence of negative consequences (thus reducing their probability), and/or the 
making of a plan of action to deal with any negative consequences. For example, in the 
‘machine task’ subjects planned to perform good machine maintenance to decrease 
the probability of machine breakage (Huber et al. 1997).
In their research, Huber and colleagues have mainly concentrated on naturalistic 
situations in which the DM possesses control over the occurrence of risky events 
(Huber, 1997; Huber et al. 1997). However, there are naturalistic situations in which 
a DM cannot influence the occurrence of a risky event. This is particularly true for 
natural disasters, which are the focus of this paper. Natural disasters constitute 
large-scale risks that are beyond human control and cause great damage or loss to 
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physical capital (e.g., housing or productive capacity), and/or human capital (e.g., 
lives or physical health). Risks of this type are characterized by two features: (a) 
they occur relatively rarely, that is their probability is rather low, and (b) they have 
highly negative consequences (they are catastrophic). Although natural disasters 
cannot be prevented, one can still try: (1) to anticipate them, and (2) to undertake 
actions aimed at reducing their negative consequences. We tested the hypothesis 
that pseudo-realistic scenarios which dealt with natural hazards would evoke 
higher interest in probabilities among our participants in comparison to naturalistic 
situations in which DMs had control over the occurrence of a negative event (as 
researched by Huber and colleagues).
Our second aim was to discover which other factors apart from controllability 
might have an impact on subjects’ interest in probabilities and RDOs. We thought 
that one such factor might be the importance or significance of a particular decision 
to the DM. We chose two operationalizations of a decision’s significance: (1) the 
possible consequences of a natural disaster, namely loss of life versus loss of physical 
capital, and (2) whether the decision was being taken for oneself or for others. We 
believed that when a decision is more important for a DM it is natural that they will 
be more interested in it, and will generally tend to collect more information about 
the decision situation, including information about probabilities and information 
on possible ways of diffusing risks. The rationale for this hypothesis is reasonably 
straightforward when the importance of a decision problem is operationalized 
in terms of a natural disaster’s consequences: a life-threatening situation should 
be considered as more important than a capital-threatening situation. Thus, in 
comparison to the latter case, we expected subjects to collect more information 
about the decision situation in general and also more information on probabilities 
and RDOs in the former case.
The rationale for the hypothesis concerning how much information is collected 
when a DM is making a decision impacting on themselves in comparison to making 
a decision impacting on others is even more straightforward: it is natural to assume 
that the DM should consider the former types of decision as more important than 
the latter. This suggests that, relative to decisions affecting others, in decisions 
involving the self the DM should collect more information in general about the 
decision situation, including information about probabilities and information on 
RDOs. At the same time, Stone and Allgaier’s (2008) social values theory suggests 
that, when taking decisions involving others, people mainly act in accordance with 
the social value placed on the risk involved in a specific situation. Specifically, 
in situations concerning individual physical safety, social value is placed on risk 
avoidance. Thus, in such situations, instead of considering all factors, the DM 
simply ‘follows a norm to make the socially-sanctioned decision for the other 
person’ (Stone et al. 2013; p. 251). In contrast, when deciding for oneself, a host 
of factors are considered and all the pros and cons of each specific decision are 
weighed. In line with this, Stone et al. (2013) report that, in situations involving 
potentially serious physical harm, decisions taken for the self are more risky than 
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decisions taken for others. Thus, we assumed that when taking decisions involving 
others a DM should consider fewer factors and therefore ask fewer questions than 
when taking decisions involving themselves. So, instead of thoroughly analyzing a 
situation, the DM should almost immediately reject the risky option and therefore 
omit looking for information about different aspects of the situation, including 
probabilities and RDOs. Social values theory reinforces our hypothesis that the 
DM should be interested in collecting more information in general, as well as 
more information on RDOs and probabilities, when taking decisions involving 
themselves than when taking decisions involving others.
Finally, the present research addressed the relationship between risk aversion 
and information search in the context of negative events’ probabilities. By 
definition, people who are more risk-averse are generally more interested 
in avoiding risky situations, or, when this is not possible, in reducing the risk 
inherent in situations. Thus, they should be more interested both in knowing the 
probability of a negative event and in knowing information about possible RDOs. 
Therefore, we tested the hypothesis that the more risk-averse a person is, the more 
they should be interested in the probabilities of negative events and in RDOs. To 
the best of our knowledge this is the first study investigating the relationship 
between individual risk attitudes and information search in the domain of 
probabilities concerning negative events.
2.2  METHOD
2.2.1  Subjects
In total, 116 students and non-students of different professions took part in the 
study. Of these, 68 were females and 48 were males, with a mean age of 25.72 years 
(SD = 4.36). Participants were recruited using the Online Recruitment System for 
Economic Experiments (ORSEE) (Greiner, 2015). None of them had previously 
taken part in a similar experiment. For their participation subjects could receive up 
to 58.5 PLN (13.81 EUR): 20 PLN (4.72 EUR) in the main task and maximally 38.5 
PLN (9.08 EUR) in the risk aversion measurement task. Although no time limit 
was imposed, participants needed 30 minutes at most to complete all experimental 
tasks.
2.2.2  Decision scenarios
Experimental manipulation used four quasi-realistic scenarios with a mudslide as our 
choice of natural disaster. At the end of all four scenarios, subjects were presented 
with two choice alternatives: a non-risky alternative with certain positive and negative 
consequences and a risky alternative. The scenarios are described below:
You live in a spacious house with a garden. You simply love your house. 
However, the house is located on a hillside where, in the past, mudslides 
occurred. Recently, rainfall increased and the occurrence of mudslides grew. 
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With concerns about residents’ safety, local authorities offer people living in the 
affected area relocation. In return, they offer those homeowners who agree to 
relocate another house free of charge in a new neighborhood; yet this house is a 
little less attractive. So you have a choice: either to stay in your old house, or to 
move to the new house.
The scenarios differed in two aspects. First, they differed in the type of possible 
damage: whether they put life or capital in danger. In the ‘life-threatening’ 
scenarios, subjects were informed that mudslides had previously killed several 
people, and by deciding to stay in their old house they exposed themselves to the 
danger of also being killed by a mudslide. In the ‘capital-threatening’ scenarios, 
subjects were informed that although mudslides occur at a speed enabling 
evacuation of people, they completely destroy affected houses. Thus, in this case a 
person risks losing all of their material possessions, but not their life. The second 
aspect concerned the object of the decision, namely whether the decision was 
being taken for the subject themselves or for others. As the name suggests, in the 
case of the ‘self’ manipulation a participant took a decision for themselves. In the 
case of the ‘others’ manipulation a subject took the role of a charity organization 
representative who had to advise an old couple as to the decision they should 
take in the situation described in the scenario. Detailed descriptions of the four 
scenarios are in Appendix A.
A ‘Virus infection’ scenario from Bär and Huber (2008) was used as a warm-up 
exercise. In this scenario, a subject took the role of a vacationer in an unknown 
country who was infected with a dangerous virus and who had to decide about 
their treatment (see Appendix B for a description of the warm-up task).
2.2.3  Experimental procedure
To analyze the information search process, we used the AIS paradigm which 
involves a subject receiving a minimal description of a decision task presented 
in the form of a scenario and then having to acquire additional information from 
the experimenter. In order to be able to answer most of our subjects’ questions we 
ran several pre-experimental sessions with large groups of subjects in which we 
collected an extensive (but not exhaustive) list of possible questions. Standardized 
answers for these questions were prepared.
Each subject was interviewed individually in the experiment. They started 
with the warm-up exercise and then were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental scenarios. After reading both the warm-up and the experimental 
scenario an individual could ask the experimenter questions. The experimenter read 
an answer from the previously prepared list of standardized answers. All interviews 
were tape-recorded. Once the interview was completed subjects performed Holt 
and Laury’s (2002) lottery-task (with stakes 10 times greater than in the original 
Holt and Laury experiment). In this task subjects make 10 choices between 2 
lotteries: a ‘safe’ lottery (A) and a ‘risky’ lottery (B) – see Appendix C. The switching 
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point between lottery A and lottery B was used as our first operationalization of 
subjects’ individual risk attitudes.
One of the main disadvantages of complex methods of eliciting risk preferences 
such as the Holt and Laury lottery-task is that, depending on the population, a 
significant number of subjects often fail to understand the procedure (Charness 
et al. 2013). Thus, we used an additional operationalization of risk attitude: as part 
of a post-experimental questionnaire, subjects were asked to assess their general 
desire to take risks on a scale from zero to 10 (see Appendix D). A debriefing 
procedure and payment followed.
2.3  RESULTS
2.3.1  Data classification
First, we created eight categories for questions’ classification: six of them were 
taken from the previous work of Huber et al. (2011); two were our own categories. 
All categories are defined in Table 2.1.
To test the reliability of the coding of questions, 100 randomly chosen questions 
were categorized independently by three raters. There was 94% agreement between 
the three raters.
2.3.2  Hypothesis testing
In total, the 116 participants generated 772 questions (M = 6.66 per participant). 
Almost 40% of questions were in the ‘consequences’ category, the least number of 
questions (1.9%) were in the ‘new alternative’ category. The distribution of the total 
number of questions per category can be seen in Figure 2.1.
Formal tests of the hypotheses concerning the information search process based 
on scenario type and subjects’ risk aversion are now presented.
2.3.2.1  Controllable versus uncontrollable scenarios
We start by comparing our results to those of Huber and colleagues (henceforth 
called Huber’s experiments). We hypothesized that in our experiment significantly 
more questions would be asked about, or more subjects would be interested in, 
the probability category than in Huber’s experiments. (Values are taken from 
different publications of Huber and colleagues; not every publication reported both 
variables of current interest.) Since we found no significant differences between the 
information search patterns for ‘the self’ and ‘others’ scenarios, we analyzed these 
two groups jointly (for more details refer to the Importance of decision section). 
Table 2.2 presents the average number of questions per participant (M) which fell into 
the probability category in our experiment and in several of Huber’s experiments, 
sample sizes are also given. Average values are reported separately for the ‘life’ and 
‘house’ experimental scenarios along with average values over all scenarios (Total).
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Figure 2.1  Distribution of questions per category.
The values in Table 2.2 show that, on average, participants in our experiment asked 
more questions concerning probabilities than in Huber’s experiments. When Huber 
and colleagues used the classic AIS method, that is, the standard AIS experimental 
procedure without any additional manipulations, they always received fewer 
questions about probabilities than in our experiment. The closest of Huber’s results 
to ours are those of Huber et al. (2009) where: (1) the problem in the experiment 
was more serious in comparison to other experiments by Huber’s team (here, a 
subject had to decide for their partner, who was in a life-threatening condition, 
which of two available medicines they should be treated with. Both medicines had 
severe side effects. See Huber et al. (2009) for a detailed description.); (2) a serious 
decision was to be taken for another person; (3) a critical situation had occurred, so 
the control factor was missing as in our study, and (4) an additional ‘justification of 
choice’ manipulation was introduced – namely, after choosing one of two decision 
options, a subject had to explain and justify their decision.
Table 2.2  Average number of questions in the probability category per 
experiment.
Scenarios/Paper M CI95 N Notes
Life scenarios 1.05 [0.74, 1.36] 58 –
House scenarios 0.80 [0.45, 1.14] 58 –
Total 0.92 [0.69, 1.15] 116 –
Huber (2007) 0.55 – 42 Classic AIS
Huber et al. (2009) 0.60 – 30 Classic AIS
Huber et al. (2009) 0.73 – 30 Justification of choice 
manipulation
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Next we compared the number of participants asking at least one question in 
the probability category in our experiment and in Huber’s experiments. Table 2.3 
presents percentages of subjects asking at least one probability question for the 
life and house scenarios separately and an average value over all scenarios (Total). 
Sample sizes are also given. The table also includes one-sided probability values 
for Pearson Chi-squared tests comparing the total number of people asking at 
least one probability question in each of Huber’s experiments and our experiment. 
These values show that significantly more subjects asked at least one probability 
question in our experiment compared to classic AIS studies. As previously, the 
most interesting case is the experiment of Huber et al. (2009) which used a serious 
experimental problem that had to be solved for another person and where outcomes 
were beyond participants’ control. A comparison of our results with those of a 
condition in this study that did not include any additional manipulation revealed 
that in our experiment significantly more people asked at least one question about 
probabilities in life scenarios, but not in house scenarios; however introduction of 
the justification of choice manipulation changed the situation, significantly more 
subjects in Huber’s experiment showing interest in probabilities than with all our 
treatments.
Individual effect sizes (odds ratios) for classic AIS studies (see Table 2.2) also 
suggest that the odds of asking at least one probability question were consistently 
and significantly higher in our experiment than in Huber’s experiments. Since 
samples from Huber experiments were rather small, we aggregated evidence from 
individual studies into a summary (mean) effect (Table 2.2, Total). The magnitude 
of this estimated summary effect confirms that, in comparison with Huber’s three 
experiments, the odds of asking probability questions in our experiment were 2.55 
(1.71, inf) times higher, and ranged from 1.73 (1.11, inf) times higher in house 
scenarios to 3.72 (2.40, inf) times higher in life scenarios.
We conclude that our first hypothesis is supported since when; (1) occurrence of 
a negative event is beyond participants’ control, and (2) no additional manipulations 
are introduced, participants do demonstrate more interest in the probability 
category.
2.3.2.2  Importance of decision
We then tested the hypothesis concerning differences in information search 
patterns according to decisions’ importance. Starting with the self versus others 
operationalization of decision importance, there was neither a significant difference 
between experimental scenarios in the total amount of questions asked, nor in the 
number of questions in the specific RDO and probability categories. Also, there 
was no difference between scenarios in the number of participants who asked at 
least one probability question (see Appendix E). Therefore there was no support 
for the hypothesis that information search would be greater for more important 
self-decisions.
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
30 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
Table 2.3  Subjects asking at least one question in the probability category.
Scenario/
Paper
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Note: aIn estimating the summary effect size we faced the problem that only a small number of studies 
were included in the analysis. In such cases, Borenstein et al. (2009) suggest estimating a fixed effect 
model. Choice of this model was also supported by the absence of heterogeneity in the effect size 
distribution: (a) Chi-square(2) = 1.26, p = 0.53; (b) Chi-square(2) = 1.25, p = 0.53; (c) Chi-square(2) = 1.52, 
p = 0.47.
We now consider the type of damage (life versus house) operationalization of 
importance.
Number of questions: Significantly more questions were asked in the two life 
scenarios (438) than in the two house scenarios (334), Mann-Whitney U = 2051, 
p = 0.02, one-sided, supporting the hypothesis that there would be more interest in 
information collection for the more important type of damage.
Probability questions: Next we compared the number of probability questions 
asked for the life and house scenarios. All three categories of probability/frequency 
items were analyzed:
(1) Probability/frequency of loss;
(2) Probability/frequency of a mudslide;
(3) A joint category of probability of loss and a mudslide.
The first row of Table 2.4 presents results for questions relating to each 
probability category across the two experimental scenarios, including significance 
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levels associated with Pearson Chi-squared tests. Findings showed that significantly 
more questions were asked in the joint category for life scenarios compared to 
house scenarios. This result was influenced by the highly significant difference in 
the number of probability/frequency of loss questions for the two scenarios.






Probability of a 
Mudslide
NL NH p One-
Sided
NL NH p One-
Sided
NL NH p One-
Sided
Number of probability 
questions
61 46 0.037 28 11 0.004 33 35 0.363
Subjects asking at least one 
question about probabilities
34 23 0.021 21  8 0.003 26 22 0.226
Moving on to consider whether there was a difference between the two scenario 
types in the number of subjects who asked at least one probability/frequency 
question, the second row of Table 2.4 shows that significantly more participants 
asked at least one probability question in the ‘probability joint’ category in life 
scenarios than in house scenarios. This result was influenced by the highly 
significant difference in the number of subjects asking at least one question in the 
‘probability of loss’ category for the two scenarios.
We conclude that the ‘probability of a mudslide’ category was of equal importance 
in both scenarios (in total 68 questions or 48 people), but that ‘probability of loss’ 
was a more important category in life than in house scenarios (in total 39 questions 
or 29 people).
RDOs: For the RDO category there was no significant difference between the 
life and house scenarios (79 versus 61; Mann-Whitney U = 1876; p = 0.129, one-
sided). Therefore we conclude that level of interest in RDOs was not connected 
with disaster type.
2.3.2.3  Risk aversion
Finally, we performed analyses to consider whether risk aversion might influence 
information search in the RDO and ‘probability/frequency’ categories. Using 
the sum of A choices participants made in the Holt and Laury (2002) task as 
a measure of risk aversion, the mean risk aversion score was 5.38 (SD = 1.82). 
There was no correlation between number of questions asked in the joint 
probability category and risk aversion (rτ = 0.05, p = 0.589, two-sided); however 
the correlation between the measure of risk aversion and number of questions 
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asked in the probability of loss category was only marginally non-significant 
(rτ = 0.15, p = 0.089, two-sided). According to Cohen’s (1988) standard 
classification, correlations between 0.1 and 0.3 are deemed small. Contrary 
to our hypothesis, more risk-averse subjects showed less interest in obtaining 
information about RDOs (rτ = -0.14, p = 0.088, two-sided). Additionally, we 
analyzed whether individual risk attitude might generally motivate subjects 
to look more thoroughly/longer for situational information, but the correlation 
between risk aversion and number of questions asked in the experiment was 
virtually zero (rτ ≈ 0.00, p = 0.984, two-sided).
As mentioned above, we used a second operationalization of individual risk 
aversion: reported attitude towards risk. Our risk measures were weakly, but 
significantly, correlated (rτ = 0.28, p < 0.001, two-sided), and the second risk 
aversion measure was not correlated with our categories of interest (RDOs: 
rτ = –0.07, p = 0.30, two-sided; probability: rτ = –0.07, p = 0.40, two-sided; 
probability of loss: rτ = 0.02, p = 0.80, two-sided).
We conclude that, although risk aversion might have played some role in 
information search procedures in our experiment, our operationalizations of risk 
aversion were not good enough to draw any sound conclusions as to the existence 
and direction of any connections.
2.3.2.4  Gender
There were no significant differences between male and female participants for 
any of the variables of interest (see Appendix F).
2.4  DISCUSSION
Prior research on human decision-making in risky situations has shown that people 
show little interest in information about probabilities of the possible outcomes of 
their decisions. Huber and colleagues (Huber et al. 1997; Huber et al. 2001), who 
created a special framework for studying naturalistic risky situations, suggested 
that most people will use probabilistic information only if they are presented with 
it. They claim that this minor role of probabilities in people’s decision-making 
processes is because people look for RDOs instead of estimating probabilities. 
Huber et al. (1997) contrasted standard lottery-type tasks, in which the DM has no 
control over the occurrence of a particular outcome, with controllable naturalistic 
situations, and suggested that the crucial factor leading to the lack of interest in 
probabilities is controllability over risky situations.
Following this assumption, our research focused on specific naturalistic 
situations in which individuals could exert no control over threatening events, 
namely natural disasters. Results showed that, in naturalistic situations of this type, 
interest in obtaining probabilistic information substantially increases compared to 
situations in which control over the occurrence of threatening events is possible: 
almost half of our participants requested information on probabilities. There is 
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good reason to expect such interest to be even higher in non-hypothetical situations 
of this type. When we compared participants’ interest in probabilities in our study 
and in Huber’s experiments conducted using the same procedure as ours, we found 
that our subjects asked more questions about probability. Thus, Huber’s claim that 
people have little interest in probabilities in naturalistic situations should be limited 
to situations in which people can control the occurrence of threatening events: his 
claim does not hold in situations connected with natural disasters, where no control 
is possible.
Interestingly, even in situations where people had limited control over threatening 
events and where increased interest in probabilities was observed, individuals still 
searched for information about available RDOs. Moreover, RDOs proved to be the 
second most frequently searched category, after the consequences category; the 
probability category being the third most popular. This is in line with the findings 
of Lion et al. (2002) that almost twice as many participants wanted information 
about the risk controllability as about the probability of the negative consequences 
of that risk. Perhaps this behavior stems from the illusion of control phenomenon, 
(Langer, 1975) which usually manifests itself in a person overestimating their 
control over events that are actually beyond their control.
The above-mentioned findings have important implications. Although it is 
useful, Huber’s contrasting of naturalistic risky decision situations with lottery-
type tasks has important limitations. After all, lottery-type tasks are representative 
of a certain type of naturalistic risky situation, namely those in which the DM 
has no control over the occurrence of risky events, natural disasters being but 
one example of such situations. Another good example is stock-market investor 
behavior, an investor being unable to directly control the probabilities of their 
stocks’ price fluctuations. Thus, we can expect that inhabitants of areas exposed to 
natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, etc.) would be highly interested in knowing 
how often these catastrophic events occur and, similarly, an investor would be 
keen to acquire information on the probabilities of price changes of specific 
stocks before including them in their portfolio. On the other hand, a decision 
about operating a business constitutes an example of a situation which allows an 
entrepreneur direct control of the probability of success of their venture: in this 
case they can apply a number of RDOs that allow them to keep the chances of 
the business becoming bankrupt under control. In this situation we would expect 
entrepreneurs to demonstrate more interest in available RDOs than in knowing the 
precise probability of bankruptcy for their type of business.
As previously discussed, we found that our subjects systematically asked more 
probability-related questions compared to the research of Huber and colleagues. The 
only exception to this pattern was the aspect of the Huber et al. (2009) study where an 
additional justification of choice manipulation was added to the procedure. In this case, 
Huber’s subjects had significantly higher interest in probability items. We posit that, 
in general, a justification of choice manipulation induces more questions to be asked 
by creating two aims for information search. The first aim is to make an informed 
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decision between the two available choice options and the second aim is to come up 
with a good justification for the particular option chosen. This naturally leads to a 
more active search for probability and frequency items, since numerical information 
represents a sound justification for virtually every decision (Stamper, 2001).
Our study also showed that people are more interested in probabilities when 
a choice is of relatively high importance, operationalized here in terms of a 
natural disaster’s consequences: we found a significant difference in the number 
of questions asked about probabilities in life-threatening situations compared to 
capital-threatening situations. Interestingly, we also found that in total subjects 
collected more situational information in the more important (life-threatening) 
situation. This demonstrates that subjects are not only interested in obtaining 
information about the object of their interest, but that they also actively engage 
in information search about the risks of damage or destruction to that object, and 
interest in such probabilistic information increases as the object’s importance 
increases. However, we detected no difference in the number of RDO questions 
asked for the life and house scenarios. At this stage of our research we can only 
speculate that there should be a difference between life- and capital-threatening 
situations in the case of more controllable scenarios (e.g., situations such as man-
made disasters as opposed to natural disasters). This is ultimately an empirical 
question for further research.
Our second operationalization of situational importance – making a decision 
involving oneself versus others – seemed to be unsuccessful: we found no difference 
in any of the parameters of interest. We believe that this was mainly due to the 
hypothetical character of our experimental situation. While in real-life situations the 
difference between taking a decision for oneself or others is easily noticeable, it is not 
so in hypothetical situations. In the latter situations subjects may not be able to clearly 
distinguish between taking their perspective and the perspective of an advisor. Thus, 
we suspect that, although they had to take decisions for others, participants collected 
and processed situational information as if they were taking decisions for themselves. 
In contrast, the distinction between situations involving threats to life and threats to 
capital seems to be easily noticed, even in hypothetical situations.
Our hypothesis that more risk-averse people should be more interested in 
information about the probability of negative events enjoyed only moderate support. 
This was unsurprising in the light of prior research on risk attitudes which generally 
shows that measurement of this psychological characteristic is not a trivial task. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that risk preferences are neither stable across 
elicitation methods nor in time (Grether & Plott, 1979; Wärneryd, 1996; Anderson & 
Mellor, 2009). Therefore in retrospect it was probably unreasonable to expect high 
correlations between different measures of risk aversion and other variables.
Finally, the hypothesis that more risk-averse individuals should be more interested 
in information about RDOs went unsupported. In fact, the results were in a contrary 
direction. Perhaps, issues surrounding the relationship between risk attitude and 
information search involving RDOs are more complicated than we initially thought. 
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On the one hand, people who are more risk averse may indeed be more interested 
in reducing the risk inherent in a situation by applying various RDOs, and thus be 
more active in searching for information on this topic. On the other hand, more risk-
averse individuals might immediately opt for the more certain option, and therefore 
show lesser or no interest in RDOs since they are only relevant to the risky rather 
than to the certain option. This issue calls for further research.
This paper has presented evidence that in pseudo-naturalistic scenarios 
involving natural disasters people tend to actively search for information about 
probabilities. However, the question arises as to whether people are able to make 
reasonable use of such information. Here, Baker (1995) tested whether residents of 
endangered areas use probability information when making evacuation decisions 
during a hurricane threat and concluded that people were capable of comprehending 
and using probability information. Similarly, Tyszka and Zaleskiewicz (2006) 
demonstrated that although subjects had little interest in obtaining information 
about probabilities in naturalistic risky decision environments, when supplied with 
such information they were sensitive to it.
Generally, the answer to the question of how well people comprehend and use 
probability information in dealing with environmental hazards is rather complicated. 
To understand people’s responses to environmental hazards and disasters, Lindell 
and Perry (2012) proposed the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM). Threat 
perception plays the main role in this multistage model, in which environmental 
threats are perceived in terms of an individual’s expectations of personal impacts 
emanating from the environment (such as death, injury, property damage, etc.). The 
probabilities and severity of these impacts are significant predictors of protective 
actions taken and evacuation decisions. Research by Baker (1991) and meta-
analysis of hurricane evacuation studies by Huang et al. (2015) strongly support 
this claim. The question of how people handle probability information in dealing 
with environmental hazards requires much future study, but in the meantime it is 
important to note that responses to hypothetical survey scenarios provide good 
estimates of actual behavior during hurricane threats (Huang et  al. 2015). Such 
findings also suggest that our results could serve as an estimate of the type of 
information that people would search for in real-life natural disasters.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Experimental scenarios
Life-self
You live in a spacious house with a garden. You simply love your house. However, 
the house is located on a hillside where, in the past, mudslides occurred. Recently, 
rainfall increased and the occurrence of mudslides grew. Sometimes the mudslides 
occurred at night and some people were killed. With concerns about residents’ safety, 
local authorities offer people living in the affected area relocation. In return, they 
offer those homeowners who agree to relocate another house free of charge in a new 
neighborhood; yet this house is a little less attractive. So you have a choice: either to 
stay in your old house, or to move to the new house. By staying in the current house 
you expose yourself to the mudslides, as a result of which you may die.
You have to make a decision. You have to make this decision under the 
assumption that you are single, even if, in fact, you have a family. Before this, 
however, you can obtain other information, which you need to make the decision.
Now please ask your questions. You can ask as many questions as you want.
House-self
You live in a spacious house with a garden. You simply love your house. However, 
the house is located on a hillside where, in the past, mudslides occurred. Recently, 
rainfall increased and the occurrence of mudslides grew. Mudslides move at a 
speed that allows evacuation of people. Yet houses are completely destroyed. With 
concerns about residents’ safety, local authorities offer people living in the affected 
area relocation. In return, they offer those homeowners who agree to relocate 
another house free of charge in a new neighborhood; yet this house is a little less 
attractive. So you have a choice: either to stay in your old house, or to move to 
the new house.
By staying in the current house you expose yourself to the mudslides, as a result 
of which your house might be destroyed.
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You have to make a decision. You have to make this decision under 
the assumption that you are single, even if, in fact, you have a family. Before 
this, however, you can obtain other information, which you need to make the 
decision.
Now please ask your questions. You can ask as many questions as you want.
Life-others
You are a representative of a charity organization taking care of an old couple that 
has no relatives. The couple lives in a spacious house with a garden. They simply 
love their house. However, the house is located on a hillside where, in the past, 
mudslides occurred. Recently, rainfall increased and the occurrence of mudslides 
grew. Sometimes the mudslides occurred at night and some people were killed. 
With concerns about residents’ safety, local authorities offer people living in the 
affected area relocation. In return, they offer those homeowners who agree to 
relocate another house free of charge in a new neighborhood; yet this house is a 
little less attractive. So the couple has a choice: either to stay in their old house, or 
to move to the new house. By staying in the current house they expose themselves 
to the mudslides, as a result of which they may die. The couple in your care asked 
for your advice about what they should do.
You have to make a decision. Before this, however, you can obtain other 
information, which you need to make the decision.
Now please ask your questions. You can ask as many questions as you want.
House-others
You are a representative of a charity organization taking care of an old couple 
that has no relatives. The couple lives in a spacious house with a garden. They 
simply love their house. However, the house is located on a hillside where, in 
the past, mudslides occurred. Recently, rainfall increased and the occurrence of 
mudslides grew. Mudslides move at a speed that allows evacuation of people. 
Yet houses are completely destroyed. With concerns about residents’ safety, local 
authorities offer people living in the affected area relocation. In return, they offer 
those homeowners who agree to relocate another house free of charge in a new 
neighborhood; yet this house is a little less attractive. So the couple has a choice: 
either to stay in their old house, or to move to the new house. By staying in the 
current house they expose themselves to the mudslides, as a result of which their 
house might be destroyed. The couple in your care asked for your advice about 
what they should do.
You have to make a decision. Before this, however, you can obtain other 
information, which you need to make the decision.
Now please ask your questions. You can ask as many questions as you want.
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Appendix B: Virus infection scenario (warm-up task) 
from Bär and Huber (2008)
On an exotic trip you got infected with a life-threatening viral disease. You have 
a very high fever and your condition does not allow your transportation to Poland. 
You have to be treated immediately. There are only two medicine options. Which 
one should you choose?
Alternative A: The usual medicine to treat this illness is Relox. This medicine 
cures the disease for sure. Unfortunately, as a side-effect your legs will be 
paralyzed.
Alternative B: A new medicine Nexin is not yet approved for public use. It cures 
the disease for sure; however an unusual immune disorder might occur as a 
side-effect.
Appendix C: Choice list for the Holt and Laury (2002) task
Lottery A Lottery B
1/10 of 20 PLN, 9/10 of 16 PLN 1/10 of 38.5 PLN, 9/10 of 1 PLN
2/10 of 20 PLN, 8/10 of 16 PLN 2/10 of 38.5 PLN, 8/10 of 1 PLN
3/10 of 20 PLN, 7/10 of 16 PLN 3/10 of 38.5 PLN, 7/10 of 1 PLN
4/10 of 20 PLN, 6/10 of 16 PLN 4/10 of 38.5 PLN, 6/10 of 1 PLN
5/10 of 20 PLN, 5/10 of 16 PLN 5/10 of 38.5 PLN, 5/10 of 1 PLN
6/10 of 20 PLN, 4/10 of 16 PLN 6/10 of 38.5 PLN, 4/10 of 1 PLN
7/10 of 20 PLN, 3/10 of 16 PLN 7/10 of 38.5 PLN, 3/10 of 1 PLN
8/10 of 20 PLN, 2/10 of 16 PLN 8/10 of 38.5 PLN, 2/10 of 1 PLN
9/10 of 20 PLN, 1/10 of 16 PLN 9/10 of 38.5 PLN, 1/10 of 1 PLN
10/10 of 20 PLN 10/10 of 38.5 PLN
Appendix D: Question for general risk taking assessment
Now we ask you to try to assess yourself: On a scale from 0 to 10 do you perceive 
yourself as a person who is willing to take risks? Where 0 means ‘completely 
unwilling to take risks’ and 10 ‘completely willing to take risks’.
Completely Completely
unwilling to willing to
take risks  take risks
– – – – – – – – – –
00 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10
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Appendix E: Significance of Mann-Whitney U statistics 
(all tests are one-sided)
Category Self Versus Others
Number of questions p = 0.16
RDOs p = 0.22
Number of questions asked:
Probability joint p = 0.43
Probability of a mudslide p = 0.48
Probability of loss p = 0.49
Number of people asking at least one probability question
Probability joint p = 0.43
Probability of a mudslide p = 0.35
Probability of loss p = 0.42
Appendix F: Statistics by gender (means are weighted by 
the corresponding group sizes)
Category Female Male Diff. p Two-
SidedM SD n M SD n
Total questions asked 0.109 0.122 68 0.116 0.102 48 –0.007 0.33
Probability joint 0.014 0.019 68 0.018 0.025 48 –0.004 0.60
Probability of loss 0.005 0.010 68 0.007 0.014 48 –0.001 0.99
Probability of a mudslide 0.009 0.013 68 0.011 0.015 48 –0.002 0.51
RDOs 0.020 0.026 68 0.020 0.025 48 0.000 0.87
Risk aversion Holt and Laury task 5.440 1.670 57 5.310 2.020 45 0.130 0.98
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There are many situations which require people to deal with low probability high 
consequence events, like earthquakes, floods, terrorism or natural disasters. The 
growing literature on this subject suggests that people have particular difficulty in 
the processing of these small probabilities (Magat et al. 1987; Taleb, 2007; Burns 
et  al. 2010). Even experts often disagree about potential outcomes and chances 
connected with such situations (Mandl & Lathrop, 1982). Moreover, a perception 
of low probability high consequence events may be biased by affective evaluations 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Forgas & Bower, 1987). In fact, we often observe 
inconsistent behavior in these situations. On the one hand, many people are willing 
to pay inexplicably large amounts to avoid risky events (e.g., McClelland et  al. 
1990). On the other hand, many just ignore such risks and want to pay nothing for 
decreasing the level of risk (Kunreuther et al. 1978).
Consider the following behavior: Andrew lives in a flood area in a house worth 
1,000,000 USD. Large flooding occurs on average once in 1000 years in this area. 
To protect himself and his wealth, Andrew has an opportunity to buy an insurance 
policy with an annual cost less than 100 USD. However, despite the advice of his 
good friend who is an insurer, Andrew refuses to buy protection. On the other 
hand, every time Andrew plans a trip he buys additional insurance against terrorist 
attack, like plane hijacking or bomb attack. Such insurance with 50,000 USD 
benefits costs about 50 USD for a one month trip. Even in France which is the most 
exposed country to terrorist attacks in Europe, the probability that Andrew might 
be killed in a terrorist attack is extremely low – in the last two years there were 
less than 300 killed in terrorist attacks out of about 66 million people in France. 
This gives a 27 times lower probability than that of dying in a car accident (http://
www.independent.co.uk, 2016). Is there anything unusual in Andrew’s insurance 
decisions? According to the rational decision rule his behavior is inconsistent. 
Andrew seems to both overweight small probabilities (buying terrorist attack 
insurance) and underweight small probabilities (not buying flood insurance).
What is overweighting and underweighting of small probabilities? By the 
overweighting of small probabilities, we mean attributing to small probabilities 
higher weights than those predicted by normative decision theories. In other words, 
when small probabilities are overweighted, probabilities impact decisions more 
than is normatively appropriate. On the other hand, by the underweighting of small 
probabilities we understand there are situations when people do not pay much 
attention to probabilities and neglect them. Thus, probabilities impact decisions less 
than is normatively appropriate. Furthermore, in extreme situations probabilities 
might be even entirely ignored and be omitted in the decision-making process.
An excellent example of overweighting small probabilities is a situation 
described by Gigerenzer (2006). After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 
where almost 3000 people died, because of higher level of fear a lot of Americans 
decided to reduce their air travel and instead drove by car. In the three months 
after the attack, passenger miles at the US national lines decreased respectively 
by 20%, 17% and 12%. As Gigerenzer (2006) estimated such a switch from flying 
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towards driving resulted in an additional 1595 deaths for the 12 months following 
the attack. As Gigerenzer (2006, p. 350) noticed: ‘This estimate is six times higher 
than the total number of passengers (256) who died in the four fatal flights.’ This 
example describes how overweighting small probabilities may lead to irrational 
decisions and fatal consequences (i.e., choosing objectively more risky solutions 
which are, however, perceived as safer).
On the other hand, good examples of underweighting small probabilities are 
decisions not to buy insurance against floods, hurricanes or other disasters (even if 
it is subsidized). In these situations people feel that the probability of disaster is so 
low that ‘it won’t happen to me’. In such situations people avoid buying insurance 
even when the expected value of it is positive and is explicitly stated (Kunreuther 
et al. 1998).
Why are highly unlikely events either neglected or overweighted? There are 
studies showing that this may be due to individual differences, with different 
people reacting in opposite ways in the same decision situation. For instance, 
McClelland et al. (1993) asked people about their willingness to insure against loss 
of money at different levels of probability. They found that people tend to behave 
in a bimodal way: some participants will pay even more than the expected value of 
an option while others will bid zero for insurance. Similar results were found in a 
study by Kunreuther et al. (1988), which found that, when asked about the riskiness 
of a proposed high-level nuclear waste repository, some people gave the extreme 
answer ‘not at all serious’ (16%), while others gave the answer ‘very serious’ (21%). 
McClelland and colleagues argued that this pattern might result from people’s 
tendency to reduce the anxiety associated with uncertainty. When facing uncertain 
situations people might use two opposite strategies to cope with anxiety. One is to 
underweight the level of risk, thereby making the risk seem so small that a choice 
is perceived as safe. The other is to overweight probabilities, resulting in a choice 
being perceived as highly risky and thus one to be avoided (Slovic et al. 1981). But 
explanations are not limited to individual differences. Loewenstein and Mather 
(1990) noticed that people tend to apply different types of reasoning in the case of 
counter-terrorism efforts than in the case of the prevention of natural disasters. The 
former seem to be over-financed compared to the latter, which are under-financed 
(www.bigthink.com). The authors describe this pattern of behavior as overshooting 
versus undershooting an appropriate level of riskiness.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 283) conclude the same point as follows:
Because people are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme 
probabilities, highly unlikely events are either neglected or overweighted, and the 
difference between high probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated. 
Thus, small probabilities generate unpredictable behavior. Indeed, we observe two 
opposite reactions to small probabilities.
In next sections, we will focus on the mechanisms of overweighting and 
underweighting small probabilities.
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3.2  WHEN DO PEOPLE TEND TO OVERWEIGHT SMALL 
PROBABILITIES?
People’s tendency to overweight small probabilities is a robust finding which has 
support in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and in empirical studies 
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Wu & Gonzalez, 1999). Authors of prospect theory 
assume that people weight probabilities subjectively, and, as we see in Figure 3.1, 
the weights don’t need to be linear with respect to objective probabilities. In particular, 
the small probabilities are overweighted.
Figure 3.1  The inverse Kahneman-Tversky S-shape probability weighting function 
where small probabilities are overweighted and medium and large probabilities are 
underweighted. The identity line indicates linear weighting – no transformation of 
objective probabilities.
An interesting observation about the overweighting of small probabilities 
was made by Kunreuther and Pauly (2005), who noticed that after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) insurers started to offer protection in case of terrorism 
only at very high prices (and sometimes it was not possible to find a seller who 
would offer such insurance at any price). However, before 9/11, terrorism was mostly 
included in the ‘all perils’ policy form, which meant that insurers perceived the 
risks connected with car accidents and terrorism attack as the same. After that, in 
just one moment, formerly ignored terrorism started to be so heavily overweighted 
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Overweighting versus underweighting of small probabilities 45
that insurers decided to make fundamental changes on how it was categorized. 
Another example of overweighting of small probabilities is willingness to buy 
lottery tickets. According to normative theories (e.g., expected utility), people 
should not buy lottery tickets because of the negative expected value of the gamble. 
However, as probably most of us know, there are a lot of people who participate in 
lottery games.
One of the main psychological biases which influences the way people weight 
probabilities is diminishing sensitivity. Diminishing sensitivity implies that 
increasing distance from the reference points (in the case of probability there are 
two natural reference points: 0% chance which is impossibility and 100% chance 
which is certainty) diminishes the subjective impact of a change in probability. In 
other words, any change next to the reference points (i.e., from 0% chance to 1% 
chance) looms larger than any change in the middle of the scale (i.e., 50% chance 
to 51% chance). Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman revealed that a median participant 
in their study was indifferent between receiving a lottery ticket which gave a 1% 
chance to win $200 and receiving $10 for sure. On the other hand, when asked 
about the certainty equivalent for a lottery ticket which gave a 99% chance to win 
$200, the assessed amount was $188. Thus, the first percent of probability was 
priced at $10 and the last one at $12. However, the other 98% was worth $178, 
which means about $1.82 for each percent on average. Those large jumps next to 
the reference points imply that small probabilities are in this case overweighted 
and large probabilities are underweighted.
Another explanation of the overweighting of small probabilities is proposed 
by Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) – the affective deconstruction of the probability 
weighting function. The affective approach is based on an assumption of 
the occurrence of hope and fear, which explain the overweighting of small 
probabilities and underweighting of large probabilities. A change of probability 
from impossibility to possibility creates a situation in which some hope exists, in 
contrast to the situation where the probability of winning is equal to zero. A similar 
pattern is observed with regard to the right-hand side of the probability weighting 
function – when the probability of winning is lower than 1 – that is, the chance 
of winning is 99% – some fear exists. As Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001, p. 185) 
conclude: ‘… the affective approach holds that the jumps in the weighting function 
can be attributed, at least in part, to the affective reactions – which we label hope 
and fear – associated with a lottery.’ As they suggest, the greater the affect the 
larger the jumps in both sides of the probability weighting function. Thus, there is 
more overweighting of small probabilities for an affect-rich subject (i.e., a ‘short, 
painful, but not dangerous electric shock.’ (p. 188)) than for an affect-poor one (i.e., 
a $20 cash penalty).
Emotional reactions may also influence situations when the chance of occurrence 
is extremely low but the consequences are large; in such cases, people focus solely on 
losses rather than interaction between potential losses and probability (Ganderton 
et  al. 2000). As a perfect example, we can present following quotation: ‘After 
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the attacks on 9/11, considering the possibility that al-Qaeda wanted to acquire a 
nuclear weapon, Vice President of the United States Dick Cheney remarked that 
(Suskind, 2006; p. 62),
We (America) have to deal with this new type of threat… a low-probability, high-
impact event… If there’s a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda 
build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our 
response. It’s not about our analysis. It’s about our response.
Such situations, when we want to avoid the peril at any price, lead us to extreme 
overweighting of small probabilities.
We can observe that the occurrence of the overweighting of small probabilities 
may depend on a few factors like: (1) distance from reference points, for example 
we will overweight probabilities more heavily in situations when the chance of 
flood occurrence will increase from 0% to 1% than from 5% to 6%; (2) the level of 
emotional connotations; namely, we tend to overweight probabilities more heavily 
when the object of interest induces higher emotional reactions, and (3) the higher 
the perceived level of potential losses (or in other words more extreme negative 
outcomes), the greater the tendency to overweight small probabilities, for example 
if we can lose our entire wealth in a flood we will overweight the probability 
heavily and do everything to protect ourselves.
3.3  WHEN DO PEOPLE UNDERWEIGHT SMALL 
PROBABILITIES?
Numerous evidence of the underweighting of small probabilities can be found in 
the domain of insurance studies (e.g., Kunreuther et al. 1978; McClelland et al. 
1990; Botzen et al. 2015). Those studies show that people tend to neglect some 
types of threats (like natural hazards, car accidents) and behave as if the risk 
does not exist (e.g., do not buy insurance or drive without seatbelts). Moreover, 
as Kunreuther (1978) revealed, people sometimes fail to protect themselves even 
when it is subsidized (e.g., not purchasing subsidized insurance). Such patterns of 
behavior may expose societies to very high potential losses in extreme situations. 
Also, studies in other domains have indicated that people tend to underweight 
small probabilities. For example, Oberholzer-Gee and Frey (1998) revealed that 
inhabitants of areas which are potential sites for nuclear waste facilities tend to 
ignore the risk associated with the potential hazard.
Risky decisions are based on two components – the potential outcome and the 
probability of occurrence (Weber & Milliman, 1997). However, as Slovic and 
colleagues (1977) noticed, in the domain of insurance we encounter situations 
where people focus just on one factor. Thus, if people focus only on the probability, 
they may act according to the threshold model, which assumes that people ignore 
risks if their subjective probability is below a certain level of concern (Slovic et al. 
1977). Hence, people may behave in the following way: ‘if the probability is above 
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my threshold level of concern I take an action, if not I just neglect it’ (Botzen et al. 
2015). In the case of a small probability event, people might think that it is unlikely 
to happen and do not pay any attention to it. The probability itself might be below 
the individual’s perception threshold (Ganderton et al. 2000) evoking a belief that 
‘it won’t happen to me’.
Other possible explanations why people neglect small probabilities and do not 
buy insurance, for example, emerge from the research of Kunreuther et al. (2001). 
Their study showed that people are unable to understand the probability context. 
Individuals do not distinguish low levels of probability (e.g., 0.00001 or 0.000001) 
if they do not possess additional information about the riskiness of a situation. 
More precisely, to estimate properly the probability of a negative outcome 
people need fairly rich context information – the more useful it is, the better the 
probabilities are evaluated (Kunreuther et al. 2001). For example, if we want to 
properly interpret the risk associated with a 1-in-1000-year flood we need to have 
comparisons of better known examples which are easier to imagine. We need to 
show that the level of risk of a 1-in-1000-year flood is equal, for example, to the 
level of risk associated with a car crash while driving a car in mountains during a 
snowstorm. Such a reference point helps to properly evaluate the level of risk. On 
the other hand, if people do not have any additional information or reference point, 
they are unable to understand small probabilities and ignore some of them.
Another explanation for why people underweight small probabilities was 
presented by Kunreuther and Pauly (2004). As the authors claim, people sometimes 
fail to buy insurance because of the search costs associated with purchasing it. More 
precisely, if the cost of collecting information about the threat (i.e., the probability 
distribution of outcomes) is very high, it may discourage people from obtaining 
and processing the data. Thus, people do not search for objective information 
and do not buy insurance. As Kunreuther and Pauly (2004) notice, this process of 
decision-making is consistent with the bounded rationality hypothesis. Namely, 
if we do not perceive the initial level of probability as being sufficiently high to 
exceed some threshold level, we will not make an effort in time and energy to 
collect and process the data connected with probability. In other words, we might 
decide to ignore small probabilities because of the high costs of searching for the 
information needed to understand the probability.
To sum up, the underweighting of small probabilities may occur in a few situations: 
(1) when people focus solely on the probabilities (instead of the interaction of the 
probabilities and potential outcomes) and the level of probability does not exceed 
the threshold level; (2) when people do not have enough information to understand 
the probability and do not have a reference point in order to compare an unfamiliar 
risky situation to one which is well known, and (3) when cost of obtaining rational 
information about the probabilities is perceived as too high and people give up 
acquiring information.
So far, we have described two opposite reactions to small probabilities –
overweighting and underweighting – and circumstances surrounding both. 
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
48 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
Behavioral decision research has been dominated by the view that people generally 
tend to overweight the probability of a rare event (Starmer, 2000). However, some 
researchers raise the issue of ignoring the low probabilities of catastrophic events, 
leading to insufficient protective behavior or a lack of insurance against the negative 
consequences of such events (Kunreuther, 1996; Lamond et al. 2009). Perhaps the 
explanation of these phenomena lies in the manner by which people learn about 
probabilities and the outcomes of risky events. It seems that people often consider 
low probability/high impact events (e.g., natural hazards) based on their experience 
rather than on the use of statistical information (Burningham et al. 2008). In the 
next part, we describe the differences between two sources of information about 
rare events, that is, when decisions are based on descriptions or on experiences, 
and we show their influence on dealing with low probabilities.
3.4  ‘DECISIONS FROM DESCRIPTION’ VERSUS 
‘DECISIONS FROM EXPERIENCE’
Let us consider two situations described in ask.metafilter.com:
A young couple thinks about moving from a small town to Portland, which is 
affordable for them, progressive, and has a great balance between beautiful outdoor 
countryside and the community of a larger city. They do research and discover the 
Cascadia Subduction Zone. Depending on what article they read, the chances of a 
9.0 earthquake in Portland within the next 50 years is 10%–60%. As they have said: 
‘they don’t feel great about moving forward with a plan that puts them so clearly in 
danger’.
A resident responds to them that he ‘has lived in the Portland area for 38 years, and 
the largest earthquake he has experienced was about a 5.5.’ He advises them to not 
worry and to not abandon their moving plans.
The above addresses the two categories of decision situations. The first applies 
when people choose between options with explicitly given information about 
probabilities and outcomes. In this case, people make ‘decisions from description’ 
(Hertwig et al. 2004). This kind of decision is analyzed by prospect theory and was 
mostly considered in traditional research on decisions under risk (e.g., Starmer, 
2000; Fox & Poldrack, 2014).
The second applies to situations when people do not have a description about 
risky options. Indeed, people outside a laboratory rarely have an opportunity to 
know probabilities of rare events a priori. They often formulate their opinions and 
make decisions on their own experiences and observations. In such situations, 
when decision-makers learn about a distribution of risky outcomes through some 
sort of sampling, they make ‘decisions from experience’ (Hertwig et al. 2004).
In a research lab, respondents make decisions by description by choosing 
between two options (usually lotteries) with numerically described probabilities 
and payoffs. For example, they have to choose between a $100 loss with probability 
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1% or a certain loss of $10. For decisions from experience, the most popular way 
of simulating the experience is a sampling procedure (Hertwig et  al. 2004). 
Respondents see on a computer screen two buttons. Each button represents an 
option (a lottery) with distribution of outcomes unknown to the respondent. In the 
first stage respondents click on one of the two buttons and sample (observe) the 
outcomes, which are randomly generated depending on the option associated with 
the button. For example, when a respondent clicks on the button assigned to a $100 
loss with probability 1% or $0 otherwise, then two payoffs can be displayed on the 
computer screen: a loss of $100 or $0. Respondents can click on the two buttons as 
many times as they want and observe the consequences of choosing each one of the 
buttons. In the second stage, when respondents feel confident enough that they are 
familiar with the options, they make a final choice.
Figure 3.2 facilitates understanding of the experimental procedures used in 
decisions from description and decisions from experience. Both part (a) and part 
(b) represent the same problem. In a decision from description (Figure 3.2. (a)), a 
typical task consists of two options with numerically described probabilities and 
payoffs. In a decision from experience (Figure 3.2. (b)), a typical task consists 
of two stages. In Stage 1 (represented here by seven fictitious draws) a person 
explores two options by clicking on one of two buttons on a computer screen. In 
each trial, the button chosen by a participant displays a payoff which is randomly 
generated depending on the option associated with the selected button. In the 
illustration below, the left button represents a loss of $100 with probability 0.01 
and 0 otherwise, and the right button represents a certain loss of $10. In the first 
trial, a participant has selected the left button and received a 0 outcome. In the 
second trial, the participant has selected the right button and received a −$10 
outcome, etc. The participant has terminated sampling with the two buttons after 
seven trials. In a choice stage (Stage 2), after being acquainted with the nature of 
both options, the person is asked to select a left or right button to draw once for 
real. In the example below the respondent has chosen the left button and received 
a final outcome of 0.
Hertwig et  al. (2004) used this sampling procedure and found significant 
differences in risky choices between description and experience conditions across 
six decision problems involving rare events. Participants considered each problem 
having two options with the same expected value. In the description condition, 
participants most often preferred a larger rare gain over a smaller certain one 
and simultaneously preferred a smaller certain loss over a larger rare one. Such 
preferences are predicted by prospect theory and are congruent with the idea of 
overweighting small probabilities. The opposite tendency emerges when decisions 
from experience were considered: people preferred a smaller certain gain over the 
larger rare one and simultaneously selected the larger rare loss over the smaller safe 
one. These preferences were in opposition to the prediction of prospect theory and 
revealed the underweighting of small probabilities. Similar results were replicated 
in other studies (e.g., Hau et al. 2008; Rakow et al. 2008; Ungemach et al. 2009).
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Figure 3.2  Schemes for decisions from description and decisions from experience 
(sampling procedure).
In decisions from description, people tend to overweight small probabilities, 
whereas the opposite bias appears in decisions from experience, when people tend 
to underweight small probabilities (Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Rakow & Newell, 2010). 
These experimental results seem to be supported by real life situations. Kreibich 
et al. (2005) interviewed almost 1200 households affected by the 2002 flood of the 
river Elbe and its tributaries. They found that almost 60% of these households stated 
that they did not know that they lived in a flood zone, and only 6% of the households 
had flood-adapted building structures. This provides an instructive picture of the 
underestimation of flooding probabilities, which is likely to have been based on 
experience rather than description. The disparity in preferences between decisions 
from description and decisions from experience was called the description-
experience gap. Its magnitude is measured by the difference in number of risky 
choices congruent with prospect theory in description and experience conditions.
Researchers have tried to explain the description-experience gap and thereby 
explain why in some situations people overweight small probabilities and in 
other situations they underweight them. Understanding the mechanism of the 
description-experience gap can be insightful in explaining humans’ responses to 
rare, catastrophic events.
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3.5  EXPLANATIONS OF THE DESCRIPTION–
EXPERIENCE GAP
In the following section we will present mechanisms underlying the description-
experience gap. In particular, we will focus on three factors which cause 
underweighting of low probabilities: sampling bias, switching behavior, and 
recency effect, in the experience condition, and one factor – mere-presentation 
effect – which causes overweighting in the description condition.
3.5.1  Sampling bias
One of the key determinants of the underweighting of small probabilities in 
experience-based decisions is a sampling bias, which occurs because people rely on 
small samples (Hertwig et al. 2004). The sampling bias is experimentally illustrated 
in the sampling procedure. People first observe unknown payoff distributions of two 
buttons and after that make a single choice. Moreover, people can decide how long they 
want to observe the series of outcomes of each option (Hertwig et al. 2004). Hau et al. 
(2010) noticed in a number of experiments that the median number of observations 
people wanted to see did not exceed 20. Such a small size of sample did not allow for 
an adequate representation of rare events. Participants obtained a somewhat skewed 
binomial distribution of outcomes, in which rare events were underrepresented. The 
smaller the sample the more probable that respondents observed a relatively lower 
number of rare events than the objective probability. Some subjects did not see any at 
all. Consequently, they tended to underweight or ignore rare events.
Hadar and Fox (2009) claimed that a decision-maker understands distributions 
of outcomes in experience conditions differently than in description conditions. 
Thus, the description-experience gap should disappear when the information about 
probabilities and outcomes of the risky option is equivalent in both conditions. 
Thus, the sampling error occurring during the experience procedure is responsible 
for biasing the information about the probabilities. Research showed that delivering 
a larger sample size reduced the experience-description gap but did not eliminate it 
completely (Hau et al. 2008; Camilleri & Newell, 2009; Ungemach et al. 2009; Hau 
et al. 2010). Even if people have an opportunity to fully experience the frequency 
of a rare event, they tend to underweight its small probability.
The degree of the underweighting of small probabilities in decisions made 
from experience depends on the sample size: the larger the sample the smaller 
the sampling bias and the weaker the underweighting of small probabilities 
in the experience condition. Sampling bias is a significant determinant of the 
underweighting of small probabilities not only in experiments but also in real life 
situations. People usually have limited experiences of rare events and might never 
observe them during their lifetimes. Thus we can observe, for example, the limited 
concern about climate change and its consequences, because as Weber (2006, 
p. 103) suggested: ‘Personal experience with noticeable and serious consequences 
of global warming is still rare in many regions of the world.’
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3.5.2  Switching behavior
In the year 1611, Barbara, first wife of the imperial mathematician and court 
astronomer Johannes Kepler, died of cholera in Prague. Kepler, widower and father 
of two, immediately began a methodical quest for a replacement. He considered 11 
candidates, eventually choosing Susanna Reuttinger, who, he wrote, ‘won me over 
with love, humble loyalty, economy of household, diligence, and the love she gave 
the stepchildren’ (Connor, 2004; p. 252). Although we do not know how he inspected 
the 11 candidates, several search strategies are possible: Antedating modern online 
dating strategies, he could have chatted with each of them on alternate days over 
a period of months, recording whom he liked most over each series of 11 days. 
Alternatively, he could have spent weeks at a time with each candidate, making 
summary assessments of each.
Although both search strategies could uncover the same information, the choices 
that follow from them would not necessarily be the same. The first strategy might 
have led Kepler to choose the person who was better in more of the 11-day bouts 
than any other candidate. The second strategy, in contrast, might have led him to 
choose a partner whose long-term mate value turned out to be best. This could have 
been a person who was not the best companion on many days of the year but who 
greatly surpassed any competitor on a few days. This divergence in the final decision 
highlights an important possibility: Specific sequential search strategies employed 
in making a choice could be coupled with specific decision strategies employed to 
render the final decision. (Hills & Hertwig, 2010; p. 1)
Hills and Hertwig (2010) in their empirical research showed that not only 
small sample size but also sampling strategy increases underweighting of small 
probabilities. They noticed that experiment participants can be classified as either 
‘frequent switchers’ that is, those who switched frequently between two options 
they observed, or ‘infrequent switchers’ – who kept to one option before then 
switching to the other.
However, the effect of frequent switching between options in the sampling 
period is to divide a sample into a few subsamples and compare the results of 
the different options over a few rounds. The option which ‘wins’ the most rounds 
is preferred. People who do not switch between options take the average of the 
outcomes of each option and then maximize the average. The infrequent-switchers 
strategy does not lead to underweighting. The frequent-switchers strategy leads 
to underweighting of rare events in the experience condition and consequently 
enlarges the magnitude of the description-experience gap. Thus, in order to force 
people not to ignore rare, catastrophic events, they should be encouraged to observe 
a long series of outcomes for one option rather than to collect subsamples. In order 
to choose a safe residence it is better to carefully scrutinize the flood history of 
one place and then that of the other rather than switch from one place to another in 
analyzing past years.
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3.5.3  The recency effect
The recency effect is another factor, which can help to understand the 
underweighting of small probabilities in decisions from experience. The outcomes 
which a participant observes towards the end of a sequence of events seem to have a 
greater impact than the outcomes from the beginning of the sequence. Rare events 
under experience conditions can have a smaller impact on decisions than they 
should have on the basis of objective probability, because a rare event has a small 
chance of appearing at the end of the sequence of sampled outcomes. Hertwig 
et  al. (2004) divided samples into early experienced and recently experienced 
events. They report that the second part of a sample had a stronger predicted power 
than the first half, a finding which indicates a recency effect.
However, other researchers found the impact of the recency effect on final choices 
as not being significant (Hau et  al. 2008; Ungemach et  al. 2009; Camilleri & 
Newell, 2011) or being quite limited (Rakow et al. 2008).
Although the contribution of the recency effect to the underweighting of 
probabilities of rare events in decisions from experience was not strongly supported 
in empirical studies it is hard to deny that recent events can significantly influence 
the reaction to rare hazards.
3.5.4  The mere-presentation effect
The three factors mentioned so far as being responsible for underweighting small 
probabilities concerned decisions from experience. The mere-presentation effect 
is responsible for overweighting small probabilities in decisions from description.
Erev et al. (2008) noticed that outcomes with small probabilities are weighted 
more strongly in a decision from description than in a decision from experience 
simply because of their mere presentation to the decision-maker. This so-called 
mere-presentation effect means that in the decision from description, both 
outcomes of a risky option (e.g., one outcome with a small and one outcome with a 
large probability) are weighted more equally than they should be according to their 
objective values of probabilities by both being present in a subject’s mind. And if a 
rare event exists in somebody’s mind, then its psychological impact increases in the 
decision-making process. Teoderescu and colleagues (2013) compared the mere-
presentation effect to ‘a white bear effect’. If people are requested to ‘not think of 
a white bear,’ then it is very hard to ignore the sentence, and it captures and holds 
people’s attention. A rare event in the description condition has the similar effect. 
Even if people know that its probability is very low, they pay relatively too much 
attention to the outcome associated with this probability.
In the experiments with the sampling procedure respondents sample outcomes 
of risky options without initially knowing how many different payoffs they would 
experience. In contrast to the decisions from description, the rare events are not 
merely presented to a decision-maker in the decision from experience. Erev et al. 
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(2008) showed that explicitly presenting the outcomes of risky options in the 
sampling procedure increased the impact of those unlikely events on choices. 
The mere presentation of the rare event in the decision from experience mode can 
weaken the tendency towards underweighting small probabilities and diminish the 
description–experience gap.
3.6  THE PROBABILITY WEIGHTING FUNCTION: HOW TO 
COMMUNICATE PROBABILITIES
The distinction between ‘decisions from description’ and ‘decisions from 
experience’ poses a question regarding which method of communicating 
probabilistic information would be the most comprehensible by ordinary people. 
A full answer to this question will be addressed in the next chapter. Now, referring 
to the probability weighting function described in prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1992), we very briefly review research on the shape of this function when 
it is derived from decisions from description and from decisions from experience.
The shape of this function presented in Figure 3.1 was widely confirmed in 
decisions from description when probabilities were explicitly given (Starmer, 
2000; Wakker, 2010). The question is what happens to this shape in decisions from 
experience. Hau et al. (2008) conducted an experiment and estimated the parameters 
of the probability weighting function for experienced frequencies. Their curve of the 
probability weighting functions turned out to be very close to the identity line. These 
results indicated a linear weighting of experienced probabilities (see Figure 3.3).
In turn, in an experiment by Abdellaoui et al. (2011), the probability weighting 
function for the experience condition had the same curvature as in the descriptive 
condition, although it was not as elevated as for decisions from description. In 
effect, small probabilities were overweighted both in decisions from description 
and in decisions from experience, but the overweighting was less pronounced for 
experienced probabilities. Thus, at least in relation to small probabilities, the weights 
obtained for decisions from experience were closer to objective probabilities. This 
could imply either that the experienced probabilities are linearly weighted or that 
the weights for experienced probabilities are lower in decisions from experience 
than in decisions from description.
Some researchers claim that when choosing among risky options, individuals 
may use strategies which do not require representations of probability at all 
(Hau et al. 2008; Erev et al. 2010; Hertwig, 2012). For example, they may apply 
the natural-mean heuristic rule, according to which an individual observes and 
averages outcomes over the sample and chooses the option with the larger mean. 
According to another heuristic – the maximax rule – an individual chooses the 
option with the higher experienced maximum outcome. The problem with such 
rules is that while they may describe well preferences in the sense of predicted 
behavior, this does not mean that they describe well the processes which are used 
in decision-making (Glöckner et al. 2016). In particular, they do not resolve the 
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question of using the probability representation in the decision process when 
choices are based on experience.
Figure 3.3  Probability weighting functions for decisions from description and 
decisions from experience. The solid line represents the probability weighting 
function estimated from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and the dotted line represents 
the experienced frequency weighting function estimated from Hau et al. (2008).
3.7  CONCLUSIONS
People face considerable difficulty when dealing with probabilities in general and 
with small probabilities in particular. They reveal two contradictory tendencies 
regarding small probabilities: sometimes they overweight them and at other times 
they underweight or completely ignore them. The tendency to overweight small 
probabilities may come from diminishing sensitivity with increasing distance 
from the reference points, that is, from impossibility (0% chance) and certainty 
(100% chance). Another reason for overweighting small probabilities may be over-
exaggerated emotional reactions to actual or potential losses. On the other hand, 
small probabilities can be underweighted. This happens first of all when probabilities 
are perceived below some threshold level. As it is well known, a typical driver does 
not bother about the hazards associated with driving an automobile every morning. 
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Similarly, inhabitants of flood prone areas may think that the risk of living there is 
negligible. It makes sense that policymakers remind those living in such areas that 
they are not completely safe. This underweighting of small probabilities in the case 
of natural hazards such as floods is particularly undesirable behavior. It may lead 
to insufficient efforts to reduce flood risk or to entirely ignoring the need to protect 
oneself against consequences of catastrophic risk.
Research shows that an important factor determining the perceptions of 
probabilities is the source of the information about probabilities. When small 
probabilities are explicitly given to a decision-maker, people generally over-respond 
to them. But when small probabilities are experienced through sampling processes, 
the reactions are opposite: people underreact to small probabilities. This suggests 
that when people underweight or completely ignore the probability of a disaster, and 
we want to make them more attentive to the disaster, we should present probabilities 
to them in a descriptive way. Such practices are sometimes implemented on roads to 
discourage drivers from speeding, with billboards in dangerous places showing the 
number of fatal and other accidents. It would be useful to follow similar practices 
when warning about floods and other natural disasters.
On the other hand, when people overweight the probability of disaster (for 
example due to emotions) and we want to reduce their fears of a disaster, then we 
should present probabilities to them using a sort of simulation of negative events. 
The detailed procedure is shown in the next chapter.
In the case of natural hazards people should also be aware of traps related to 
decisions from experience. A common trap of this kind is that when there has 
been a long flood-free period, inhabitants of endangered land begin to neglect the 
hazard. This is the recency effect. In such a situation a policymaker could provide 
them with historical data on the risk of flooding. Moreover, the recency effect can 
be intentionally used in order to maintain people’s attention on particular issues. 
After a flood, the recency effect may be helpful for inducing protective activities 
among the affected people, which will diminish the negative consequences of 
future disasters.
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In everyday communication people use many different words and symbols in 
connection with probabilities of events. ‘Chance’, ‘risk’, ‘possibility’ and 
‘likelihood’ are among the most often used words. The multiplicity of terms used for 
probabilities can result in difficulties in interpreting a message. Therefore various 
studies have considered the problem of communicating probabilities, especially 
small values. However, according to the research review presented in the previous 
chapter (Idzikowska et al. this volume), people may either overweight or ignore 
information relating to small probabilities. As a consequence, communicating 
probability information to the general public in any domain, including that of 
natural hazards, is very difficult. At the same time, effective risk communication 
is very important as it can contribute to the taking of preventive action aimed at 
reducing the probability of an event associated with a risk occurring or diminishing 
the negative consequences of such an event if it does occur.
In the first part of this chapter we present different quantitative and qualitative 
methods of communicating probabilistic information that can be useful in the 
case of high impact, low probability (HILP) events. Our focus is on very low 
probability (below 1%) natural hazards such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, 
etc. Unfortunately, very few studies examine these types of risk (although see, 
e.g., the studies of natural hazards and traffic risk: Wu & Weseley, 2013; Hu et al. 
2014; Henrich et al. 2015). Instead, the majority of studies are in the medical field 
and doctor-patient communication, where probability levels are higher than 1%. 
Researchers agree that conveying low-probability risk magnitudes is particularly 
difficult (Covello et  al. 1986; Magat et  al. 1987; Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; 
Fisher et al. 1989; Roth et al. 1990; Fisher, 1991; Stone et al. 1997).
In the latter part of the chapter we present a new format of probabilistic information – 
sequential display – which seems to be an attractive method of communicating such 
information. The chapter ends with conclusions summarizing the main findings of 
the study and some recommendations regarding effective ways of communicating 
natural hazards with very low probabilities and serious consequences.
4.2  PROBABILITY FORMATS
Among the most frequently analyzed quantitative formats in the literature are 
numerical (e.g., frequencies, percentages, base rate, and proportions) and graphical 
(e.g., graphs, pictographs, population figures) ways of presenting probabilistic 
information (Timmermans et  al. 2008; Visschers et  al. 2009; Ancker et  al. 
2011; Hess et al. 2011). There have been a number of studies analyzing people’s 
understanding of risk and the benefits of presenting probabilistic information in 
different formats. Results show that different risk formats have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Generally, no one format is suitable for all the different situations 
requiring communication of probabilistic information. The characteristics of the 
above probability formats and a literature review analyzing formats’ impact on the 
process of communicating probabilistic information are presented below.
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4.2.1  Numerical probability formats
4.2.1.1  Percentages
Percentages (e.g., 0.1%) are the most common way to communicate risk and, 
according to many authors, also the most difficult to evaluate. They are used for 
hazard communication in many different areas; natural, medical and technical. 
Generally, research has shown that it is difficult for many laypeople to deal with 
numerical information (Gigerenzer et al. 2007; Peters et al. 2008) and to evaluate 
numerical probability information (Visschers et al. 2009), a format which requires 
cognitive effort to understand. Consequently, understanding of information is 
correlated with level of numeracy (Peters et al. 2006). In a study of health risk 
communication, Schapira et  al. (2004) showed that high numeracy skills were 
correlated with more consistent risk judgments, this being manifest in the provision 
of identical responses for percentage and frequency scales for a given risk estimate.
Moreover, presenting probability information in a percentage format may 
have a lower impact on people’s decisions due to its abstract nature (Slovic et al. 
2005). According to Timmermans et al. (2008), information that is more concrete 
and easier to imagine has a greater impact on decisions. In these authors’ study, 
participants evaluated risk information presented as percentages, frequencies and 
population figures. Results showed it was more difficult for people to understand 
and imagine probability information expressed in percentages (e.g., 10%) than in 
frequencies (1 out of 10) or with population figures. On the other hand, Schapira 
et al. (2004) compared the accuracy of breast cancer risk perceptions measured 
on both frequency and numeric (percentage) scales, and found that a frequency 
scale led to more accurate estimations of lifetime risk of breast cancer, while a 
percentage scale exhibited higher accuracy in estimating five-year risk.
Summarizing we can say that percentages:
• Are used the most often, but at the same time are the most difficult for people 
to evaluate,
• Are particularly inappropriate for less numerate people,
• Are abstract and therefore have low impact on people’s decisions, and, in 
particular, may lead people to ignore small probabilities in the case of HILP 
events.
4.2.1.2  Frequencies
Frequencies (e.g., 1 in 10,000) according to the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary and Thesaurus are defined as ‘the number of times something 
happens within a particular period’ (CALDandT, 2016) and are often used in the 
communication of probabilities as they are easier to use and imagine than percentages 
(Timmermans et al. 2008). Unsurprisingly then, research has shown that frequencies 
have a greater impact on people’s judgments (Slovic et al. 2005; Timmermans et al. 
2008) and elicit greater emotional engagement (Food & Drug Administration 
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[FDA], 2011) compared to percentage formats, which are relatively abstract. On the 
other hand, although frequencies are easier to understand than percentages, people 
may not regard frequencies as being personally important, Visschers et al. (2009) 
showing that a frequency might be positively interpreted (i.e., people associated 
themselves with one of the nine people not affected by a particular risk when the 
risk was presented as ‘1 out of 10’). However, greater emotional engagement can lead 
to higher risk evaluations, especially among respondents with low numeracy skills, 
when compared to information presented in a percentage format (Peters et al. 2006).
Studies of frequency formats have also revealed that this method of communicating 
probabilities has weaknesses that can influence the understanding of information. 
For example, the literature review by Visschers et al. (2009) indicated that frequency 
information often seems to be misinterpreted, especially when different denominators 
are used. Yamagishi (1997) analyzed what happens when the same frequency is 
presented as a fraction of various denominators. They described the effect of small 
versus large denominators (100 versus 10,000) and showed that respondents relied 
only on the numerator (the number of deaths caused by one factor from a list of 
causes) as an anchor to estimate risk and ignored the denominator (the sample size) 
when assessing risk in a population. Gigerenzer et al. (2007) showed that people 
understand frequencies better when risk is expressed as a natural frequency, which 
is a step-by-step description of a risk’s probability reflecting the way people would 
learn its probability in real life (Visschers et al. 2009).
Along with frequencies, researchers have also investigated proportions, which are a 
special case of the frequency format. With frequencies, the number of people affected 
by a risk (numerator) changes, while the denominator remains a round, constant 
number (e.g., 3 per 1000 people). In proportions, the numerator is kept constant, and 
the denominator changes (e.g., 1 per 333 people). This method of presenting probability 
information is often used by health professionals, who change denominators to obtain 
a numerator of 1 (e.g., 1 in 3333). Pighin and his team (2011) conducted a series of 
experiments in this area and showed that proportions were subjectively perceived 
as larger and more alarming than the same values presented as frequencies. These 
results provide evidence that proportions may often be misinterpreted.
Summarizing we can say that frequencies:
• Are easier to use and imagine than percentages,
• Elicit emotional engagement, which leads to higher risk evaluations,
• May be misinterpreted, especially if denominators are not the same.
4.2.1.3  Base rates
Base rates are a statistic used to describe the percentage of a population that 
demonstrates a characteristic, and are often presented in percentages or frequencies, 
that is, the base rate of a particular hazard in a given population can be presented as 
0.1% (1 in 1000), which means that 1 person will experience the particular outcome, 
while 999 will not. Research shows that probability information communicated 
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in this format is often misunderstood or neglected (Fischhof, 1995), although 
the study by Visschers et al. (2009) provided evidence that base rates are better 
understood than proportions.
Some researchers have noted that conditional base rates (for specific conditions) 
can be more useful than general base rates (for a whole population). Greening et al. 
(2005) asked two groups of respondents to report their perceptions of risk of personal 
harm. One of these groups was provided with general, and the other with conditional, 
base rates. The conditional base rate group was divided into two subgroups: low- and 
high-risk (non-smokers versus smokers in relation to the risk of lung cancer). People 
in all groups tended to report that they were at lower risk of harm than the average 
for their cohort. However, providing conditional base rates for high- and low-risk 
groups decreased the number of people reporting this over-optimistic attitude. Thus, 
conditional base rates seem helpful for a proper estimation of risk.
Moreover, Klein and Stefanek (2007) discussed the relationship between the 
framing of probability information and the propensity to take preventive actions. 
Their review noted that people are more likely to engage in screening behaviors 
(mammography) when presented with loss-based messages than gain-framed 
messages, and they often ignore the base rate of a given disease when assessing 
their own risk of getting the disease.
Summarizing, it seems that, in the case of HILP events, base rates may be used 
when information about probabilities can be augmented by additional, tailored data 
or presented with loss-framed messages in order to increase the propensity to take 
preventive actions. However, research has revealed a low level of understanding of 
probability information when it is presented in a base rate format.
In conclusion, base rates are:
• Often misunderstood or neglected,
• Sometimes better understood than proportions,
• In need of additional information (e.g., framing) to be useful.
4.2.2  Graphical probability formats
4.2.2.1  Graphs
Graphical probabilistic information formats embrace graphs, pictographs (including 
population figures) and Paling Perspective Scales. Graphs present probability 
information in a visual way to communicate risk characteristics: risk magnitude (how 
large or small a risk is), relative risk (comparison of the level of two or more risks), 
cumulative risk (trends over time), uncertainty (estimations of variability and ranges 
of scores) and interactions among risk factors (Lipkus & Hollands, 1999). According 
to Lipkus and Hollands visual displays such as graphs can increase understanding 
of information about values of a particular risk. The authors claim that graphs help 
people to analyze information more effectively than when only numbers are provided. 
There are various ways of presenting probability information via graphs: histograms, 
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line graphs, and pie charts. Figures 4.1 to 4.3 present examples of each of these for 
different types of natural disaster according to https://ourworldindata.org.
Figure 4.1 presents a histogram comparing the frequency of deaths from three 
different natural hazards (floods, earthquakes and droughts) worldwide over the 
last few decades according to https://ourworldindata.org.
Figure 4.1  A histogram presenting data on the number of deaths caused by floods, 
earthquakes and droughts between 1971–2016 (https://ourworldindata.org).
Another example of graphs are line graphs, often used to show trends over time. 
Figure 4.2 presents a line graph of deaths caused by storms from the middle of the 
20th century.
Figure 4.2  A line graph presenting a time trend of deaths from storms from the 
1950s to the first decade of the 21st century (https://ourworldindata.org).
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Figure 4.3 shows proportions of deaths from wildfires, volcano eruptions and 
dry mass movement within the first decade of the 21st century.
Figure 4.3  A pie chart illustrating proportions of deaths from volcano eruptions, 
dry mass movements and wildfires within the last decade of the twentieth century 
(https://ourworldindata.org).
Particular types of graphs serve specific purposes. Histograms are used for 
comparisons (presenting risks for different groups, seasons or areas), line graphs 
show trends over time and interactions among different risk factors, and pie charts 
are helpful for judging proportions.
Generally, graphical depictions capture attention more than numerical information 
(Chua et al. 2006). However, they do not lead to more accurate estimates of risks 
compared to numeric-only displays (Schapira et al. 2006). Moreover, graphs are 
difficult to use for very rare natural hazards. Many researchers have emphasized 
that graphs should be accompanied by clear, comprehensible explanations of their 
meaning (Armstrong et al. 2001; Parrot et al. 2005; Lipkus, 2007).
In conclusion, graphs:
• Help people to analyze information, but do not lead to more accurate 
estimates of risks,
• Are useful for showing trends and interactions,
• Are problematic for displaying probabilities below 1%.
4.2.2.2  Pictographs
Pictographs are symbols used to present proportions graphically. They help to 
communicate risk. Depending on the type of risk communicated, pictographs 
show the part of a population at risk. Figure 4.4 shows a pictograph depicting house 
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fire risk. The number of houses reflects the number of elements in a population. A 
black house indicates a fire, a white house designates no fire.
Figure 4.4  A pictograph communicating the risk of a house fire.
Several studies have shown that, contrary to numerical formats, pictographs can 
be particularly useful for communicating risks to people with low numeracy skills 
(Zikmund-Fisher et al. 2008; Galesic et al. 2009; Hess et al. 2011). There are two 
basic ways of processing pictographs: focusing on the numbers of different elements 
or holistic processing. Highly numerate people pay more attention to the numerical 
information in a graph, while those with lower numeracy may have difficulty 
analyzing such information. Adding reference information to a pictograph can 
therefore help to communicate risks only when the receiver of information exhibits 
high numeracy (Paling, 2003; Lipkus, 2007; Hawley et al. 2008).
Figure 4.5 shows a special type of pictograph called a population figure 
pictograph. These are used in communicating probability information concerning 
risks related to humans. The number of figures represents the size of the population. 
The grey figure indicates a person at risk (e.g., of having a particular disease), 
while the black figures indicate people at no risk.
Figure 4.5  An example of a population figure pictograph.
Timmermans et  al. (2008) showed that population figure pictographs have a 
great affective impact. Risk presented in this format was evaluated as significantly 
greater than the same risk presented in other formats. Again, as with the previously 
described graphical formats, pictographs and population figures are difficult to use 
in cases of very small probabilities.
In conclusion, both pictographs in general and population figure pictographs:
• Help to communicate risk, especially to people with low numeracy skills,
• May induce the greatest affective impact of all formats,
• Are problematic for probabilities below 1%.
4.2.2.3  The Paling Perspective Scale
The Paling Perspective Scale is a type of graphical representation depicting risks of 
different orders of magnitude on a logarithmic scale. In contrast to other graphical 
formats, it presents not only the risk at issue but also information about other risks, 
which may help people evaluate the particular risk at issue (Keller & Siegrist, 2009). 
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For instance, this format allows representation of flood risk in relation to risk of 
fire or other natural hazards. Figure 4.6 illustrates the use of the Paling Perspective 
Scale to present information about the probability of a selection of rare natural 
hazards causing death.
Figure 4.6  Frequency of natural hazards as causes of death presented using the 
Paling Perspective Scale.
The inclusion of information about the probability of other risky events is based 
on the assumption that people may not know whether the probability of the risk at 
issue is low or high. Therefore, additional information helps them to evaluate the 
risk. Keller and Siegrist (2009) noted that the comparative risks selected might 
substantially influence risk perceptions. In order to facilitate comparison between 
different risks, all risks should belong to the same category, for example, natural 
hazards, health problems, crime.
Keller and Siegrist also analyzed relationships between risk level, numeracy 
skills, and comprehension of probability information presented on a logarithmic 
scale. Results showed that only highly numerate people can understand information 
presented using the Paling Perspective Scale. Although this scale was developed to 
facilitate the comprehension of information about very low probability events, this 
finding limits its applicability.
Summarizing, the Paling Perspective Scale:
• Provides additional information to help to evaluate a risk,
• Is understandable only to highly numerate people.
4.2.3  Verbal probability information
Verbal probability terms (e.g., exceptionally unlikely, almost certain, almost 
impossible) are qualitative methods of communicating probabilities. They are 
intuitive since they are used in everyday life. Moreover, they imply an interpretation 
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of risk probabilities that can induce affect (Visschers et al. 2011). Verbal probability 
expressions are predominantly used in the case of very frequent events, where a 
relatively large number of synonyms exist. The smaller number of terms available 
for describing very rare events increases the difficulty of precisely communicating 
probability information for such events.
Research shows that numerical correlates of verbal expressions differ greatly 
between individuals, and especially between experts (e.g., physicians) and the 
general public (Weber & Hilton, 1990; Visschers et al. 2009). Brun and Teigen 
(1988) showed that verbal information about probabilities was associated with 
lower numerical values in a medical treatment context than in a no-context 
condition. Therefore, to accommodate different interpretations of the same 
expressions, Visschers and colleagues (2009) claim that verbal expressions of 
probability information should be pretested for the specific contexts and target 
groups for which they are to be used. Some researchers suggest using both 
numerical and verbal probability information in risk communication, because 
people prefer numerical information for its accuracy but use verbal statements to 
relay probability information to others (Visschers et al. 2009).
Patt and Schrag (2003) asked participants to assign a numerical value to verbal 
probabilities and found that highly severe consequences decreased the numerical 
probabilities assigned to verbal probability expressions. Indeed, when participants 
were asked to assign numerical probabilities to the terms ‘likely, perhaps likely’, or 
‘unlikely, perhaps very unlikely’, they ascribed lower numerical probabilities to a 
hurricane than to a snow flurry.
Summarizing: communicating probability information using a verbal format is:
• Very intuitive,
• Dependent on context.
4.3  DISPLAYING PROBABILITY INFORMATION IN A 
SEQUENTIAL FORMAT: AN EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION
The above literature review shows that the majority of existing formats for imparting 
probability information are difficult to use in the case of very low probability hazards, 
that is, very rare events. Therefore, we have attempted to develop a new format of 
probabilistic information designed to communicate very low probabilities. This 
new format is based on a combination of graphically displayed and experience-
based probability information. Participants in an experiment were asked to observe 
a series of binary events which allowed them to learn the proportion of specified 
events occurring. Such a combination was tested by Tyszka and Sawicki (2011) who 
presented their participants with a sequence of 100 binary events represented by 
two photographs: one of a normal child and one of a child with Down’s syndrome. 
When they compared the experience-based format with certain numerical and 
graphical formats they found that the experience-based probability format led to 
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greater sensitivity to differences in probability magnitudes. However, the format 
used by Tyszka and Sawicki cannot be applied to very rare events.
Therefore our goal was to design a new format appropriate for presenting very 
small probabilities using a sequential display format. This is a series of screens, 
each of which presents the number of distinct objects (e.g., house fires in a particular 
area, HIV infected patients) in the context of the whole population at issue. Using 
a number of screens instead of one allows the representation of very rare events.
4.4  EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2: COMPARING A 
SEQUENTIAL DISPLAY FORMAT WITH OTHER 
PROBABILITY FORMATS
4.4.1  The research goal
The main goal of our research was to test whether the new sequential display 
format for communicating probabilities is better than the alternatives. In doing 
this, we took account of Sjoberg’s (1979) observation that small probabilities are 
especially difficult to judge because it is hard to discern meaningful subjective 
differences between, for example, a probability of 0.001 and a probability of 
0.0001. Therefore, we were interested in whether, relative to other formats, the 
new format improves sensitivity to differences between small probabilities. We 
hypothesized that sensitivity to differences in probability magnitudes would be the 
highest for the sequential display probability format.
4.4.2  Method
4.4.2.1  Participants
We recruited 139 students for Experiment 1 and 150 students for Experiment 2 
from Kozminski University, Warsaw. For Experiment 1 participants’ mean age was 
24 years (SD = 5.9), and 59% were women, while in Experiment 2 participants’ 
mean age was 23 years (SD = 4.5) and 61% were women. Participants were given 
course credits for their participation.
4.4.2.2  Design
Both experiments consisted of one computerized session (performed using the 
labsee.com online platform). To test the hypothesis, we chose two scenarios 
involving different rare risks: a house fire risk connected with high material losses 
and risk of HIV infection.
The first of these, used in Experiment 1, is an example of a rare natural hazard. 
Levels of probability used in the study were obtained from an analysis of fire 
service headquarters statistics and reflected the real incidence of house fires.
In Experiment 2 we used medical risk as the majority of studies in the extant 
literature on the effects of probability format on comprehension of information and 
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decision-making concern medical risk, and people do indeed frequently have to 
face probabilistic information in the context of the medical treatment of diseases. 
Risk of HIV infection was selected since World Health Organization statistics 
show that its frequency is similar to that of a house fire.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. 
Each condition used one of three probability formats. Probabilities of a serious 
house fire (or people infected with HIV) were presented as frequencies (e.g., 
10 in 10,000), as percentages (e.g., 0.1%) or as sequential displays (the novel 
format).
4.4.2.3  The sequential display probability format
In our experiments we applied the sequential display probability format and two 
other probability formats: percentages and frequencies. In Experiment 1 the risky 
event was a house fire, observed by the participant on 20 sequentially presented 
screens (Figure 4.7). In Experiment 2 the risky event was HIV infection during 
blood transfusion, observed in the same manner as for Experiment 1. On those 
screens a series of figures (houses or people) were presented, where the red figures 
(indicating the occurrence of the risky event) were distributed randomly. In both 
experiments the total presentation of events lasted less than one minute.
Figure 4.7  An example of boards in the sequential display format.
The Experiment 1 scenario was as follows:
Please imagine that you are going to change your place of residence. In a 
moment, you will be shown the frequency of house fires in one year in your new 
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 The communication of probabilistic information 71
location according to the statistics of the local fire service. You will see a series 
of houses in two colors: white and red. Red indicates houses having suffered a fire 
and white indicates houses experiencing no fire. Fires were serious enough to cause 
significant material damage.
(The red houses were distributed randomly. The total presentation of events 
lasted less than one minute.)
The Experiment 2 scenario was as follows:
Please imagine that you are going on vacation to an exotic country. During your 
stay you fall ill with a disease, the treatment of which requires a blood transfusion. 
In a moment you will see a display of World Health Organization statistics relating 
to the annual frequency of HIV infection during blood transfusions in this country. 
The display consists of a series of people in two colors: black and red. A red person 
indicates an HIV infection and a black person indicates no infection during a blood 
transfusion in this country.
(The red people were distributed randomly, and the total presentation of events 
lasted less than one minute.)
4.4.2.4  Procedure
Each participant was presented with three different levels of the probability of a 
house fire (or HIV infection; a within-subjects factor) in random order: 10, 32, or 
50 in 10,000. There were breaks of five seconds between presentations of each 
screen
After each presentation at a given probability level, participants were asked 
to evaluate the risk of a house fire in Experiment 1 and HIV infection risk in 
Experiment 2 on a visual analog risk affect scale (0–100) consisting of three items:
• Risk – (ranging from ‘complete lack of risk’ to ‘extremely high risk’),
• Danger – how dangerous the risky situation was (from ‘complete lack of 
danger’ to ‘extremely high danger’),
• Worry – being worried about the risk (from ‘extremely calm’ to ‘extremely 
anxious’).
Cronbach’s α for the scale was 0.94.
4.4.3  Experiment 1 – results
4.4.3.1  Evaluation of house fire risk on the risk affect scale for three 
probability formats
Figure 4.8 depicts average evaluations of the three probability levels on the risk 
affect scale for the three probability display formats. Data were analyzed using a 
mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with probability level (0.0010, 0.0032, 
0.0050) as a within-subjects factor and probability format (sequential display, 
frequencies, percentages) as a between-subjects factor. We found a significant 
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main effect of probability level, F(2,272) = 78.088, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.365, and 
a significant main effect of probability format, F(2,136) = 4.158, p = 0.018, 
ηp2 = 0.058. Additionally, there was a significant probability level by probability 
format interaction, F(4,272) = 2.892, p = 0.023, ηp2 = 0.041. Planned contrast 
showed that probability format had significant impact on evaluation of risk on the 
affect scale for probability 0.0010, F(2,136) = 3.187, p = 0.044, ηp2 = 0.045 and for 
probability 0.0050, F(2,136) = 4.981, p = 0.008, ηp2 = 0.068 but was insignificant 
for probability 0.0032, F(2,136) = 2.956, p > .05.
Figure 4.8  Average evaluation of house fire risk information on the risk affect scale 
for three probability levels in the three probability formats. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals.
Evaluations of house fire risk were the highest for the sequential display 
probability format and lowest for the percentage probability format for two 
probability levels: 0.0032 and 0.0050. Previous studies have found that people tend 
to ignore information about probabilities of very rare events, and the tendency to 
ignore this information was lowest for the sequential display format. Moreover, 
the interaction between probability level and probability format indicated that 
participants had differing sensitivities to probability variations across the three 
probability formats.
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4.4.3.2  Sensitivity to differences in probability magnitudes
We measured sensitivity to differences in probability magnitudes as the difference 
between evaluations of house fire risk for the highest (0.0050) and lowest (0.0010) 
probability levels on the risk affect scale (see Figure 4.9).
Figure 4.9  The difference between evaluations of the highest (0.0050) and the 
lowest (0.0010) probability levels on the risk affect scale for three probability 
formats. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
For the results presented in Figure 4.9 the mean difference between the highest 
(0.0050) and lowest (0.0010) evaluations of house fire risk on the risk affect scale 
was 29.88 (SD = 18.20) for the sequential display format, 19.17 (SD = 18.20) for 
the frequency format, and 17.33 (SD = 19.74) for the percentage format. A one-way 
ANOVA performed on the differences between evaluations revealed a significant 
effect of format on risk affect scale responses, F(2,122) = 4.935; p = 0.009. The 
Tukey post hoc test revealed that the sensitivity to differences in probability 
magnitudes was significantly greater when sequential displays probability format 
was used than when both frequencies and percentages were used (each p < 0.05). 
The sensitivity to differences in probability magnitudes was not significantly 
different when frequencies and percentages were used.
Summarizing, the data supported the study’s hypothesis that participants 
would be the most sensitive to probability variations when the sequential display 
probability format was used. Additionally, we found that the lowest sensitivity was 
observed for the percentage format.
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4.4.4  Experiment 2 – results
4.4.4.1  Evaluation of HIV infection risk on the risk affect scale for 
three probability formats
Figure 4.10 represents average evaluations of the three probability levels on the 
risk affect scale for the three probability formats. As in Experiment 1, data were 
analyzed using a mixed-design ANOVA with probability level (0.0010, 0.0032, 
0.0050) as a within-subjects factor and probability format (sequential display, 
frequencies, percentages) as a between-subjects factor. There was a significant 
main effect for probability level, F(2,294) = 72.783, p < 0.001; ηp2 = 0.331, and 
a significant main effect for probability format, F(2,147) = 3.464, p = 0.034, 
ηp2 = 0.045. The interaction between probability level and probability format was 
marginally non-significant, F(4,294) = 2.135, p = 0.076, ηp2 = 0.028.
Figure 4.10  Average evaluation of HIV risk information on the risk affect scale 
for three probability levels in the three probability formats for communicating 
probabilistic information. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Unlike Experiment 1, evaluations of HIV risk were highest for the frequency 
probability format and (for two probability levels: 0.0032, 0.0050) lowest for the 
percentage probability format. However, for all three probability levels, the mean 
evaluations of HIV infection risk for the sequential display format were similar 
to those in Experiment 1 where the stimulus was house fire risk. This result 
suggests that, regardless of the type of risk, participants made similar evaluations 
of probability levels on the risk affect scale under the sequential display format.
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4.4.4.2  Sensitivity to differences in probability magnitudes
We measured sensitivity to variations in probability as the difference between 
evaluations of HIV infection risk for the highest (0.0050) and the lowest (0.0010) 
probability levels on the risk affect scale (see Figure 4.11).
Figure 4.11  The difference between evaluations for the highest (0.0050) and the 
lowest (0.0010) probability level on the risk affect scale for three probability formats. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
For the results presented in Figure 4.11 the mean difference between the highest 
(0.0050) and lowest (0.0010) evaluations of HIV infection risk on the risk affect 
scale was 21.99 (SD = 15.56) for the sequential display format, 16.17 (SD = 12.47) 
for the frequency format, and 16.3 (SD = 17.93) for the percentage format. A 
one-way ANOVA performed on the differences between the evaluations showed 
no significant effect of format on risk affect scale responses, F(2,134) = 2.119, 
p = 0.124.
Summarizing, the data partially supported the study’s hypothesis that participants 
would be the most sensitive to probability variations when the sequential display 
probability format was used, and that the lowest sensitivity would be observed for 
the percentage format.
In the two studies we demonstrated the effect of probability format on 
sensitivity to probability variations using a risk affect scale. In both studies the 
highest sensitivity was observed for the sequential display format. Differences 
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in sensitivity to variations in probabilities across formats were significant in the 
experiment involving house fire risk but not in that involving HIV infection risk. 
Therefore, there was only partial confirmation of the hypothesis that the highest 
sensitivity to probability variations would be for the sequential display format. 
Nonetheless, we still suggest that, overall, the new presentation format is more 
effective for low probability events than the alternatives.
The studies also showed differences in comprehension of probability information 
for both house fire risk and risk of HIV infection during a blood transfusion. Perhaps 
this was due to the type of risk: to a physical asset in the case of house fire risk and 
to health in the case of HIV infection. Generally, we obtained higher values on the 
risk affect scale in the case of health risk (Experiment 2), which can be attributed to 
the nature of this risk inducing greater emotional arousal. Consequently, this could 
also have resulted in the lower differences in sensitivity to probability variations 
observed in Experiment 2. However, further research is required to confirm this. 
It is worth noting that, in addition to its sensitivity to probability variations being 
the highest and despite differences in the nature of risk, the mean measure for the 
sequential display format was relatively stable across both studies.
4.5  CONCLUSIONS
The proposed new format for communicating probabilities – sequentially 
displayed frequencies – had some advantages over other formats. One advantage 
was that the new probability format was less influenced by the type of risk being 
evaluated, which makes the probability evaluations it produces more reliable. The 
other advantage was that it had the highest sensitivity to variations in probabilities 
compared to the frequency and percentage formats. These advantages suggest that 
the sequential display format may be useful in communicating small probability 
risks and may contribute to more systematic and less heuristic-laden processing of 
risk messages (Visscher et al. 2009).
Where do the advantages of sequential displays of frequencies over the other 
formats of presenting probabilities come from? In the 1950s and 1960s there 
was a series of research studies on the perception of frequencies of everyday life 
events such as frequencies of the appearance of different letters in newspapers, of 
different words in spoken English, etc. (see, e.g., Attneave, 1953). The results of 
these experiments showed that subjective evaluations of the frequencies of such 
events were highly accurate. Further, Hasher and Zacks (1979) found that even pre-
school children performed well on tasks in which they observed stimuli shown with 
different frequencies and had to evaluate their frequencies of occurrence. According 
to Tooby and Cosmides (1992), this amazing accuracy of perceptions of frequencies 
may be the result of human evolution. Historically, people needed to develop a 
mechanism for using information about the frequencies of various events. Human 
hunter-gatherers depended upon the resources they were able to find in nature. The 
ability to properly determine frequencies associated with the abundance of resources 
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seems to be crucial for survival. Thus, the proposed sequential display method of 
communicating probabilities is based on evolutionarily adapted perceptions of 
frequencies of events. And this accounts for its high practical usability.
Still another advantage of the sequential display of frequencies format over the 
other formats of presenting probabilities is its relative insensitivity to affect-laden 
stimuli. This is a vital issue, since when dealing with affect-laden stimuli people 
become insensitive to values of probabilities. For example, Fox (2014) noted that 
more than a quarter of Americans were worried about being infected with Ebola 
despite expert opinion that the spread of this virus in the United States or any other 
developed country was very unlikely. In this case, intense emotions resulted in 
significantly overweighting the very low level of probability. On the other hand, 
people may underweight small probabilities of events which have not occurred 
recently (see Chapter 2 of this volume). The sequentially displayed frequencies 
method seems to reduce such tendencies.
How might this method be used for communicating probabilities of flooding? 
There are two major differences between the display used in our two experiments 
and the requirements for information about flooding. First, while frequencies of 
fires and infections can be represented by the proportions of their occurrence 
within a neighborhood or community during a given interval, frequencies of floods 
should be presented as a function of time (years). The frequencies of flood events 
should refer to the flooding of certain areas during different periods. Second, 
unlike fires and infections, which either happen or not, the degree of severity of a 
flood is highly relevant. Thus, in the case of floods it seems desirable to include at 
least three states: no flooding, a small flood and a large flood.
For example, in order to communicate the probabilities of flood events – 0.02 
for a large flood, 0.2 for a small flood, and 0.78 for no flood – one could use a 
sequence of 50 screens randomly presenting the three events – no flood, small 
flood, and large flood (as shown in Figure 4.12), with corresponding frequencies: 1, 
10, and 39. Each screen represents one year. For still smaller probabilities, one can 
use screens representing not 1 year but longer intervals such as 10 years.
Figure 4.12  Communicating probabilities of flood events. Random presentation 
of screens relating to three events: (1) no flood; (2) small flood, and (3) large flood.
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5.1  INTRODUCTION
5.1.1  Risk perception
This chapter focuses on the role of emotions in forming judgements about risk, 
and particularly judgements in the context of differentiation between risks caused 
by acts of nature versus human actions. The notion of risk is ambiguous. The most 
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common technical definition of risk views it as a combination of the probability of 
an adverse event and the magnitude of its consequences (Rayner & Cantor, 1987). 
This simple approach to risk has been used extensively by experts, who define risk 
using only two dimensions: the objective probability of a specific event happening 
and the severity of the event’s consequences. In contrast, risk perceptions of the 
general public are based on the subjective assessment of probabilities and the 
degree of concern about consequences (Sjöberg et al. 2004). Generally, public risk 
perceptions are based not only on technical and scientific descriptions of danger, 
but on more complex assessments than those used by experts, and are influenced 
by various psychological and social factors, such as personal experience, emotions, 
values, interests, worldviews, etc. (Slovic, 2000; Leiserowitz, 2005).
Analysis of the specific factors that have a decisive role in public risk perceptions 
has attracted much interest from both politicians and researchers. One of the 
most dominant and popular models in the field of risk perception research is the 
psychometric model developed by Slovic and his collaborators (Fischhoff et al. 1978, 
1981; Slovic, 2000). In this model people’s risk perceptions have at least 19 dimensions 
(Covello et al. 1988). However, only five of these are crucial for the evaluation of 
risks: severity of consequences, perceived event controllability, knowledge of risks, 
voluntariness of exposure, and dreadfulness (Slovic et al. 1982; Covello et al. 1988; 
Slovic, 2000; Fox-Glassman & Weber, 2016). These aspects of risk perception are 
measured by asking people to assess a risky situation or event based on several scales:
• Perceived event controllability is assessed as the degree of an individual’s 
belief that they can influence a risk.
• Severity of consequences estimates the subjective likelihood that the 
consequences of the risky situation or event will be fatal.
• Knowledge of risks describes the extent of personal familiarity with the 
presented risks.
• Voluntariness of exposure evaluates whether people generally face the 
described risks voluntarily or not.
• Dreadfulness asks whether the risks presented are common risks that people 
have learned to live with, or whether they are risks that people dread greatly 
(Sjöberg et al. 2004).
In the present research topic – the difference in perceptions of risk between 
events caused by acts of nature and events caused by human actions – our attention 
focuses on three aspects that are closely linked to risk perception dimensions in the 
psychometric model: the general notion of risk, the severity of consequences, the 
degree of suffering caused by an event, and the unfairness of an event.
In our research, we use ‘dangerousness’ to assess general perceptions of the 
riskiness of a situation or event. The concepts of risk and dangerousness are used 
interchangeably both in laypeople’s risk perceptions and in the literature (Tierney 
et  al. 2001; Mansnerus, 2012). Both dangerousness and risk are ambiguous 
concepts (Leiserowitz, 2005) and their meanings in the context of risk assessment 
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vary from person to person. They can be used to describe the severity of negative 
consequences (Kogan & Wallach, 1964), to refer to the probability of occurrence of 
damage or harm (Moiraghi, 2007) or reflect dread (Rudski et al. 2011), the latter is 
directly comparable to the dimension of dreadfulness in the psychometric model. 
In the legal literature the term dangerousness refers to the probability of antisocial 
behaviour (cf. Kozol et al. 1972).
We also employ two closely related risk perception dimensions: severity of 
consequences and degree of suffering (both physical and psychological) caused 
by a negative event. These two dimensions focus on the negative consequences 
(damage) experienced by people exposed to risk. In contrast to the psychometric 
model, we assess severity of consequences in terms of seriousness of damage, 
which can be both financial and physical, and not as the probability of death 
resulting from an event. The dimension of suffering as a negative consequence 
of an event defines another aspect of damage, and was previously emphasized in 
research by Slovic et al. (1991) and Siegrist and Sütterlin (2014).
A fourth dimension used to assess risk perception in our work is an event’s 
unfairness. This aspect is referred to as ‘equity’ in the psychometric model, and 
is used to define an equitable versus inequitable distribution of risks and benefits 
(Covello et  al. 1988). Fairness is an important factor in risk acceptability and 
tolerance (Rayner & Cantor, 1987; Sjöberg, 1987; Nerb & Spada, 2001). People are 
more willing to accept risks if the distribution of risks and benefits is perceived to be 
just (Keller & Sarin, 1988). On the other hand, the unfairness of an event increases 
perceptions of the event’s riskiness (Sandman, 1989; Gregory & Mendelsohn, 
1993; Sjöberg & Drottz-Sjöberg, 2001).
Finally, we include a concept which we define as ‘compensation for the exposure to 
a risky situation’ (Viscusi, 1995; Janmaimool & Watanabe, 2014). Strictly speaking, 
compensation size is not a dimension of risk perception, but we believe it to be 
associated with the severity of consequences and perceived suffering dimensions 
(Bromley, 1992; Ritov & Baron, 1994; Kunreuther, 2002; Baan & Klijn, 2004).
5.1.2  Hazards and emotions
An increasing body of evidence suggests that, in addition to cognitive processes, 
emotions have an enormous impact on risk perception and assessment processes 
(Kunreuther, 2002; Sjöberg, 2007, 2012; Nguyen & Noussair, 2014). Authors such 
as Finucane et al. (2000), Loewenstein (2001) and many others (e.g., McDaniels 
et al. 1995; Slovic & Peters, 2006) consider that emotions are a central factor in 
risk perception. Finucane et  al. (2000) developed the ‘affect heuristic’ concept, 
as a mediator of the relationship between risks and benefits in individual risk 
assessment. This heuristic postulates that individuals automatically assess events 
or other entities as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. ‘Good’ entities evoke positive feelings and are 
subsequently perceived as safe, and ‘bad’ entities evoke negative feelings and are 
perceived as risky (Rudski et al. 2011). Instead of basing their judgements of risk 
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on objective facts, people tend to use their feelings (affect) about specific hazards 
to assess the risk associated with them (Slovic & Peters, 2006; Siegrist & Sütterlin, 
2014). In a similar fashion, the risk-as-feelings model of Loewenstein et al. (2001) 
emphasizes the important role of feelings, in addition to cognitive evaluations, 
in people’s behaviour. Note that Zajonc (1980) also suggested that an emotional 
component dominates people’s decisions and behaviours, since emotional (affective) 
evaluation occurs automatically before any conscious processing can take place.
In risk analysis, emotional reactions can be expressed both as affect (negative 
or positive: Sjöberg, 2000; Sokolowska & Sleboda, 2015) or specific emotions, 
especially negative ones (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Sjöberg, 2007). Böhm (2003) 
suggests that, in contrast to general affect, concrete emotions carry specific semantic 
content and thus provide better information about individual risk perceptions and 
behavioural tendencies. Different types of emotions perform different roles in 
risk perception (Böhm, 2003). Specifically, moral emotions may be important for 
human judgement and decision-making (Spranca et al. 1991; Boyce et al. 1992; 
Harris & Brown, 1992; Walker et al. 1999). Models of risk perception that include 
an ‘unnatural and immoral risk’ factor have higher predictive value than models 
without such a factor (Sjöberg, 2000).
Moral emotions are evoked by violations of moral rules or obligations and 
subsequent moral concerns (Roberts, 2010; Landmann & Hess, 2016), and can be 
directed at either the perpetrator (e.g., anger for transgressions), the victim, (e.g., 
compassion for suffering and pain) or the self (e.g., shame for being unable to 
stop a perpetrator). Haidt (2003) distinguishes four families of moral emotions: 
other-condemning emotions (contempt, anger and disgust), self-conscious moral 
emotions (shame, embarrassment and guilt), other-suffering moral emotions 
(distress at others’ distress and sympathy/compassion) and other-praising moral 
emotions (gratitude, awe and elevation). He notes that there are also other emotions 
which can be considered moral but which do not fall into the above four categories, 
for example, schadenfreude and, in some circumstances, fear; Haidt (2003: 864) 
calls these ‘marginal or non-prototypical moral emotions’. Similarly, Böhm and 
Pfister (2000) suggest classifying moral emotions, or as they term them ‘ethics-
based emotions’, into other-directed (disgust, contempt, outrage, anger and 
disappointment) and self-directed (guilt and shame) ethical emotions.
5.1.3  The study’s aim
‘Origin of hazard’ is one of the risk perception dimensions used in the psychometric 
model: it addresses the question of whether a risk is caused by an act of nature or by 
human actions (Covello et al. 1988). Laypeople tend to perceive human-made risks 
as riskier than those caused by natural factors. Specifically, human-made risks are 
perceived as being scarier, more dangerous, causing more suffering, and having 
more severe outcomes; their fatalities are seen as being less acceptable than those 
occurring as the result of natural hazards (Rudski et al. 2011; Siegrist & Sütterlin, 
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2014). When given a choice, people prefer to be injured due to a natural cause 
rather than an artificial cause (Rudski et al. 2011). Similarly, people’s willingness 
to prevent harm caused by humans is greater than their willingness to prevent 
the same harm resulting from natural causes (Kahneman et al. 1993; Kahneman 
& Ritov, 1994). In line with these findings, in our study we expected that, when 
harm occurred due to human action, a risky situation would be perceived as more 
dangerous and unfair, the damage it caused would be considered to be more severe 
and a victim’s suffering to be greater, and, consequently, that a victim would be 
said to be entitled to higher monetary compensation for exposure to a risky event.
Human-made hazards also evoke more intense emotional reactions than natural 
hazards. Stronger negative affect is observed in response to disasters caused by 
humans than natural disasters (Rudski et al. 2011). Moreover, human-made hazards 
often evoke blame, anger and outrage directed at the responsible agents (Nerb & 
Spada, 2001; Böhm, 2003). In contrast, natural hazards require no assignment of 
responsibility since they are beyond anyone’s control (they are inevitable) and can 
affect anyone (Nerb & Spada, 2001). Thus, the acceptance of natural cycles results 
in more favourable assessment of natural hazards compared to disasters caused by 
humans that can be avoided if controlled (Weiner, 1995; Siegrist & Sütterlin, 2014). 
Consistent with this previous research then, in our study we also expected emotional 
responses to hazards caused by humans, expressed both as negative affect and 
specific moral emotions, to be stronger than emotional responses to natural hazards.
Emotional reactions play a mediating role between type of hazard (human-
made or natural) and perceived risk (Xie et al. 2011). In line with Böhm (2003) 
we hypothesized that specific emotions, both those directed at a perpetrator (e.g., 
anger and outrage) and a victim (e.g., compassion and sadness), would be better 
at predicting risk perceptions than negative affect, due to the specific semantic 
content that they carry.
This chapter aims to conduct a thorough examination of the structure of 
emotional responses to natural and human-made hazards and their impact on the 
perception of risks embedded in specific hazards. First, we compare the perceived 
riskiness of hazards with the same harmful consequences when caused by nature 
versus human actions. Then we examine differences in emotional responses to 
events caused by nature and humans. Finally, we analyse the impact of various 
emotional responses evoked by hazards on perceptions of hazards’ riskiness.
5.2  METHOD
5.2.1  Participants
Two hundred participants were randomly assigned to one of four treatments: 
50 participants per treatment. Of the 200 participants, 101 were female and 99 
male, equally distributed across treatments. Participants had a mean age of 43 
years (SD = 9.55). This specific age structure was chosen since we believed that 
life experience, which increases with age, might be beneficial in completing the 
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experimental tasks. Moreover, older participants have been found to be better at 
expressing emotional reactions (Miesen, 2011), which was beneficial in answering 
our research questions. Participants were compensated for their participation and 
informed that they had to correctly answer three control questions included in the 
scenarios used in order to get a reward for their participation. These questions 
ensured that participants carefully read the scenarios presented to them. Data were 
only analysed for participants correctly answering all control questions.
5.2.2  Materials and procedure
5.2.2.1  Scenarios
The experimental scenarios described situations in which protagonists suffered 
harm. This harm had either a human-cause (1a) or was caused by nature (1b). 
Moreover, irrespective of the cause of harm, the type of harm caused to the 
protagonist was either physical (2a) or material (2b: i.e., harm was caused to the 
protagonist’s property causing financial loss). Thus, a first treatment variable was 
perpetrator with two levels: human versus nature. A second treatment variable was 
harm with two levels: physical versus financial. The two treatment variables were 
incorporated in short scenarios consisting of descriptions of a single event which 
were presented to participants. The content of each scenario is summarized below, 
and precise descriptions of the scenarios can be found in Appendix A:
• Nature-Financial: A protagonist lives in a house situated in an area prone to 
floods. This area is protected by a levee. Due to heavy rains, the level of water 
in a nearby river recently increased. One day the levee was overtopped by 
water and many houses, among them the protagonist’s house, were flooded.
• Human-Financial: A protagonist lives in a house, which is situated in an 
area prone to floods. This area is protected by a levee. Due to heavy rains, 
the level of water in a nearby river recently increased. The levee was broken 
on the orders of the governor of the district, whose house was in an area 
unprotected by the levee a few kilometres down the river. This was done to 
protect his house from flooding, but as a result many houses, among them the 
protagonist’s house, were flooded.
• Nature-Physical: A protagonist went on a long-planned trip to Morocco. She 
planned to visit many places. However, during the second day of her visit 
an earthquake occurred. During this earthquake the protagonist suffered an 
open fracture of a thighbone and after being treated in hospital had to return 
immediately to her home country.
• Human-Physical: A protagonist went on a long-planned trip to Morocco. 
She planned to visit many places. However, during the second day of her 
visit a terrorist detonated a bomb. As a result of the explosion the protagonist 
suffered an open fracture of a thighbone and after being treated in hospital 
had to return immediately to her home country.
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In the scenarios participants were instructed to take on the role of a sibling 
of the protagonist and try to experience the emotions that they would experience 
in the aftermath of the events described. According to Sjöberg (2000) the ‘risk 
target is a factor of great importance in risk perception’, since people tend to assess 
risk differently according to whether the target of a risky situation is a member 
of their family (or themselves) or the general population. Thus, by defining the 
risk target as a participants’ family member we attempted to make them become 
actively engaged in the experimental task and have a higher degree of empathy 
with protagonists in the experimental scenarios, to the extent that they would 
experience stronger feelings about the stories presented.
5.2.2.2  Emotional response measurement
Two types of emotional response were measured. First, we assessed participants’ 
general emotional reactions to scenarios, henceforth this is referred to as negative 
affect. For this, participants were asked to express their feelings after reading a 
scenario on a scale ranging from ‘very negative’ (1) to ‘very positive’ (11). Second, we 
evaluated the specific emotions experienced by participants after reading a scenario. 
Here, participants were presented with a set of predefined emotions and asked to 
evaluate which of them they experienced. They evaluated each of the presented 
emotions on a scale ranging from ‘haven’t experienced at all’ (1) to ‘experienced 
very intensively’ (11). Emotions were presented to participants in random order.
Choice of specific emotions
In accordance with Izard’s (1997) theory of emotions, and in line with the findings 
of Sjöberg (2007) who found that negative emotions are more important than 
positive emotions in predicting risk perceptions, we selected nine predominantly 
negative emotions from the Geneva Emotions Wheel (GEW; Scherer, 2005; 
Scherer et  al. 2013). These emotions are: sadness, regret, compassion, disgust, 
contempt, anger, disappointment, hate and fear. Since some of these emotions 
represent responses to the bad deeds of others and some represent responses to 
bad things experienced by others, we find it useful to further group the emotional 
terms into ‘other-condemning’ (disgust, contempt, anger, disappointment and hate) 
and ‘other-suffering’ (sadness, regret and compassion) emotions. Note that since 
fear could be both a reaction to the bad deeds of others and a reaction to others’ 
suffering (e.g., fear for loved ones) we consider it to be a mixed-emotion and do not 
include it in these emotion groups.
5.2.2.3  Risk perception
For the present work, we adopted the consequentialist view of risk perception 
suggested by Böhm and Pfister (2000): evaluation of the consequences of a 
negative event consists of not only evaluating potential negative consequences 
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but also negative consequences that are already present. Based on theoretical 
considerations and previous empirical applications (Fischhoff et al. 1978; Slovic 
et al. 1980; Ritov & Baron, 1994; Nerb & Spada, 2001; Rudski et al. 2011; Siegrist 
& Sütterlin, 2014) five items (questions) were chosen to measure various dimensions 
of risk perception:
• How much did a person suffer due to the negative event?
• How severe was the damage to the person as a result of the event?
• How dangerous do you think the event was?
• How unfair was the event?
• What (monetary) compensation should the protagonist get for their suffering 
in the described situation from a fictitious EU Assistance Fund which helps 
victims of unfortunate events?
To evaluate the first four risk perception items, participants used a scale ranging 
from ‘not at all’ (1) to ‘very (much/severe/dangerous/unfair)’ (11). Monetary 
compensation could be offered in the range 1 to 50 thousand PLN. Risk perception 
items were presented to participants in random order. The instructions for the 
‘Compensation size’ risk perception item can be found in Appendix B.
5.3  RESULTS
Perpetrator: Nature versus Human
Table 5.1 presents the mean values of specific risk perception items for each of 
the two perpetrator-type treatments: nature and human. Statistical tests for all five 
risk perception items revealed significant differences in the perception of damage 
occurring between events attributable to natural and human causes, the results 
suggesting that incidents caused by humans are evaluated as riskier than those 
caused by nature, even when event outcomes are the same.
Table 5.1  Risk perceptions for the perpetrator treatments: nature versus human.
Items Cause of Event NN = NH M-Wp
Nature Human
M SD M SD
Perceived suffering 8.14 1.90 8.79 1.93 100 0.001
Perceived severity of damage 7.93 1.72 8.40 1.80 100 0.023
Perceived dangerousness 6.57 2.73 7.36 2.52 100 0.034
Perceived unfairness 6.55 2.78 8.13 2.55 100 0.000
Size of compensation 25.89 16.99 31.71 16.35 100 0.012
Note: For items 1 to 4 scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to 11 (very much); for item 5 values 
ranged from 1 to 50 thousand PLN; NN and NH are sample sizes for the nature and human 
scenarios. M-Wp is the two-sided probability of Mann-Whitney tests.
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The emotional reactions reported by participants are presented in Table 5.2. As 
in previous research (cf. Siegrist & Sütterlin, 2014), for the most part, the events 
caused by humans resulted in significantly stronger emotional reactions than 
those caused by nature, the only exceptions being the non-significant results for 
compassion and disappointment.
Table 5.2  Emotions experienced in response to the perpetrator treatments: 
nature versus human.
Emotion Item NN = NH M-Wp
Nature Human
M SD M SD
Affecta 9.36 1.83 9.80 2.21 100 0.003
Sadness 8.92 2.38 9.81 1.85 100 0.002
Regret 9.03 1.97 9.22 2.62 100 0.028
Disappointment 6.12 3.06 6.69 3.68 100 0.135
Fear 7.30 3.08 7.96 3.28 100 0.050
Disgust 2.71 2.49 4.85 3.75 100 0.000
Contempt 2.48 2.13 5.07 3.72 100 0.000
Hate 2.60 2.32 6.06 3.82 100 0.000
Anger 7.22 2.83 8.57 2.94 100 0.000
Compassion 9.63 1.72 9.40 2.71 100 0.210
Note: For the intensity of specific emotions scales ranged for 1 (not at all) to 11 (very much); NN and NH are 
sample sizes for the nature and human scenarios. M-Wp is the two-sided probability of Mann-Whitney tests.
aAffect was reverse recoded on a scale ranging from 1 (positive) to 11 (negative).
Harm: Financial versus Physical
Table 5.3 presents the mean values of specific risk perception items for each of the 
two harm treatments: financial versus physical. Overall, the results suggest that 
incidents resulting in financial harm are evaluated as riskier than those causing 
physical harm. Participants’ decisions to offer significantly higher compensation 
for financial harm than for physical harm were consistent with these findings.
Table 5.3  Risk perceptions for the harm treatments: financial versus physical.
Items Cause of Event NF = NP M-Wp
Financial Physical
M SD M SD
Perceived suffering 8.16 2.30 8.77 1.46 100 0.135
Perceived severity of damage 8.41 1.84 7.92 1.67 100 0.011
Perceived dangerousness 7.46 2.48 6.47 2.74 100 0.008
Perceived unfairness 7.43 2.94 7.25 2.62 100 0.306
Size of compensation 35.14 15.57 22.46 15.80 100 0.000
Note: For items 1 to 4 scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to 11 (very much); for item 5 values ranged from 
1 to 50 thousand PLN; NF and NP are sample sizes for the financial and physical harm scenarios. M-Wp 
is the two-sided probability of Mann-Whitney tests.
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The emotional reactions of participants based on type of harm to the 
protagonists are presented in Table 5.4. Except for marginal differences in sadness 
and compassion, emotional reactions did not differ between the treatments.
Table 5.4  Emotions experienced in response to harm treatments: financial versus 
physical.
Emotion Item NN = NH M-Wp
Financial Physical
M SD M SD
Affecta 9.76 2.03 9.40 2.04 100 0.106
Sadness 9.12 2.30 9.61 2.03 100 0.092
Regret 8.88 2.41 9.37 2.20 100 0.138
Disappointment 6.60 3.41 6.21 3.37 100 0.376
Fear 7.70 3.08 7.56 3.30 100 0.998
Disgust 4.02 3.65 3.54 3.02 100 0.572
Contempt 3.97 3.49 3.58 3.08 100 0.484
Hate 4.08 3.61 4.58 3.59 100 0.348
Anger 7.88 3.02 7.91 2.91 100 0.945
Compassion 9.09 2.72 9.94 1.61 100 0.074
Note: For intensity of specific emotions scales ranged for 1 (not at all) to 11 (very much); NF 
and NP are sample sizes for the financial and physical harm scenarios. M-Wp is the two-
sided probability of Mann-Whitney tests. aAffect was reverse recoded on a scale ranging 
from 1 (positive) to 11 (negative).
5.3.1  The structure of emotional reactions and 
risk judgements
Correlational analysis showed that many of the specific emotions evoked by 
the experimental treatments were significantly correlated with each other (see 
Appendix C). This indicates that subjects experienced several similar emotions 
at the same time. Factor analysis was therefore conducted to discover ‘bundles’ 
of emotions. An initial factor analysis revealed a structure of emotions loading on 
two factors: five on a first factor and four on a second factor. However, subsequent 
examination suggested exclusion of the fear item from the factor analytic 
solution. The fear item was removed based on a criterion presented in Hair et al. 
(2014: 120), which suggests removing items with communalities below 0.50: the 
communality of fear was 0.38. Additional criteria for the decision were (1) quite a 
low correlation between this item and the total score for the initial scale (r = 0.38), 
and (2) improvement of scale reliability after the removal of fear from 0.72 to 0.77. 
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This decision was also consistent with the criterion of judging solutions by their 
‘interpretability and scientific utility’ (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013: 647). According 
to Böhm (2003) and Xie et al. (2011), fear clearly belongs to a group of emotions 
which have a ‘prospective’ character, yet the initial factor analysis assigned it to the 
‘retrospective’ group. The fear item was analysed as a separate emotion in further 
analyses.
Table 5.5 presents respecified factor loadings for emotion ratings after 
VARIMAX rotation. This solution corresponds to our theoretical distinction 
between emotion types (other-condemning and other-suffering emotions) and to 
Böhm’s (2003) distinction between ethics-based other-directed and consequence-
based retrospective emotions. The first factor, which involves other-condemning 
emotions, has high loadings for disgust, contempt, hate, anger and disappointment. 
The second factor, which reflects other-suffering emotions, has high loadings for 
regret, sadness and compassion.















Explained variance (%) 39.04 27.56
Cronbach’s α 0.83 0.77
An index for each of the two factors (i.e., emotion bundles) was computed by 
taking participants’ mean ratings across all of the emotions that loaded highly 
on a factor. These indices had acceptable internal consistency as measured by 
Cronbach’s α (see Table 5.5). Further analyses were conducted with the two 
calculated ‘bundles’ of emotions, and, as mentioned above, fear as a separate 
emotion.
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, the strength of the other-condemning and other-
suffering emotions differed depending on the source of threat. However, the difference 
was much greater in the case of other-condemning than other-suffering emotions.
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Figure 5.1  Other-condemning and other-suffering emotions experienced in 
response to the two perpetrator treatments: nature versus human. U Mann-Whitney 
***p < 0.001, *p = 0.028.
5.3.2  Mediation analyses
In the next step we tested whether any of the emotional reactions expressed by 
participants were predictors of responses to risk perception items. Here, for each 
risk perception item separately, we constructed a model allowing transmission of 
treatment effects through several mediation mechanisms simultaneously, namely 
other-condemning emotions (OCE), other-suffering emotions (OSE), fear, and 
negative affect (NA). Although significant, the correlations between NA and 
the specific emotions were low, suggesting that there were no problems with 
multicollinearity in the mediation analyses (see Appendix D). Since we found 
no significant differences between financial and physical harm with respect to 
emotional reactions, we concluded that emotions had no explanatory power in 
accounting for differences in risk perception between these scenarios. Therefore, 
we did not perform separate analysis for the harm treatments and concentrated 
our analysis only on the perpetrator treatments. Results of mediation analyses are 
summarized in Appendix E.
Emotional reactions as a mediator between the perpetrator treatment 
variable and perceived dangerousness
The relationship between perpetrator-type and the dangerousness risk perception 
item was mediated by NA. As Figure 5.2 illustrates, the regression coefficient 
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for the perpetrator-type – NA relationship was statistically significant, as was that 
for the NA – perception of dangerousness relationship. We tested the significance 
of the indirect effect (0.16) using bootstrapping procedures, and the bootstrapped 
95% confidence interval suggested that the indirect effect was statistically 
significant (CI95 = [0.008, 0.444]).
Figure 5.2  Mediation analysis for perceptions of dangerousness.
Emotional reactions as a mediator between the perpetrator treatment 
variable and perceived severity
The relationship between perpetrator-type and the severity risk perception item 
was partially mediated by both the OCE and NA. As Figure 5.3 illustrates, the 
regression coefficient for the relationship between perpetrator-type and OCE was 
statistically significant, as was that for the relationship between OSE and the 
severity risk perception item. Also, the regression coefficients for the relationships 
between type of perpetrator and NA, and NA and perceived severity were 
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statistically significant. The significance of the two indirect effects (OCE = 0.21; 
NA = 0.20) was tested using bootstrapping procedures. The bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals (OCE: CI95 = [0.015, 0.423]; NA: CI95 = [0.057, 0.419]) 
suggested that both indirect effects were statistically significant. Next, we tested 
which indirect effect was stronger (Hayes, 2013), that is, which of the mediators 
accounts for more of the effect that perpetrator-type had on the severity risk 
perception item. The difference between the two indirect effects (0.01) was 
insignificant (C95 = [-0.271, 0.285]), thus we concluded that the indirect effects 
were of similar strength.
Figure 5.3  Mediation analysis for perception of severity.
Emotional reactions as a mediator between the perpetrator treatment 
variable and perceived suffering
The relationship between perpetrator-type and the suffering risk perception item 
was mediated by NA. As Figure 5.4 illustrates, the regression coefficient for the 
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perpetrator-type – NA relationship was statistically significant, as was that for 
the relationship between NA and perception of suffering. The bootstrapped 95% 
confidence interval (CI95 = [0.066, 0.428]) suggested that the indirect effect (0.20) 
was statistically significant.
Figure 5.4  Mediation analysis for perception of suffering.
Emotional reactions as a mediator between the perpetrator treatment 
variable and perceived unfairness
The relationship between perpetrator-type and the unfairness risk perception item 
was partially mediated by both the OCE factor and NA. As Figure 5.5 illustrates, 
the regression coefficient for the relationship between type of perpetrator and 
OCE was statistically significant, as was that for the relationship between OSE 
and the unfairness risk perception item. Also, the regression coefficients for the 
relationship between type of perpetrator and NA, and NA and perceived unfairness 
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were statistically significant. Again, we tested the significance of the two indirect 
effects (OCE = 0.56; NA = 0.18) using bootstrapping procedures. The bootstrapped 
95% confidence intervals (OCE: CI95 = [0.266, 0.942]; NA: CI95 = [0.025, 0.435]) 
suggested that both indirect effects were statistically significant. We then tested 
which indirect effect was stronger to see which of the mediators had the greatest 
role in explaining the relationship between perpetrator-type and responses to the 
unfairness risk perception item. The difference between the two indirect effects 
(0.38) was non-significant (CI95 = [-0.007, 0.835]) and we concluded that the 
indirect effects were of similar strength.
Figure 5.5  Mediation analysis for perceived unfairness of the event.
5.4  CONCLUSIONS
Our research leads to several important conclusions. First, results showed that a 
hazard’s origins influence its perceived riskiness. When the cause of harm was 
human action rather than nature, a situation was perceived as more dangerous and 
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unfair, damage was considered more severe, a victim’s suffering greater and higher 
compensation for the victim was recommended. Generally, these differences are 
in line with the results of previous research showing that harm caused by humans 
is perceived as riskier (Xie et  al. 2011), more dangerous (Rudski et  al. 2011), 
more severe (Siegrist & Sütterlin, 2014; Rudski et al. 2011), and as causing more 
suffering (Siegrist & Sütterlin, 2014) than harm resulting from natural events. 
Second, emotional responses to hazards caused by humans are generally stronger 
than emotions evoked by natural hazards. We compared three types of emotional 
responses: general NA and two types of moral emotion – OCE and OSE. Our 
results revealed that, relative to natural hazards, hazards caused by humans evoked 
stronger NA, as well as OCE (i.e., a mixture of disgust, contempt, hatred, anger 
and disappointment) and OSE (i.e., a mixture of sadness, regret and compassion). 
The intensity of OSE was much greater than OCE in both natural and human-made 
risky situations. Thus, witnessing the victim’s distress and pain induced a very 
high level of OSE in comparison to OCE, irrespective of the origins of harm.
Both of these results – the influence that a hazard’s origins have on its perceived 
riskiness and the stronger emotional response elicited by hazards caused by 
humans – accord with the idea that human-made risks are less accepted than 
risks attributable to natural causes. This suggests that the harm caused by the 
breaking of a levee under the orders of a local authority to prevent the flooding of 
highly populated areas would evoke stronger negative reactions than equal harm 
resulting from natural causes, for example, the natural breaking or overflowing of 
the levee. Presumably, people would expect higher financial compensation for a 
loss resulting from human action than for an objectively equal loss caused by the 
forces of nature. This provides a suggestion for efficient risk management in hazard 
prone localities. Meeting resident victims’ expectations regarding compensation 
for losses would result in an increase in the trust in authorities and as such could 
induce more cooperative behaviour in response to future hazards. For example, 
trust in authorities increases compliance with evacuation orders (Paul, 2012; Rød 
et al. 2012).
Additionally, we analysed which, if any, negative emotional reactions mediate 
the differences in perception of natural and human-caused risky situations. First, we 
found that, for all four dimensions of risk perception, NA was a significant mediator 
of the difference in perceptions of natural and human-caused risky situations. In 
other words, perceiving risky situations caused by humans as more dangerous, as 
causing more harm and suffering and as being more unfair than naturally-caused 
risky situations, was mediated by the stronger NA felt when a hazard was human-
made than when it was caused by nature. Similarly, for some dimensions of risk 
perception – dangerousness and victims’ suffering – OCE were a significant mediator 
of the difference in perceptions of natural and human-made risky situations. That 
is, perceiving a risky situation caused by a human as more dangerous, and as 
causing more suffering than a naturally-caused risky situation, was mediated by the 
stronger OCE felt when a hazard was human-made and not caused by nature. Thus, 
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the emotions evoked by a human perpetrator contributed to the final evaluation 
of human-made risks as being higher than risks caused by nature. The mediation 
effect of OSE was however small and insignificant. A possible explanation for this 
finding could be the fact that OSE were extremely high in both natural and human-
made risky situations. This is in line with Böhm and Pfister (2005), who found that 
such emotions as sympathy, sadness and sorrow, or as they call them ‘consequence-
based emotions’, were less affected by the risk origin and were generally highly 
independent of whether the hazard was nature or human-caused.
The fact that fear did not influence risk perception might be surprising, since 
there are studies showing such influence. Lerner et al. (2003) for example showed, 
that participants feeling more fear gave higher probability estimates of risks terror-
related as well as not terror-related than participants feeling less fear. However, 
this might be due to the fact that fear is an emotion that precedes the occurrence of 
the consequences while in the scenarios used in the study negative consequences 
have already occurred, thus other types of emotions – for example, anger or hatred – 
became more important.
The above results show that both types of emotional reactions – general NA 
and certain moral emotions (specifically, OCE) – are responsible for differences in 
risk perception occurring between human-made and naturally caused hazards. In 
other words, attributing harm to a human perpetrator increases people’s negative 
emotional reactions. Stronger negative emotions in turn lead to a situation or 
activity being perceived as more dangerous, having more severe consequences, 
causing more suffering, etc. So, increases in perceived risk can be an effect of the 
affect heuristic: the worse we feel when contemplating a situation/activity the more 
dangerous and the more harmful we find it.
Fischhoff et al. (1978) studied methods of informing the public about risks and 
involving them in policy decisions. They focused on so-called ‘fault trees’, that is, 
schematic, hierarchically organized representations of possible causes of undesired 
outcomes or events. These are simple devices for analysing and evaluating things 
that could go wrong. One of the main findings was that people were rather insensitive 
to factors left out of a fault tree, ignoring factors that were not explicitly stated. 
Another finding was that people perceived a particular branch as more important 
when it was presented piecemeal, for example, a single branch representing the 
breaking of levees by water would mean more for a person if it was presented as two 
branches: (1) penetration of levees, and (2) water overflowing levees.
This type of technique is likely to be useful for making residents of flood-prone 
areas more aware of a range of possible causes of hazard-related loss. In particular, 
such increased awareness would be desirable where residents are inclined to succumb 
to the so-called ‘safety illusion’, that is, feeling safer than is justified because of the 
existence of some form of protection such as a levee (see Chapters 9 and 10 for more on 
the safety illusion). The devising of a fault tree might be an efficient way of stimulating 
residents’ awareness of the range of possible causes of a hazard. Including different 
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aspects of human activities in such an analysis would increase the availability of 
causes and the probabilities assigned to them when thinking of the hazard.
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIOS
Nature-financial
Imagine that you have a brother named Peter. Peter and his wife live in a house that 
his wife has inherited from her aunt. The house is very comfortable and located 
in a nice place, and Peter really likes it. The house is located on a flood plain. The 
river is protected by a levee. Flooding has not occurred in the area for a long time. 
Recently, heavy rains dramatically increased the level of water in the river. One 
night, the water overtopped the levee and many houses in the area, among them 
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the house of Peter, were flooded. Water flooded basements and reached 30 cm in 
rooms on the ground floor.
Human-financial
Imagine that you have a brother named Peter. Peter and his wife live in a house that 
his wife has inherited from her aunt. The house is very comfortable and located in a 
nice place, and Peter really likes it. The house is located on a flood plain. The river is 
protected by a levee. Flooding has not occurred in the area for a long time. Recently, 
heavy rains dramatically increased the level of water in the river. A village a few 
kilometres down the river, which had no flood embankment, was threatened. The 
governor of the district had a house in this village. One night, without notice to 
residents, to avoid flooding the governor’s house, the levee was broken in the village 
where Peter lived, with the full awareness that many homes would be flooded. After 
breaking the levee many homes in the area, among them the house of Peter, were 
flooded. Water flooded basements and reached 30 cm in ground floor rooms.
Nature-physical
Imagine that you have a sister named Kasia. Kasia is a primary school teacher. It 
is hard work because she works with a variety of children, including children with 
special needs. Kasia is very dedicated to her work and the kids love her. During 
the winter holidays she decided to go for a long-deserved vacation and went on a 
week’s trip to Morocco. She had been dreaming of this trip for a long time and 
saved-up for it. She was very glad that she would see famous Moroccan cities such 
as Casablanca, Marrakech and Fez. On the second day, when she was in the old 
town of Marrakech, there was an earthquake. The strength of the shock was so 
great that the facades of buildings collapsed and Kasia suffered an open fracture of 
a thighbone. Kasia is now in hospital and after receiving first aid she will return to 
Poland. Her insurance covers the costs of treatment and her return to the country, 
but she will not recoup the money she spent on the trip.
Human-physical
Imagine that you have a sister named Kasia. Kasia is a primary school teacher. It 
is hard work because she works with a variety of children, including children with 
special needs. Kasia is very dedicated to her work and the kids love her. During 
the winter holidays she decided to go for a long-deserved vacation and went on a 
week’s trip to Morocco. She had been dreaming of this trip for a long time and 
saved-up for it. She was very glad that she would see famous Moroccan cities such 
as Casablanca, Marrakech and Fez. On the second day, when she was in the old 
town of Marrakech, there was a terrorist attack – a bomb exploded. The explosion 
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of the bomb planted by the terrorist was so strong that the facades of buildings 
collapsed and Kasia suffered an open fracture of a thighbone. Kasia is now in 
hospital and after receiving first aid she will return to Poland. Her insurance covers 
the costs of treatment and her return to the country, but she will not recoup the 
money she spent on the trip.
APPENDIX B: COMPENSATION
Imagine that there is an EU Assistance Fund. This fund pays compensation to 
victims of adverse events or misfortune for the pain and suffering associated with 
these events. Typical compensation ranges from 1 to 50 thousand PLN. Kasia/Peter 
got in touch with this fund. In your opinion, what compensation should Kasia/Peter 
get from the EU Assistance Fund?
APPENDIX C: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DIFFERENT EMOTIONS
Emotion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sadness (1)
Regret (2) 0.542**
Disappointment (3) 0.219** 0.256**
Fear (4) 0.353** 0.339** 0.252**
Disgust (5) 0.070 –0.088 0.396** 0.098
Contempt (6) 0.102 –0.042 0.371** 0.024 0.759**
Hate (7) 0.146* 0.015 0.331** 0.171* 0.697** 0.676**
Anger (8) 0.455** 0.243** 0.406** 0.325** 0.389** 0.404** 0.486**
Compassion (9) 0.537** 0.491** 0.025 0.251** -0.195** -0.168* -0.083 0.176*
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
APPENDIX D: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NEGATIVE AFFECT 
AND SPECIFIC EMOTION FACTORS
Emotional Reaction (1) (2) (3)
Negative affect (1)
Other-condemning emotions (2) 0.234**
Other-suffering emotions (3) 0.383** 0.107
Fear (4) 0.229** 0.221** 0.380**
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E: SUMMARY OF MEDIATION ANALYSES 
RESULTS
Emotional Reaction Risk Perception Measure
Dangerousness Severity Suffering Unfairness
Negative affect + + + +
Other-condemning 
emotions
- + - +
Other-suffering 
emotions
- - - -
Fear - - - -
Note: (+) mediation effect; (-) no mediation effect.
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6.1  INTRODUCTION
Chapter 6
What determines willingness to 
take preventive actions in areas 
experiencing severe flooding?
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Negative events such as floods or other natural hazards generally cannot be prevented, 
but one can try to anticipate them and to take actions aimed at reducing their negative 
consequences. In order to minimize possible losses the decision-maker needs to: (1) 
accurately perceive the danger, and (2) take adequate precautionary measures. In the 
present research we focus on both of these issues. The first issue is how inhabitants 
of areas exposed to frequent flood hazards perceive this threat, including perceived 
magnitude and probability of damage, and how much they worry about the next 
flood. The second issue concerns willingness to adopt precautionary measures.
The purpose of the research was therefore to identify the crucial factors 
determining both the perception of flood threat and the willingness to adopt 
means of prevention among people exposed to flood hazards. Numerous studies 
(see quotations below) show that several factors influence these perceptions and 
behaviors. Among the factors that determine willingness to take protective actions, 
the most frequently discussed are the following:
• previous personal experience of disasters
• social norms concerning preparedness for disasters
• perception of the threat
As shown by Weinstein (1989), the most crucial factor which determines both 
threat perceptions and decisions to adopt precautionary measures seems to be 
previous personal experience of a disaster. Weinstein (1989) claimed that personal 
experience affects risk perception: victims see the hazard as more frequent than 
non-victims, and this in turn increases willingness to take precautionary actions. 
In particular, severity of past damage increases hazard preparedness. However, 
Kunreuther (1978) showed that this effect is more complex. In Kunreuther’s study, 
severity of flood damage led to more protective measures, but severity of an 
earthquake had little effect. Moreover, Siegrist and Gutscher (2008) showed that 
crucial in determining whether precautionary measures are taken is the extent to 
which negative emotions are associated with a disaster experience. People who had 
recently been affected by a flood disaster were more likely to take preventive action 
due to the strong negative affect associated with a flood. Still, the authors found 
that while negative experience increased willingness to invest time and money 
in preventive measures, it did not guarantee that such action would be taken (a 
large proportion of subjects who experienced flooding did not intend to take any 
remedial measures to forestall the effects of future floods). Indeed, research by 
Zaalberg et al. (2009) showed that the relationship between self-protective behavior 
and personal experience tends to be mediated by beliefs about the effectiveness of 
protective measures. In the present study almost all residents supplying data had 
experienced flooding. Therefore the subject of our research was the degree of flood 
severity rather than the presence or absence of previous flood experience.
The second most frequently mentioned factor in the context of willingness to adopt 
precautionary measures is social norms concerning preparedness for disasters. When 
an individual is uncertain of the correct course of action in a given situation they often 
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follow established social norms. Indeed, in their study of evacuation behavior at the 
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in 1979, Cutter and Barnes (1982) 
found that the actions of friends and neighbors strongly influenced residents’ decisions 
to evacuate. Similarly, Mileti and Darlington (1997) emphasized the influence of 
neighbors and relatives on disaster preparedness. Many other researchers (e.g., Major, 
1993) have also shown that social norms can have a strong impact on decisions to take 
precautionary actions. Again, this factor was taken into account in this study.
A third set of factors that possibly influence willingness to adopt precautionary 
measures are those related to risk perception. Two crucial components of risk 
perception are the perceived magnitude and probability of future damage. As 
noted by van der Pligt (1998), decision theory, the theory of reasoned action 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) all 
predict that the probability and severity of consequences are prime determinants of 
attitudes towards precautionary behaviors. However, research findings concerning 
the impact of perceived risk on precautionary behaviors are mixed (see van der 
Pligt, 1998). In particular, Schade et al. (2012) demonstrated that worry was much 
more important than subjective probability in determining willingness to pay for 
insurance. This suggests that risk-taking behavior may be better explained by the 
risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et  al. 2001) or emotion-imbued choice 
model (Lerner et al. 2015) than the rational decision theory.
Within the framework of the decision theory model, two other factors should 
also have an impact on a decision-maker’s willingness to take preventive measures. 
One is that their actions can make a difference in preventing damage, a positive 
correlation being expected here. In line with this expectation, Kievik and Gutteling 
(2011) found that, in the context of flood risk, there was a high correlation between 
efficacy beliefs and declared intention to engage in self-protective behaviors. 
Similarly, one can expect a negative correlation between decision-makers’ 
willingness to adopt means of prevention and the belief that in the case of a negative 
event one can obtain outside help (e.g., from local government). These factors were 
also included in our research along with factors related to the perceived risk.
In addition to the above factors we considered the effects of technical 
infrastructure protecting against flooding. We believed that this factor might affect 
both perceptions of the flood threat and willingness to adopt means of prevention 
against flood hazards. This factor has not been studied very often in the context of 
natural disasters. Our interest in this topic started from a remark by Kundzewicz 
(1999) that ‘a flood protection system guaranteeing complete safety is an illusion’ 
(p. 559). However, it is likely that people whose safety has subsequently been 
improved by the introduction of technical infrastructure after severe flooding might 
be subject to a safety illusion, believing that the probability of future flood damage 
is extremely low. This might decrease willingness to take preventive action. This 
second claim is in line with the risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1982). According 
to this theory, after the introduction of a new safety measure people become less 
cautious and risk returns to its preceding level.
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To study the effects of introducing new safety measures we took advantage of 
having access to inhabitants of villages which have frequently experienced floods. 
We decided to compare the perceptions and behaviors of inhabitants of two different 
types of flooded area. First, the villages of Ciezkowice and Gnojnik were selected. 
These are situated in sub-mountainous regions where relatively steep slopes 
cause flash floods – a type of flood characterized by a very short time between 
precipitation and a flood wave. Between the years 1997 – 2010 lower or higher flood 
levels occurred very often in both places: nine times in Ciezkowice and ten times 
in Gnojnik. These two areas are not protected by levees. Second, the village of 
Swiniary was selected. This village is protected by levees which results in floods 
occurring only rarely. The levees protect this area against small and medium sized 
floods, but in the rare instances when a flood overtops the levees, inhabitants are 
faced with a catastrophic situation: the depth of the water exceeds two or three 
metres in many places. In 1972 such a flood occurred in this area and in 1997 and 
2010 the water came so close to the top of the levees that inhabitants were evacuated.
Summarizing, the first two areas (Ciezkowice and Gnojnik) are not protected 
by levees and floods affect local societies relatively often causing small or medium 
losses. The third area (Swiniary) is protected by levees and flooding is a rare 
occurrence, but when it does occur losses are very high. In studying these two 
different types of area it was not possible to separate the impact of the existence 
of levees and frequency of flooding since these two factors were necessarily 
confounded. Irrespective of the existence of levees, regularity of flood occurrence 
may have its own effects on assessment of probability related to the next flood and 
on willingness to protect oneself against the flood. We know that when people 
observe even a very short sequence of a single type of event they tend to expect a 
continuation of the trend (Huettel et al. 2002); this is known as the positive recency 
effect. Thus, in our field study we formed hypotheses concerning the joint effect of 
two factors: existence of levees and regularity of flooding.
H1. Inhabitants of the area protected by levees (resulting in rare experience of 
floods) will perceive the probability of flooding as lower than inhabitants of 
the areas unprotected by levees (resulting in frequent experience of floods).
H2. Inhabitants of the area protected by levees (resulting in rare experience 
of floods) will be less ready to adopt protective actions against floods 
than inhabitants of the areas unprotected by levees (resulting in frequent 
experience of floods).
 Naturally, as mentioned above, the levees are not the only determinant 
of willingness to adopt protective actions against floods. Thus, we formed 
Hypothesis 3.
H3. Willingness to adopt protective actions against floods will be affected by the 
severity of previous negative experiences, perceived social norms concerning 
protecting oneself against floods, and the perceived threat of floods.
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6.2  METHOD
Participants and materials: One hundred and fifty-one residents of three areas 
experiencing severe flooding (44% male and 56% female) participated in the study. 
In the recent past, all three areas had experienced regular floods. Two of them were 
still not protected by levees and were frequently flooded, causing small or medium 
losses for residents. The third area was recently protected by levees, causing floods 
to occur less frequently. All participants completed a questionnaire consisting of 20 
questions.
Three questions concerned willingness to undertake preventive actions. 
First, respondents were asked to directly answer the question ‘do you undertake 
any preventive actions against floods?’ Secondly, they were asked to specify 
the amount of money they were willing to spend on a government-subsidized 
prevention program. Finally, they were asked to indicate which of 12 preventive 
actions listed they actually took.
Other questions concerned possible determinants of willingness to undertake 
preventive actions against floods. Issues tapped were as follows:
• personal experience (have you ever personally experienced a flood?)
• the water level in a person’s house during the largest flood experienced
• the perceived probability of damage caused by floods
• the perceived magnitude of damage caused by floods
• worries about flooding (how much are you worried about flooding?)
• social norms (do your neighbors undertake any preventive actions against the 
consequences of floods?)
• the belief that one’s action can make a difference
A five-point Likert-type scale (from 1 to 5) was used to respond to most of these 
questions. Responses to the question about personal experience took the form of 
a yes-no answer. Responses to the item about the water level in houses during the 
largest flood experienced were given in centimetres.
A few additional questions which are not analyzed in this paper were also asked 
(e.g., Does local government protect this area against floods in any way? During 
flood seasons are you provided with all the necessary information? A question 
about insurance, etc.).
6.3  RESULTS
No statistical differences were found between the two unprotected regions, therefore 
we concentrate upon differences between the unprotected regions and regions 
protected by flood levees. As mentioned in the Introduction, high percentages of 
residents in both types of region had personally experienced a flood (85% and 86% 
respectively).
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6.3.1  How did inhabitants of the areas exposed to flood 
hazards perceive the threat?
Table 6.1 shows the results of independent samples t-tests comparing perceptions of 
the flood threat of people in the region protected against flooding by embankments 
versus perceptions of those in the two non-protected regions. As can be seen, 
inhabitants of both types of region declared a high level of worry linked to 
the possibility of floods. Here, the difference between the two means was non-
significant. On the other hand, the perceived probability of damage was significantly 
lower in the region protected against floods compared to the non-protected regions. 
This supported the hypothesis that the presence of levees (resulting in only rare 
experience of floods) influenced perceived probability of floods.
Table 6.1  Mean judgments of factors potentially determining willingness to take 






N Mean N Mean
Water level in the 
house
101 58.9 50 218.7 -9.010 149 <0.000
Perceived probability 
of damage
101 78.7 50 49.1 5.400 149 <0.000
Perceived magnitude 
of damage
101 3.88 50 4.82 -5.523 149 <0.000
Worry about flooding 101 4.09 50 4.42 -1.459 149 0.147
Moreover, Table 6.1 shows that inhabitants of both types of region expected 
extensive material damage if a flood were to occur, but perceived magnitude 
of damage was significantly higher in the region protected against flooding by 
embankments than in the non-protected regions. This is consistent with a finding 
that inhabitants of the region protected against floods previously experienced 
significantly higher water levels in their houses than those living in the non-
protected regions.
As shown in Table 6.2, we found significant positive correlations between 
judgments of worry and perceived probability of damage (r = 0.34), and 
perceived magnitude of damage (r = 0.46). Interestingly, separate analyses for 
the two types of region showed that for the inhabitants of unprotected regions 
judgments of worry were positively correlated with both, perceived probability 
of damage and with perceived magnitude of damage, while for the inhabitants 
of the protected region there was only a significant correlation for perceived 
magnitude of damage.
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Table 6.2  Pearson correlations between judgments of worry and both perceived 






Perceived probability of damage 0.34** 0.10 0.56**
Perceived magnitude of damage 0.46** 0.39* 0.48**
*Correlation significant at the 0.005 level
**Correlation significant at the 0.001 level
6.3.2  Determinants of willingness to take preventive 
actions against flood hazard
As can be seen in Table 6.3, both groups of residents declared a general 
willingness to take preventive actions. The difference between the two means was 
not significant. However, inhabitants of the regions unprotected against floods 
reported significantly more (around twice as many) concrete preventive actions than 
inhabitants of the region protected by flood levees. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show how 
many preventive actions were reported as being undertaken in the two unprotected 
regions versus the region protected by levees. Similarly, in the regions unprotected 
against floods, the inhabitants declared that they were prepared to spend significantly 
more money on government-subsidized prevention programs. Thus, Hypothesis 2 
was supported for two of the measures of willingness to take preventive actions: 
residents of the regions unprotected against floods reported a higher number of 
preventive actions and declared that more money should be spent on government-
subsidized prevention programs than inhabitants of the region protected by flood 
levees.
Table 6.3  Means of three measures of willingness to undertake preventive 






N Mean N Mean
Declared willingness to 
take preventive actions
101 3.13 50 2.86 1.027 149 0.31
Number of protective 
actions
101 3.88 50 1.90 2.219 146 0.03
Amount of money willing to 
spend on the government 
prevention program
98 1092 PLN 50 440 PLN 5.023 149 0.001
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of the number of preventive actions taken in the two unprotected 
regions.
Figure 6.2 Distribution of the number of preventive actions taken in the region 
protected by flood levees.
Moreover, we found a significant positive correlation (r = 0.48, p < 0.001) 
between number of preventive actions taken and extent of willingness to take 
preventive actions in the unprotected regions, but no such correlation for the 
protected region. Also, no significant correlations were found between the amount 
of money spent on government-subsidized prevention programs and the two other 
measures of willingness to take preventive actions.
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To test Hypothesis 3, we performed three regression analyses to identify variables 
influencing willingness to take preventive actions. Potential predictors were as follows:
• protected versus unprotected region type
• perceived magnitude of damage
• perceived probability of damage
• worry about flooding
• perceived social norm concerning protection of oneself against a flood
• water level in a person’s house during the largest flood experienced
Two measures of the willingness to take preventive actions were used as 
dependent variables: general declaration, and number of preventive actions taken. 
Since we found no significant correlations between the amount of money spent on 
government-subsidized prevention programs and the two measures of willingness 
to take preventive actions, we do not regard the amount of money spent on 
prevention programs as another measure of willingness to take preventive actions.
Results of these analyses are presented in Table 6.4 As can be seen, declared 
willingness to undertake preventive actions was significantly influenced only by 
the perceived social norm. The number of protective actions taken was significantly 
influenced by the type of region, perceived social norm, and marginally by the water 
level in a person’s house during the largest flood experienced. When we applied 
regression analysis to predict the number of protective actions taken separately for the 
two unprotected regions’ data only, we found significant effects for the perceived social 
norm and the water level in a person’s house during the largest flood experienced.
Table 6.4  Summary of multiple regression analyses for variables predicting 












Taken for Two 
Unprotected 
Regions
B SE β SE β SE
Water level in the house 0.027 0.094 0.143 0.093 0.335* 0.092
Perceived probability of 
damage
0.050 0.091 0.083 0.090 0.117 0.107
Perceived magnitude of 
damage
0.153 0.094 0.027 0.092 -0.116 0.106
Worry about flooding -0.042 0.090 0.014 0.088 0.093 0.111
Perceived social norm 0.400* 0.077 0.235* 0.076 0.381* 0.089
Type of region 0.083 0.109 0.413* 0.107 – –
N 151 151 101
R2 0.203 0.229 0.228
F 6.098 7.112 7.686
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Neither perceived probability of damage nor perceived magnitude of damage had a 
significant impact on any measure of willingness to protect oneself against the hazard.
6.4  CONCLUSIONS
In the present research we compared residents of two types of region with respect 
to their perceptions and willingness to take preventive actions against natural 
hazards. One type of region had previously experienced severe flooding but had 
recently been protected by raising embankments to hold back water, while the 
other type remained unprotected and regularly experienced severe flooding. As far 
as perception of risk was concerned, we found that the two groups of inhabitants 
differed markedly with respect to perceived probability of flooding. Inhabitants 
of the unprotected regions with regular experience of severe flooding perceived 
the probability of the flooding as high, while inhabitants of the protected region 
perceived the probability of the flooding to be much smaller. This confirms several 
previous findings that the frequency and recency of events strongly affects the 
perceived probability of the occurrence of another event (see Weinstein, 1989; for 
a review). Obviously the present research did not allow us to determine whether 
the perceived probability of damage was more highly influenced by the presence 
of levees or by the frequency and recency of flooding since these two factors were 
necessarily confounded.
Interestingly, however, residents of both types of region were equally highly 
worried about flooding. Thus, the presence of embankments and lack of recent 
experience of flooding did not reduce inhabitants’ judgments of worry. Moreover, 
we found differences between the two groups of residents with respect to 
relationships between judgments of worry, perceived probability of flooding, and 
perceived magnitude of possible damage. Judgments of worry in residents of the 
unprotected regions were positively correlated with both the perceived probability 
of flooding and perceived magnitude of damage. On the other hand, judgments 
of worry in residents of the protected region were positively correlated with the 
perceived magnitude of possible damage, but not with the perceived probability of 
damage. Taken together, these results demonstrate that worrying about flooding is 
not only contingent upon recent negative experience; it may be elicited by old but 
severe experience of damage as well. Indeed, as shown in Table 6.1, residents of 
the protected region had previously experienced more damage than residents of the 
unprotected regions (as measured by the water level in a person’s house during the 
largest flood experienced).
Inhabitants of both types of region declared a high level of willingness to take 
preventive action. However, inhabitants of the regions not protected by levees 
reported a relatively high number of specific actions taken to prevent flooding, 
in addition to a greater readiness to spend more money on the government-
subsidized prevention program. Thus, only in the case of inhabitants of the 
unprotected regions were high feelings of worry and high declared willingness 
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to take preventive action accompanied by taking specific preventive actions and 
readiness to spend relatively high amounts of money on the government-subsidized 
prevention program. Equally high feelings of worry and declared willingness to 
take preventive action did not translate into such behaviors in inhabitants of the 
region protected by levees. Inhabitants of the unprotected regions reported taking 
significantly more specific preventive actions than inhabitants of the protected 
region. Similarly, inhabitants of the unprotected regions declared significantly 
higher readiness to spend money on the government-subsidized prevention 
program than inhabitants of the protected region. Moreover, there was only a 
significant correlation between making a general declaration of willingness to take 
preventive actions and the declared number of actions undertaken for inhabitants 
of the unprotected regions (there was no such correlation for inhabitants of the 
region protected by flood levees). This may suggest that general declarations of 
willingness to protect themselves against the flood threat by inhabitants of the 
flood protected region were just ‘cheap talk’. Taken together, these results suggest 
that inhabitants of the region where the safety measures were introduced felt well 
protected against the flood and were not motivated to take additional preventive 
actions. This may be interpreted as showing overconfidence in safety measures or 
an illusion of safety. It is interesting that this overconfidence in safety measures, 
while seemingly reducing inhabitants’ willingness to protect themselves against a 
flood threat, did not reduce declared feelings of worry.
The present research supports previous findings on the impact of personal 
experience and perceived social norms on willingness to take preventive actions 
against hazards. The importance of both of these factors has been reported in 
several previous studies. They are also discussed in many theoretical approaches, 
including Lindell and Perry’s (2011) Protective Action Decision Model. Although 
the effect of personal experience on self-protective behavior is commonly 
recognized, there is some disagreement about the mechanism involved. Some 
researchers emphasize the severity of previously experienced disasters (Weinstein, 
1989) and other factors related to perceived risk (e.g., perceived vulnerability). 
Others have shown that negative emotions associated with personal experience 
of a flood disaster are crucial in determining willingness to take precautionary 
measures. For example, Siegrist and Gutscher (2008) found that people who had not 
been affected by a flood disaster experienced difficulty in taking the position of a 
flood victim and imagining their emotions during a flood. Interestingly, the present 
research implies that the impact of a given factor on willingness to protect oneself 
against a hazard may depend upon the type of protective behavior measured. Thus, 
the amount of money that participants declared that they were willing to spend on 
a government-subsidized prevention program was significantly related to worry 
about flooding. On the other hand, when willingness to protect oneself against a 
hazard was measured through the number of preventive actions actually taken by 
an individual, water level in a person’s house during the largest flood experienced 
was a significant determinant of the behavior.
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As with much other previous research (Cutter & Barnes, 1982; Major, 1993; 
Mileti & Darlington, 1997), in the present study social norms were a key factor 
determining willingness to take preventive actions against hazards. This was true 
irrespective of how willingness to protect oneself was measured: by (1) a general 
declaration; (2) the amount of money that participants declared they were willing 
to spend on a government-subsidized prevention program; or (3) the number of 
preventive actions actually taken by an individual.
Perhaps the most intriguing finding was the absence of a relationship between 
decision-makers’ willingness to undertake preventive actions and factors related 
to risk perception: perceived probability of damage and perceived magnitude of 
loss. This runs contrary to decision theory, which suggests that these two factors 
should motivate an individual to protect oneself against a hazard. Naturally, many 
psychological theories (e.g., the theory of reasoned action) assume that when an 
individual considers taking an action they first form an intention to take the action. 
However, such an intention does not necessarily lead to actual behavior. A person 
can face several barriers (lack of resources, lack of time, etc.) which prevent them 
from taking the planned actions. This is also considered in Lindell and Perry’s 
(2011) Protective Action Decision Model, where the authors recognize that the 
behavioral response of an actor depends not only on intentions to take preventive 
actions but also on various situational impediments.
Finally, we found somewhat mixed results concerning the impact of worry 
on willingness to protect oneself against flood hazard. When residents of 
endangered regions were asked about the amount of money that they were willing 
to spend on a government-subsidized prevention program their answers were 
influenced by their feelings of worry. This finding agrees with that of Schade 
et al. (2012) who found that worry was very important in determining decisions 
to purchase insurance against disasters. Perhaps the decision to spend money on 
a government-subsidized prevention program was considered by residents as a 
type of behavior similar to purchasing insurance against a disaster. By contrast, 
when residents were asked about the number of preventive actions actually taken, 
this measure of willingness to protect oneself against a hazard was not correlated 
with worry about flooding. Here, when undertaking various preventive actions, 
perhaps the residents of the threatened regions had learned that such actions 
did not reduce the risk to a high degree. In fact, more than 70% of residents 
of the threatened regions believed that their actions would make no difference. 
Thus, since the inhabitants of the unprotected areas did not believe in efficient 
self-protection, their decisions to take protective actions against the threat could 
hardly be based on their threat perceptions. We speculate that inhabitants of 
the unprotected areas, experiencing a type of learned helplessness (Seligman, 
1975), did not base their prevention activities on cognitive dimensions of threat 
appraisal, but, rather, based them on their previous personal experience of 
disasters and perceived social norms instead.
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7.1  INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your family house is located in a beautiful village, near a mountain 
stream. This year, the stream has flooded, destroying most of your personal 
belongings. Moreover, an expert has said that your house must be rebuilt if you 
intend to remain living there safely. This will be very expensive and you do not 
know if you can afford it.
Chapter 7
Cognitive and emotional factors 
influencing the propensity to 
insure oneself against disaster
© IWA Publishing 2017. Large risks with low probabilities: Perceptions and willingness 
to take preventive measures against flooding
Tadeusz Tyszka and Piotr Zielonka
doi: 10.2166/ 9781780408590_119
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
120 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
Despite the disastrous outcomes associated with natural hazards such as those 
described above, people often tend to restrain themselves from purchasing insurance 
against them (Zaleskiewicz et al. 2002; Kunreuther & Pauly, 2004). People may 
downplay their evaluations of environmental threats, including the expected severity 
of negative consequences (such as death, injury, property damage, etc.). They also 
downplay, or even ignore, information about probabilities (Slovic et al. 1977). Rather 
than basing their decisions on cognitive processes, people facing natural hazards 
may base their insurance decisions on emotional reactions (e.g., fear) evoked by 
personal experience of a disaster (Zaleskiewicz et al. 2002). In the present study 
we attempted to identify which factor – cognitive evaluations or feelings – is more 
decisive in insurance purchasing decisions. Specifically, we hypothesized that 
personal experience of severe negative outcomes would increase feelings of worry 
which, in turn, would influence decisions to pay more for insurance.
7.1.1  Cognitive factors influencing the propensity to 
insure oneself against disaster
Buying insurance against a natural hazard can be regarded as a decision to reduce 
a low-probability risk of severe negative consequences. Thus, the disastrous 
consequences of losing all of one’s belongings as the result of a flood might be 
compensated by purchasing insurance that transfers the risk of a financial loss to 
the insurer. Normative theories of choice (e.g., expected utility [EU] theory) posit 
that a rational decision-maker weights outcomes by probabilities in order to choose 
an alternative characterized by the highest expected utility (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944). Following this assumption, it is argued that optimal decisions 
to purchase insurance are made by people considering factors such as its price, 
their wealth, and the potential magnitude of loss and its probability (Mossin, 1968; 
Raviv, 1979; Dong et al. 1996).
The EU approach is accepted by Lindell and Perry (2012) in their multistage 
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM), which describes several phases 
of the protective decision-making process. The process begins with observing 
environmental and/or social cues. For example, when one observes that one’s 
neighbors are flooded or are buying insurance against flooding, or that authorities 
in the mass media have identified a flood threat and have suggested taking 
protective action, one starts to think about the threat. This leads to perception of 
the threat, mainly in terms of the probability of a disaster and its consequences 
(i.e., the expected personal impact, such as injury or property damage). When 
the probability of a disaster and its negative consequences are judged to be at an 
unacceptable level people are motivated to decide whether to invest money in 
property insurance or whether to take protective actions. The PADM involves 
many specific factors and processes influencing insurance purchase decisions.
Summarizing, according to the approach commonly accepted in decision 
theory, the subjective probability of a disaster should be one of the most important 
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cognitive factors in deciding whether to purchase insurance. However, Kunreuther 
and Pauly (2004) posit that objective information about the probability of a disaster 
is rarely available and people are generally not interested in searching for such 
information (Tyszka & Zaleskiewicz, 2006; Huber & Kunz, 2007). Furthermore, 
probability information is usually poorly understood even it is known (Kunreuther 
et al. 2001). For example, people judging the safety of a hypothetical chemical 
facility did not distinguish between a 1 in 100,000 and a 1 in 1,000,000 probability 
of a disaster. According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), objective 
probabilities are transformed non-linearly and extremely low probabilities (such 
as the probability of a natural disaster) are likely to be ignored or underestimated. 
This effect appears to be even more pronounced under the influence of affect 
(Traczyk & Fulawka, 2016). In the case of insurance decisions, whether the 
subjective probability of such risks exceeds a detection threshold appears crucial 
(Kunreuther, 2006; Huber, 2012; Ranyard & McHugh, 2012).
7.1.2  Emotional factors influencing the propensity to 
insure oneself against disaster
There is increasing empirical evidence that cognitive processes may be less 
important than affective processes in risky decision-making. A growing body of 
research has accumulated over the past two decades showing that affect and feelings 
have a core role in risk-taking behavior (Bechara et al. 1996; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Bechara, 2004; Slovic et al. 2007; Lerner et al. 2015). 
For example, Damasio (1994) proposed the somatic marker hypothesis, according 
to which, feelings generated from secondary emotions predict future outcomes 
and guide rational decisions. Similarly, Slovic et al. (2007) posited that positive or 
negative affect in response to a stimulus serves as a cue altering perceptions of risks 
and benefits, although other authors have demonstrated that feelings’ influence on 
decisions is not simply dependent on emotional valence (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
The role of affect and feelings in risk-taking behavior may be especially 
important for low-probability, high-loss events such as natural hazards (Ranyard, 
2017). Probability information may be difficult to understand and process in such 
situations (Kunreuther et  al. 2001). Instead of considering the abstract concept 
of probability, people may take more concrete and easily accessible factors into 
account such as affect (Slovic et al. 2007).
A theoretical distinction between how emotional reactions and cognitive 
evaluations can influence decision-making was proposed by Loewenstein et al. 
(2001) in their risk-as-feelings hypothesis. Their model assumes that both 
emotional and cognitive factors influence risk-taking behavior (see Figure 7.1). 
Importantly, the above authors emphasize that negative feelings (e.g., fear or 
worry) associated with risky decisions are highly influenced by the vividness of 
mental images of risk: the more vivid that the mental images of the consequences 
of risk taking are, the more intense will be the evocation of negative feelings and 
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the greater the influence on subsequent behavior. Vividness of mental images 
may account for the crucial role that personal experience of a disaster plays in 
risk perception and protecting oneself against similar disasters (e.g., by buying 
insurance).
Figure 7.1  The risk-as-feelings model, adapted from Loewenstein et al. (2001).
7.1.3  The role of personal experience in the propensity to 
insure oneself against disaster
Besides cognitive and emotional factors, personal experience appears to be 
extremely important in decisions about purchasing insurance against natural 
disasters. For example, Weinstein’s (1989) review article pointed to the important 
role of past experience in many self-protective behaviors, such as using seat belts, 
quitting (or reducing) smoking and, importantly, in natural hazard preparedness. 
Based on previous research, he concluded that experience of flood damage 
was related to greater fear, higher subjective probability of future disaster, and 
to the more frequent purchasing of insurance and making of other adjustments 
with respect to this hazard. Although the results of the studies reviewed were 
more inconsistent with respect to other natural hazards, such as tornados and 
earthquakes, many more recent studies have revealed that personal experience of 
a natural disaster is positively related to greater perceived risk (Keller et al. 2006), 
self-protective behavior (Tyszka & Konieczny, 2016), tendency to buy insurance 
(Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Papon, 2008; Hung, 2009), and disaster preparedness 
(Miceli et al. 2008).
Miceli et al. (2008) examined disaster preparedness and risk perception of floods 
among Italian adults living in areas previously affected by floods. Participants 
were asked to complete a questionnaire measuring the adoption of protective 
behaviors (e.g., taking out insurance against natural disasters, the protection of 
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important objects, attendance on a first-aid course, keeping a list of emergency 
phone numbers), damage experienced in the past due to natural disasters, and 
perceptions of flood risk (the likelihood of risky events occurring and feelings of 
worry associated with these events). Participants were asked to imagine a flood 
disaster occurring in their area in the next five years and to assess their worries 
about such an event. The authors found that the most important source of feelings of 
worry was previous experience of personal damage. Personal experience affected 
not only risk perceptions but also disaster preparedness.
Another important empirical test examining the specific role of personal 
experience in perceptions of natural hazards and the tendency to protect against 
them was conducted by Siegrist and Gutscher (2008). These authors interviewed 
two groups of Swiss people living in flood-prone areas: those who were personally 
affected by floods in 2005 and those who were not affected (the unaffected group 
was instructed to imagine that they had experienced flooding). The study’s results 
revealed significant differences between the two groups in the emotional reactions 
elicited when thinking about the disaster. Participants in the affected group 
recalled these reactions with very high frequency and intensity even nine months 
after the floods. In contrast, people unaffected by floods barely mentioned negative 
feelings as being the worst thing about a flood, and focused mostly on material 
aspects. Feelings, such as fear, insecurity and helplessness were dramatically 
underestimated by participants who only imagined a disaster. Taken together, the 
study’s results indicate that it is extremely difficult to visualize how one would feel 
during and after a flood when one has no previous experience of them. Moreover, 
people who had experienced floods took more preventive actions and pointed to 
fear as an important motivating factor.
There are at least two possible explanations of the above effects. On the one 
hand, experience of a natural disaster may increase subjective evaluations of 
the probability that a similar event will occur in the future (i.e., if something 
occurred in the past, it is possible that it will also occur in the near future). On 
the other hand, experiencing a disaster with dramatic consequences (e.g., part 
of a property being destroyed) evokes strong negative feelings such as fear and 
insecurity.
We argue that there are at least two major concerns with the large amount 
of research which has attempted to identify predictors of insurance-taking 
behavior. First, the research has been unable to control confounding variables 
(e.g., variations in local government support for preventive actions against natural 
disasters) and has also been unable to introduce experimental manipulations of 
personal experience in field studies. Second, due to their designs being focused 
tightly on studying probability processing in insurance-taking behavior (e.g., 
manipulating several probability levels of a fictitious disaster), laboratory 
experiments have often failed to reproduce the real-life psychological effects of a 
disaster. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to address the 
above-mentioned concerns.
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7.1.4  Overview of the present study and hypotheses
In a series of three experiments, we aimed to determine whether cognitive or 
emotional factors have the greatest influence on how much one will pay to insure 
oneself against a disaster. We designed an original task mimicking real-life 
insurance-related behavior in a laboratory setting (the Experimental Insurance 
Task, EIT). Specifically, we asked participants to build a house from cardboard 
which could be insured against a disaster (a windstorm caused by running a fan). 
To test the roles of cognitive and emotional factors in determining how much 
people were willing to pay for insurance, we monitored the time course of changes 
in feelings of worry and ratings of subjective probability. We hypothesized that 
personal experience of low-probability severe negative outcomes would increase 
feelings of worry – but not ratings of subjective probability – which, in turn, would 
influence the decision to purchase more expensive insurance.
7.2  EXPERIMENT 1
7.2.1  Method
7.2.1.1  Subjects
Seventy undergraduate students (88% females, ages ranging from 18 to 35 years) 
participated in the study in exchange for course credits or 30 PLN compensation. 
None of the participants was excluded from data analysis. Each participant gave 
their informed consent before the experiment.
7.2.1.2  Design
All participants were informed that they would take part in a simple game in which 
they would have to build their own cardboard building and protect it from a disaster 
for a time span of several virtual years. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions. Those in an experimental condition experienced a disaster: a 
windstorm that destroyed their cardboard building. Those in a control condition 
experienced no such disaster. To monitor the time course of insurance decisions, 
participants were given the opportunity to purchase an insurance policy at the 
beginning of each year of the game. Buying the insurance policy compensated 
them for possible losses in case of a disaster. Additionally, each quarter, participants 
assessed their feelings of worry and provided a subjective probability that a disaster 
would happen within the next three months.
7.2.1.3  The Experimental Insurance Task (EIT)
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant received 100 tokens. 
Participants were instructed to aim to have as many tokens as possible at the end 
of the game (they were not informed about the exact length of the game). First, 
they were asked to build a cardboard building (prior to this, individuals received 
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precise instructions about the construction of the building). The value of the 
building was assessed at 50 tokens (another 100 tokens were left in participants’ 
accounts). If the building stood until the end of the game, participants would keep 
their 50 tokens. However, if the building was destroyed participants would have to 
invest 50 tokens from their account to rebuild it. The current account balance was 
updated after each insurance decision and displayed to participants on a computer 
screen.
Each virtual year, participants had the possibility of choosing from 10 insurance 
policies prepared to compensate them for losses caused by a disaster (i.e., 
insurance premiums ranging from 1 to 10 tokens). For example, paying 1 token 
for an insurance policy covered the loss of 5 tokens of their building’s value in 
the event of a disaster. On the other hand, paying the maximum price of 10 tokens 
covered the loss of 50 tokens (i.e., the entire value of the building) in the event of 
a disaster. Insurance coverage increased by 5 tokens for each 1 token in premium 
until the maximum amount of 50 tokens of coverage was reached. Tokens used 
for buying insurance were not returnable if a disaster did not occur. The decision 
to buy insurance was voluntary (i.e., participants had the opportunity not to buy 
insurance). When insurance was purchased it was valid for only one year.
7.2.1.4  Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a laboratory. The experiment lasted for three 
virtual years (from 1st January 2014 to 1st January 2017). Each successive virtual 
day of the year (e.g., 3rd March 2015) was automatically displayed for 500 ms 
at the central position of the computer screen. At the start of each year the same 
graphical information was presented about the objective probability (10 in 10,000) 
of a disaster occurring. Subsequently, participants made their insurance decision 
(making four decisions during the entire experiment) by giving tokens (from 0 to 
10) to the experimenter. Additionally, every three months, participants assessed 
their feelings of worry and provided a subjective probability using 10-point rating 
scales (Figure 7.2).
On the fixed date of 28th November 2015 participants in the experimental 
condition experienced a disaster: a ‘Disaster’ caption in red-font was displayed 
centrally on the screen and the experimenter ran a fan which destroyed the 
cardboard building. In this case, participants lost 50 tokens minus their insurance 
coverage. Then, they had to invest 50 tokens from their account to rebuild their 
house. Participants in the control condition did not experience a disaster.
To increase participants’ engagement in the game, they were told they had an 
opportunity to prevent their cardboard building from being destroyed. To do this, 
they needed to press the space bar key as quickly as possible when the ‘Disaster’ 
caption was displayed on the computer screen. If their reaction time was longer than 
200 ms they failed to save their building. Before the main experiment, participants 
could test their reaction time using a computerized procedure unrelated to the main 
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task. None of the participants responded within a 200 ms time window during both 
the practice tests and the main experiment.
Figure 7.2  A schematic illustration of the procedure in the experimental condition 
(disaster). The lack of a disaster was the only difference between the experimental 
and control conditions. Notes: Thunder – disaster (building is destroyed by a 
windstorm: a fan run by the experimenter); W – ‘To what extent are you WORRIED 
that your building will be destroyed in the next three months?’ (1 – not at all, 10 – 
extremely); P – ‘What do you assess the CHANCES are of your building being 
destroyed in the next three months?’ (1 – low, 10 – high); Insurance – ‘How much 
will you pay for a one-year insurance policy covering the loss of your building 
which is worth 50 tokens?’ (from 0 to 10 tokens covering the value of the cardboard 
building from 0 to 50 tokens, proportionally).
7.2.2  Results
7.2.2.1  The effects of personal experience on insurance purchasing 
decisions
In a first step of analysis we tested whether the experimental manipulation of 
personal experience of a disaster influenced insurance buying decisions (i.e., the 
number of tokens spent on purchasing insurance on a scale from 0 to 10). A mixed 
2 (group: experimental, control) × 4 (year of insurance: first, second, third, and 
fourth) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed. There was no main effect 
of group, F(1,68) = 2.33, p = 0.131, η2 = 0.033. However, there was a significant 
main effect of the year of insurance, F(3,204) = 7.28, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.097, 
and also a significant interaction between the year and group, F(3,204) = 4.24, 
p = 0.006, η2 = 0.059. Post-hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed that 
the only significant differences between the experimental and control conditions 
were for the third (p = 0.028) and fourth year (p = 0.025) of insurance decisions 
(Figure 7.3). No differences were found in the first (p = 0.928) and second year 
(p = 0.927). Thus, participants who experienced loss (their cardboard building 
being destroyed) between the second and third years of the game, paid more for an 
insurance policy during the next two years than participants in the control group 
experiencing no such loss (descriptive statistics for ratings of worry, subjective 
probability and insurance decisions in all three experiments can be found in the 
appendix).
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Figure 7.3  Mean number of tokens paid for an insurance policy during a four-year 
long game as a function of personal experience (i.e., loss of a cardboard building 
after the second year as a result of a disaster). Error bars represent the upper limit 
of 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
An additional analysis revealed that participants who experienced a disaster 
in the experimental condition ended the game with fewer tokens (M = 50.23, 
SD = 7.93) than participants in the control condition (M = 86.74.23, SD = 10.11), 
t(68) = -16.813, p < 0.001.
7.2.2.2  Indirect effects of personal experience of a disaster on 
insurance decisions. The role of feelings of worry and subjective 
probability
In the second step of analysis we verified whether personal experience of a disaster 
influences feelings of worry and subjective probability ratings, which, in turn, 
affect insurance buying decisions. We employed the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2013) to determine whether personal experience of a disaster (independent 
variable, X) exerted an effect on insurance policy buying decisions (dependent 
variable, Y) via changes in two mediator variables: feelings of worry and ratings 
of subjective probability. We computed measures of amount payed for insurance, 
worry and subjective probability by subtracting mean amount payed for insurance, 
and mean ratings of worry and subjective probability before disaster struck from 
mean ratings after disaster struck (mean number of tokens spent on insurance in 
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the third and fourth year minus mean number of tokens spent on insurance in the 
first and second year). Therefore, higher values indicated that participants paid 
more for insurance, felt more worried and rated subjective probability as higher.
As expected, feelings of worry, but not ratings of subjective probability, 
mediated the relationship between personal experience of disaster and insurance 
buying decisions. Specifically, using 95% confidence intervals (1000 bootstrap 
samples), we found a significant indirect effect via feelings of worry, 0.47 [0.01, 
1.37], but not subjective probability, 0.07 [-0.12, 0.91] (Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4  Unstandardized beta regression coefficients for the mediation model 
linking personal experience of a disaster (X) and amount paid to buy insurance (Y) 
via feelings of worry and subjective probability. The correlation coefficient between 
feelings of worry and subjective probability was r = 0.704, p < 0.001.
7.2.3  Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrated that personal experience of a disaster influenced 
insurance purchasing decisions. Participants who experienced a windstorm at the 
end of the second year paid more for insurance in the third and fourth years of the 
game compared to participants not experiencing this disaster. Importantly, this 
effect was mediated by changes in feelings of worry but not by changes in ratings 
of subjective probability.
Our findings are consistent with the results of previous research showing that 
worry is a more important factor in insurance-taking behavior than ratings of 
subjective probability that a disaster will occur (Schade et  al. 2012). However, 
the design of the game in this experiment might be considered problematic in 
that participants in the experimental condition always experienced a disaster 
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that led to more pronounced changes in their budget compared to those in the 
control condition. To solve this problem, in Experiment 2 we modified the control 
condition. Specifically, in parallel with the reduced budget associated with 
participants’ experience of disaster in the experimental condition, we reduced the 
budget of participants in the control condition, telling them that they had spent 
the money on purchasing a holiday. This allowed us to equalize the number of 
tokens that were left in participants’ accounts at the end of the game across the 
two conditions. Thus, we tested whether personal experience of a disaster led to 
purchasing more expensive insurance even when controlling for the final number 
of tokens in the control condition.
7.3  EXPERIMENT 2
7.3.1  Method
7.3.1.1  Subjects
Seventy undergraduate students (46% females, ages ranging from 18 to 27 years) 
participated in the study in exchange for course credits or 30 PLN compensation. 
None of the participants was excluded from data analysis. Each participant gave 
their informed consent before the experiment.
7.3.1.2  Design and procedure
There was one substantial modification introduced to the procedure of the EIT 
designed for Experiment 1. To control the effect of financial loss caused by 
a disaster, participants in the control condition (i.e., without a disaster) were 
informed that they had spent an amount of money on a holiday (this information 
was provided on the same date as a disaster in the experimental condition). The 
cost of the holiday was related to the insurance decisions made by participants (i.e., 
50 tokens minus insurance coverage, as in the experimental condition involving a 
disaster). For example, participants who paid 5 tokens for an insurance policy were 
informed that they had spent 25 tokens on a holiday. This made the financial loss 
due to a disaster equivalent to a loss caused by purchasing a holiday. Participants 
were not informed about the algorithm used to compute the price of the holiday 
(i.e., that the cost of the holiday was related to their insurance decisions).
7.3.2  Results
7.3.2.1  The effects of personal experience on insurance purchasing 
decisions
A mixed 2 (group: experimental, control) × 4 (year of insurance: first, second, third, 
and fourth) ANOVA was used to predict the amount spent on insurance. We found 
significant main effects of group, F(1,68) = 7.98, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.105, and year of 
insurance, F(3,204) = 4.19, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.058. Importantly, the interaction between 
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these two variables was also significant, F(3,204) = 7.01, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.093. Post-
hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed that participants who experienced a 
disaster paid more for insurance in the third (p = 0.006) and fourth year (p < 0.001) 
compared to participants who lost tokens by purchasing a holiday trip (Figure 7.5). No 
differences were found in the first (p = 0.742) and second year (p = 0.085).
Figure 7.5  Mean number of tokens paid for an insurance policy during a four-year 
long game as a function of personal experience (i.e., loss of a cardboard building 
after the second year as a result of a disaster in the experimental condition; in the 
control condition participants experienced a financial loss unrelated to a disaster). 
Error bars represent the upper limit of 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.
It is important to note that participants who experienced a disaster in the 
experimental condition and those losing money by buying a holiday in the control 
condition ended the game with similar amounts of tokens (M = 50.60, SD = 9.14 in 
the experimental and M = 50.91, SD = 7.37 in the control condition respectively), 
t(68) = -0.158, p = 0.875.
7.3.2.2 Indirect effects of personal experience of a disaster on 
insurance decisions. The role of feelings of worry and subjective 
probability
We reran the indirect effects analysis performed in Experiment 1. Here, indirect 
effects via feelings of worry (0.242, 95% bootstrapped CIs [-0.010, 0.842]) and 
subjective probability (-0.036, 95% bootstrapped CIs [-0.519, 0.098]) were 
not significant. However, participants experiencing a disaster purchased more 
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expensive insurance compared to participants who spent their money on buying a 
holiday, b = 1.722, p = 0.010, (see Figure 7.6).
Figure 7.6  Unstandardized beta regression coefficients for the mediation model 
linking personal experience of a disaster (X) and amount paid to buy insurance (Y) 
via feelings of worry and subjective probability. The correlation coefficient between 
feelings of worry and subjective probability was r = 0.734, p < 0.001.
7.3.3  Discussion
Experiment 2 demonstrated that personal experience of a disaster led to 
purchasing more expensive insurance even when controlling the final number 
of tokens in the control condition. This replicated findings from Experiment 1 
and other research showing the crucial role of personal experience in insurance 
buying and self-protective behavior (Weinstein, 1989; Zaleskiewicz et al. 2002; 
Papon, 2008; Tyszka & Konieczny, 2016). However, contrary to Experiment 1, 
feelings of worry did not mediate the relationship between personal experience 
and insurance buying behavior. It is noteworthy that in Experiment 2 there 
was no difference in feelings of worry between the experimental and control 
conditions. The reasons for these differences between the two experiments are 
unclear. One explanation may be differences in participants’ characteristics. 
Compared to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 there were far fewer women and 
very few psychology students.
One remaining methodological problem was addressed in Experiment 3. In 
this experiment we used a between-subjects experimental design to separate the 
influences of worry and subjective probability on insurance buying behavior.
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7.4  EXPERIMENT 3
7.4.1  Method
7.4.1.1  Subjects
Seventy undergraduate students (67% females, ages ranging from 18 to 45 years) 
participated in the study in exchange for course credits or 30 PLN compensation. 
None of the participants was excluded from data analysis. Each participant gave 
their informed consent before the experiment.
7.4.1.2  Design and procedure
Similarly to the previous experiments, participants played a game in which they had 
to protect a cardboard house from being destroyed by a windstorm (the EIT). Only 
the experimental condition was used, in which a disaster always occurred on a fixed 
date. To separate the influence of feelings of worry from subjective probabilities 
on insurance buying decisions, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions. In the first condition, participants rated their feelings of worry (using a 
10-point scale as in the previous experiments) and declared the extent of their worries 
every three months using a 100-point open-ended question. In the second condition, 
every three months, participants rated the subjective probability (using a 10-point 
scale as in the previous experiments) and the chances (as a percentage, using an open-
ended question) that a disaster would happen. To measure changes in current affective 
states, all participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson et al. 1988) twice: at the beginning and at the end of the experiment.
7.4.2  Results
To capture changes in feelings of worry, subjective probabilities and insurance 
buying decisions, mean ratings for these measures before the disaster were 
subtracted from mean ratings after the disaster. Similarly to the previous 
experiments, higher scores indicated that participants were more worried, rated 
the subjective probability of disaster as higher, and paid more for insurance. Since 
responses for scale ratings and open-ended questions were highly correlated 
(r = 0.905, p < 0.001 and r = 0.871, p < 0.001, for the subjective probability and 
worry conditions respectively), these measures were averaged.
There was a positive correlation between increasing Negative Affect (NA) 
and ratings of worry, r = 0.293, p = 0.044, whereas the relationship between 
subjective probability ratings and NA was non-significant, r = 0.137, p = 0.216. 
No associations with changes in Positive Affect (PA) were observed (r = -0.204, 
p = 0.120 for subjective probability and r = -0.185, p = 0.144 for worry).
Next, we performed two separate regression analyses to test whether feelings 
of worry or subjective probability better predicted changes in the number of 
tokens spent on purchasing insurance. Measures of NA and PA were introduced 
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in the first step of hierarchical regression analyses, and either feelings of worry or 
subjective probabilities were entered into models in the second step (Table 7.1). In 
the group of participants who were asked to rate feelings of worry, this measure 
significantly predicted insurance buying decisions, b = 0.229, p < 0.001. There was 
no effect of subjective probability on insurance buying decisions in the second 
condition, b = 0.096, p = 0.175. Importantly, introducing feelings of worry into a 
regression model substantially increased the explained variance in amount paid for 
insurance, ΔR2 = 0.294, p < 0.001, whereas no similar result was found in the case 
of subjective probabilities, ΔR2 = 0.054, p = 0.175.
Table 7.1  Two hierarchical linear regression models in which insurance 
purchasing decisions were predicted by changes in Positive Affect (PA) and 
Negative Affect (NA) from the PANAS, feelings of worry, and subjective 
probabilities.
Feelings of Worry R2 ΔR2
B SE t p
Step 1 Intercept 1.472 0.382 3.854 0.001
NA 0.027 0.079 0.336 0.739
PA –0.043 0.089 –0.479 0.635 0.015
Step 2 Feelings 
of worry
0.229 0.063 3.633 <0.001 0.309 0.294***
Subjective Probability
B SE t p R2 ΔR2
Step 1 Intercept 0.671 0.439 1.530 0.136
NA 0.040 0.079 0.508 0.615
PA –0.134 0.088 –1.520 0.138 0.083
Step 2 Subjective 
probability
0.096 0.069 1.389 0.175 0.137 0.054
Note: *** p < 0.001.
Similarly to Experiment 2, we found no significant differences between the 
groups in the number of tokens possessed at the end of the game, t(68) = 0.327, 
p = 0.745. Participants providing subjective probabilities finished the game with 
M = 51.51 (SD = 7.73) tokens, and those rating their feelings of worry finished with 
M = 50.94 (SD = 6.86) tokens.
7.4.3  Discussion
In Experiment 3 we demonstrated that our scales of worry and subjective 
probability measured separate constructs. First, only feelings of worry correlated 
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with a standardized measure of current negative affective state (i.e., the Negative 
Affect scale of the PANAS). Second, we replicated findings from Experiment 
1 showing that emotional factors related to feelings of worry, but not cognitive 
evaluations of subjective probabilities, predicted insurance buying decisions. 
Taken together, our findings imply that personal experience of a low-probability 
disaster leads to a propensity to spend more on insurance. Crucially, this effect can 
be explained by changes in feelings of worry that are related to the financial loss 
caused by the disaster.
7.5  CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this study was to explore why personal experience is a key factor 
in decisions regarding insurance purchases. Introducing a novel experimental 
task, we were able to show that emotional rather than cognitive factors led to a 
propensity to spend more on insurance against natural hazards. This means that 
insuring oneself against natural disasters is determined not so much by cognitive 
evaluations of risk, but rather by emotions which usually accompany personal 
experience of a disaster. This result is in close agreement with findings of Siegrist 
and Gutscher (2008) showing that non-material consequences and feelings (e.g., 
evacuation, effort of cleaning up, shock, and helplessness) were most commonly 
mentioned as the worst aspects of flooding by people experiencing such a disaster. 
Similarly, in our series of three laboratory experiments, we showed that decisions 
about how much to spend on purchasing insurance are driven by personal 
experience of low-probability disasters with serious consequences, operating 
indirectly through changes in emotional feelings of worry, rather than through 
cognitive evaluations of subjective probability. Thus, we can say that the prominent 
role of emotional factors in dealing with natural disasters has been confirmed both 
when interviewing people living in flood-prone areas (in naturalistic settings) and 
in controlled laboratory experiments.
The results of the present study may explain why people often fail to purchase 
insurance against high-loss disasters (Schade et al. 2012) and experience severe 
financial and psychological consequences, even if premiums are at fair prices 
(Kunreuther & Pauly, 2004). Our research suggests that such individuals are likely 
to be people who have not experienced disasters before, and who are therefore 
untroubled by the negative emotions which accompany personal experience of 
a disaster. There are at least two possible psychological mechanisms that may 
underlie our findings. First, personal experience of a disaster is likely to make the 
consequences of disaster more available (e.g., it would be easy to recall that water 
had flooded into one’s cellar) and this higher availability will lead to intense negative 
emotions. Alternatively, personal experience of a disaster resulting in severe 
material and financial losses may influence the imaginableness of consequences, 
this, in turn, leading to more vivid mental images of disaster and evoking more 
intense negative emotions (without better recall). Given that availability and affect 
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are closely connected (Keller et al. 2006), future studies ought to focus on testing 
these two hypotheses directly.
However, there is some initial evidence favoring the crucial role of affect-
laden imagery in risk perception and risk taking. Specifically, previous research 
by Traczyk et al. (2015) demonstrated that even imagining the consequences of 
risk (but not directly experiencing them) exerts an influence on risk perception 
and willingness to take risk. Moreover, these relationships were mediated by 
emotional factors (i.e., negative affect and feelings of stress; Sobkow et al. [2016]; 
(Traczyk et al. [2015]). Based on these findings, one can speculate that researchers 
could influence people’s decisions to purchase insurance against disasters by 
evoking intense affect-laden imagery. Indeed, previous research has documented 
that even the simple instruction to visualize the consequences of risks (Traczyk 
et al. 2015) or asking specific questions regarding risky scenarios (e.g., ‘Can you 
see smoke from the fire when you get to the exit?’; Holmes & Mathews [2005]) 
produces vivid mental images of risks and elicits intense emotional responses. 
However, the prospects of using such procedures in the real world are unclear 
since recent neuroscientific findings have revealed that simple behavioral training 
is not sufficient to generate long-term changes in behavior (Santarnecchi et al. 
2015). More promising techniques might involve the use of transcranial direct 
current stimulation to stimulate areas of the brain responsible for vivid mental 
images, or using neurofeedback (Johnston et  al. 2010) to teach people how to 
create more vivid images of risk. It would also be very interesting and challenging 
to combine neural stimulation with behavioral procedures designed to simulate 
personal experience of a disaster using virtual reality (Tarr & Warren, 2002; 
Diemer et al. 2015) and test whether such quasi-experience has an impact on real-
life insurance decisions.
Our finding that emotional feelings of worry, rather than cognitive evaluations 
of subjective probability, are a main determinant of the amount one will pay to 
insure oneself against natural hazards, fits well with previous findings that people 
discount the experiences of other decision-makers compared to experiencing 
a loss themselves (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2015). Indeed, from a cognitive 
perspective, others’ loss experiences should be equally as informative as our 
own loss experiences. The observation that disasters affecting other people have 
a reduced impact on our own insurance-related behavior, provide strong support 
for the idea that emotional feelings are crucial in decisions to insure oneself 
against natural hazards.
Finally, we attach great importance to our novel Experimental Insurance Task 
(the EIT). Participants found the task highly engaging and it seems to effectively 
mimic real-life situations and evoke similar psychological processes. Also, good 
experimental design, rigorous procedures, and a laboratory setting permit the control 
of confounding variables and the drawing of causal inferences. So, the task provides 
vast possibilities to researchers interested in studying the role of personal experience 
in protective behavior. In the reported experiments we focused on a low-probability 
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disaster with serious consequences, and we did not manipulate probability levels 
or the role of self-engagement in building a property. However, one could study 
these issues using our EIT technique. In addition to studying insurance purchasing 
decisions, the technique could also be used to study the taking of actions to prevent 
the negative consequences of natural hazards and disasters.
Two clear conclusions may be drawn from our research:
Using experimental settings, we demonstrated that personal experience of a 
disaster caused people to pay more for insurance against natural hazards.
Emotional feelings of worry, rather than cognitive evaluations of subjective 
probability, mediated the relationship between personal experience of a disaster 
and insurance buying decisions.
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APPENDIX
Table 7.A.1  Descriptive statistics for number of tokens allocated for purchasing 
insurance.
Experiment Group Insurance
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
1 control 3.00 (2.53) 3.43 (2.79) 3.26 (2.78) 3.57 (3.22)
experimental 3.06 (2.73) 3.37 (2.43) 4.89 (3.26) 5.31 (3.15)
2 control 2.91 (3.08) 2.17 (2.47) 2.74 (2.23) 2.11 (1.86)
experimental 2.69 (2.70) 3.2 (2.46) 4.60 (3.17) 4.91 (3.17)
3 only worry 2.97 (2.93) 3.31 (2.54) 4.51 (2.79) 4.83 (2.77)
only subjective 
probability
3.43 (3.36) 3.23 (2.87) 3.77 (2.27) 4.2 (3.13)
Table 7.A.2  Descriptive statistics for ratings of worry.
Experiment Group Worry
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
1 control 3.29 (1.59) 3.27 (1.59) 3.37 (1.81) 3.66 (2.09)
experimental 3.52 (2.04) 3.44 (2.30) 4.28 (2.34) 4.51 (2.57)
2 control 3.12 (1.74) 2.92 (1.61) 2.96 (1.62) 3.03 (1.90)
experimental 3.61 (1.43) 3.44 (1.63) 3.63 (1.58) 4.00 (1.86)
3 only worry 2.96 (1.68) 2.69 (1.51) 3.38 (1.92) 3.74 (2.41)
Note: for years 1–3 ratings of four respective quarters were averaged (i.e. for year 1 ratings 
from quarter 1, 2, 3 and 4 were averaged etc.). In year 4 participants rated worry only once.
Worry was rated on 10-point scale (1 – not at all, 10 – extremely).
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Cognitive and emotional factors to insure oneself against disaster 139
Table 7.A.4  Descriptive statistics for open-ended questions from Experiment 3.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
worry 21.4 (18.06) 20.86 (17.09) 28.80 (22.24) 31.00 (24.72)
subjective 
probability
34.48 (28.63) 28.21 (24.28) 37.41 (26.66) 38.49 (29.39)
Note: for years 1–3 ratings of four respective quarters were averaged (i.e. for year 1 ratings 
from quarter 1, 2, 3 and 4 were averaged etc.).
Table 7.A.3  Descriptive statistics for ratings of subjective probability.
Experiment Group Subjective Probability
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
1 control 2.86 (1.12) 2.89 (1.24) 2.87 (1.45) 2.89 (1.61)
experimental 3.41 (1.88) 3.59 (2.01) 4.12 (1.78) 4.11 (2.36)
2 control 3.00 (1.560) 2.44 (1.40) 2.4 (1.25) 2.31 (1.47)
experimental 3.09 (1.63) 2.83 (1.71) 2.89 (1.63) 3.43 (2.09)
3 only subjective 
probability
3.96 (2.23) 3.49 (2.12) 4.22 (2.26) 4.14 (2.78)
Note: for years 1–3 ratings of four respective quarters were averaged (i.e. for year 1 ratings 
from quarter 1, 2, 3 and 4 were averaged etc.). In year 4 participants rated subjective 
probability only once.
‘How do you assess the CHANCES that your building will be destroyed the next three 
months?’ (1 – low, 10 – high).
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8.1  INTRODUCTION
The economic consequences of catastrophic events have become more severe in 
recent years (Michel-Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2011). One major reason is accumulation 
of inhabitants and/or capital in many vulnerable areas; it is also understood that 
climate change leads to more variability and more extremity of weather events 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2012). Moreover, this 
tendency is expected to strengthen in the near future (Bevere et al. 2011).
To limit the negative consequences of catastrophic events, policies are required 
that reduce the vulnerability to catastrophic losses and redistribute or shift 
the exposure to risks to those who are willing and able to bear them. In many 
developing countries and in disaster-prone areas such as the Caribbean, insufficient 
supply of insurance (often due to missing or unaffordable reinsurance) is a major 
Chapter 8
Peer effects in catastrophic risk 
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problem (Cavallo & Noy, 2009). Government-sponsored protection and insurance 
programs have already been installed in many countries. Examples include the 
National Flood Insurance Program in the USA, the Flood Re plan in the UK and 
the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme in India. They will increasingly 
become important if weather events become more severe in the near future.
While the supply of affordable insurance and protection products is crucial, 
it has been observed that there may also be important problems on the demand 
side for these products. As Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (2011) discuss, take-up 
of catastrophic insurance, for example flooding insurance, is surprisingly low. 
Inhabitants of vulnerable areas might be very hesitant to take up even subsidized 
insurance products. For example, only 40% of residents of the New Orleans 
parish had flood insurance when hurricane Katrina struck, despite support from 
the National Flood Insurance Program (Insurance Information Institute, 2005). 
This is a major puzzle in view of the assumption of predominant risk aversion 
(typically made at least in the context of Expected Utility Theory) which implies 
that taking up fair or subsidized insurance products should be very attractive. 
As discussed in other chapters of this volume, several potential explanations for 
this apparent puzzle have been suggested and tested. One important dimension 
of risk perception and insurance choice concerns the social effects caused by the 
observation of other decision-makers (Kunreuther et  al. 2009). Most decisions 
under risks are not made in isolation. In the case of catastrophic risks, peer effects 
appear particularly important as, by the very nature of such threats, many people 
are simultaneously affected. Studying these effects might provide us with hints 
as to why some consumers may be reluctant to take up ever attractively priced 
insurance against natural disasters and what methods to encourage them to do so 
are likely to work. In this chapter we discuss possible mechanisms via which peer 
effects may operate, past empirical evidence trying to verify these mechanisms, 
and our own recent experimental study. In view of space constraints, only selected 
elements of the latter are covered, a more complete description (together with 
transcripts of stimuli used) is available in Krawczyk et al. (2017).
8.2  PEER EFFECTS: MECHANISMS
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Several types of influences have been discussed under the umbrella term of ‘peer 
effects’ in insurance take-up choices and decision-making under risk in general, 
see Table 8.1. First, observing others’ (not) incurring a loss can affect one’s 
willingness to purchase insurance. It is largely an open question though, how own 
versus others’ experience is weighted. Second, an individual may be affected by 
others’ insurance decisions. Actually, several ways in which such peer effects 
may operate can be distinguished. Information about the underlying risky event 
or the insurance contract may be incomplete or it might take a non-trivial amount 
of time and effort to process it. In such cases, observing what others chose facing 
the same or a similar decision may provide a valuable hint as to what represents 
the optimal behavior. For example, if flood insurance is worth it for my neighbors, 
it may well be worth it for me; this can be called rational social learning. There 
is also ample evidence from sociology and social psychology that most people 
in most situations are to some degree prone to conformity, that is, following 
others’ choices just to be similar to them, to gain their acceptance and recognition 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) and not because these must necessarily be the best 
choices per se. The most basic form of conformity is simple imitation, whereby 
others’ decisions are followed blindly. While conformity can be modeled as others’ 
choices directly affecting utility associated with own choices, it can also be the 
case that others’ outcomes affect utility of own outcomes.
Table 8.1  Overview of peer effects.
Mechanism Description
Learning from others’ 
losses
Using others’ experience to update own loss 
probability
Rational social learning Using informed others’ choices as hints as to 
what is the optimal choice for self
Imitation Simply following what others do
Social regret Anticipating less regret when others are likely to 
be affected if I am and also neglected protection
Inequality aversion Anticipating guilt or envy if disaster changes my 
income as compared to my reference group
Moral hazard Anticipating better chances for government’s 
assistance when others affected as well
Two variants can be distinguished here. Under social regret (Cooper & Rege, 
2011), also known as the ‘misery loves company’ effect, an unattractive outcome 
which could have been avoided is less aversive if others have made the same 
‘mistake.’ Thus, in having one’s uninsured property destroyed by a hurricane, 
one may find some consolation that others had neglected protection as well. 
In  a  slightly different and much better known mechanism, inequality aversion 
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(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), staying behind the reference groups is painful, no matter 
in what ways their financial situation was affected by their choices.
Finally, the extent of moral hazard in risk taking (the tendency to save on 
insurance in the hope that the government will help out in case a disaster strikes) may 
be affected by peers’ situations as well. Indeed, the more people remain uninsured 
in the area, the greater their potential lobbying power with the government. Of 
course, correlation between peers’ insurance choices could also be due to their 
similarity in (unobservable) dimensions, rather than any causal relationship. Note 
also that many of these mechanisms predict an overall effect of awareness that 
others are threatened by the same risk (even if no information on their decisions 
is conveyed) on willingness to purchase insurance. This is the third type of impact 
sometimes referred to as ‘peer effects’, one that is directly relevant for the problem 
of seemingly insufficient demand for catastrophic insurance. Notably, inequality 
aversion may lead to relatively low insurance take-up if others’ risks are perfectly 
correlated with own risks, compared to when they are independent. Likewise, 
insufficient learning from others’ experience and decisions is likely to lead to low 
catastrophic insurance take-up, as major disasters are, nearly by definition, rare, so 
that most people have not personally experienced one (yet). In other words, relying 
solely on own experience will lead people to base their decisions on small and 
potentially biased samples (Ert & Trautmann, 2014).
Overall, distinguishing between these various mechanisms (all of which lead to 
clusters of insured and uninsured households) is very difficult. However, it is not 
only of importance from the purely academic viewpoint of understanding human 
behavior in some specific circumstances; there may be significant differences in 
policy implications as well. For example, one may wonder what impact targeted 
subsidizing of insurance purchase will have on households that are not covered by 
such a campaign. Under rational learning, there will be little effect, because the 
targeted and not-targeted households will face different conditions; the fact that 
a person purchased some good or service when offered a discount that another 
person cannot enjoy does not make her think it is more attractive. By contrast, 
inequity aversion and moral hazard predict a strong effect, as one does not wish to 
be among the few with uncovered losses, while predictions based on social regret 
and conformity are probably intermediate, depending on the specific formulation 
of the concepts used. The picture is different if one considers providing potential 
insureds with additional information. It is expected to have a strong effect also on 
others if they are rational learners – it is especially valuable to follow a peer who 
has received specialized training and therefore made a truly informed decision.
8.3  PEER EFFECTS: EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Several empirical studies tried to distinguish between the mechanisms just 
discussed. It should be mentioned that due to insufficient literature focused on 
insurance, we also rely on studies investigating other types of decision-making 
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under risk. As Richter et al. (2014) rightly point out, such inference must be made 
with caution, as there may be significant idiosyncrasies associated with decision-
making in the insurance context – perception of risk and behavior under risk may 
differ from formally analogous situations in other domains (Slovic, 1987; Kusev 
et al. 2009).
Starting with effects of past losses (rather than decisions) it is often reported that 
catastrophes lead to increased perceived probability of a loss in the future (Cameron & 
Shah, 2015) and greater demand for insurance (Michel-Kerjan & Kousky, 2010). 
Using a particularly suitable data set and method, Gallagher (2014) found that local 
floods increased flood insurance take-up among American inhabitants of the Gulf 
of Mexico and Florida’s Atlantic coast. A spike, followed by a slow decline (the 
effect being undistinguishable from zero after nine years) can be best captured by 
Bayesian learning with short memory – a model in which new information helps 
update prior beliefs but then fades away from the decision-maker’s awareness. 
It should be noted that reliable long-run statistics available for these areas make 
actual information content of each specific event miniscule. Importantly, dwellers 
of unaffected areas also adjusted their behavior, suggesting that others’ experience 
also plays a role (albeit a smaller one than own experience).
By contrast, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2015), using field data on tap water 
contamination, showed that people may in fact nearly neglect potentially 
informative experiences of other people in their social environment. An important 
shortcoming of this analysis is that the authors do not observe whether people 
actually believe that the quality of their own tap water is correlated with the quality 
of the tap water of other people in their reference group. Indeed, water quality can 
strongly depend on local aspects such as the quality and material of the pipes etc.
In a laboratory experiment, Viscusi et al. (2011) directly addressed the issue 
of learning from others’ choices (rather than experienced losses) by observing 
investment decisions made individually and in the group context. Even though 
subjects were provided with complete information about probabilities and 
outcomes, others’ decisions made a difference in that choice behavior of subjects 
tended to drift towards the median choice.
A carefully designed laboratory study by Cooper and Rege (2011) allowed 
distinguishing between various mechanisms. These authors let their subjects 
choose between pairs of gambles represented as colored grids. One of the many 
tiny colored squares would be picked at random, with different colors standing for 
different amounts, so that their respective frequencies represented probabilities 
involved. Assessing the number of same-colored squares (and thus probabilities 
involved) was easy when they were clustered together (‘simple’ format – risk 
condition) but difficult or impossible when they were scrambled (ambiguity 
condition) or only some of them were visible at all (‘blackout’). In any case, 
subjects only had eight seconds to choose between the gambles, which was clearly 
not enough to count the squares in the scrambled format. Each pair of gambles was 
shown three times, with two information conditions used: either only one’s own 
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past choice for this particular pair was shown (individual feedback) or also those 
of peers (social feedback). Social regret and inequality aversion thus predicted that 
there would be more regression towards others’ choices in the social feedback, 
compared to individual feedback, largely regardless of presentation format. This 
was what Cooper and Rege actually observed. Moreover, rational social learning 
was expected to play a greater role in the scrambled format (others had different 
noisy signals of the underlying probability distributions, so their decisions 
represented a valuable hint) than in other formats (all subjects faced the same 
ambiguous situation), which was actually disconfirmed.
In a unique field experiment, Bursztyn et al. (2014) worked with a brokerage firm 
offering a new asset to their clients. In pairs of friends or relatives among them, one 
investor was approached and offered the asset. About half of them were interested, 
but were told that due to supply shortage, only half of those willing to purchase the 
asset would actually be able to do so. Subsequently, the other investor was informed 
or not informed (random treatment assignment) about the first investor’s reaction 
and, in the former case, about the outcome (whether the first investor actually 
obtained the asset or not). This design allowed distinguishing between social 
learning and social regret/inequity aversion. Both channels were statistically and 
economically significant. Interestingly, social learning was positively correlated 
with first investor’s advantage in financial sophistication over the second investor.
Lahno and Serra-Garcia (2015) focused on distinguishing between inequality 
aversion on the one hand and imitation and social regret on the other. They investigated 
choices between lotteries, conditional on peer’s decision (choice treatment) or on an 
exogenous allocation the peer could not change (allocation treatment). Looking at 
individuals who changed their mind compared to purely individual decision, the 
authors concluded that the fraction of subjects following others nearly doubled in 
the choice treatment compared to the allocation treatment. This finding implies that 
both inequality aversion and conformism (or social regret) matter.
Friedl et al. (2014) did not study the impact of others’ specific insurance decisions, 
but their simple design allowed investigating the impact of others being merely 
affected by the risk perfectly aligned with that of the decision-maker. In their short 
classroom experiment, Friedl and colleagues endowed their 149 participants with 
10 euro each and told them they faced a 50% probability of losing this amount. This 
risk was either to be resolved independently for each participant, or jointly for 
all (a ‘catastrophic’ risk, affecting everyone). Each participant was then asked to 
indicate for amounts ranging from 4 euro to 6.25 euro whether she would be willing to 
purchase full insurance against the aforementioned risk for the amount in question. 
The main finding was that willingness to pay was greater for independent risks. A 
natural interpretation is that participants were affected by inequality aversion, so 
that uninsured losses were more acceptable when many other participants incurred 
losses as well (some of which were probably also uninsured).
Friedl et  al. (2014) argued that the simultaneous over-insurance for high 
probability low cost risk and under-insurance of low probability high cost risks 
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(as  discussed in Browne et  al. 2015) could be due to social comparison and 
correlated losses: typical low probability natural risks (such as floods) are highly 
correlated across people in a region or neighborhood while typical high probability 
risks (such as bike theft) are uncorrelated across people. In the former case, thus, 
social comparison does not lead to strong feelings of loss, because peers also lose, 
while in the latter case the loss is felt intensely.
While the idea that low insurance take-up fuels expectations of governmental help 
is appealing, the potential role of moral hazard in insurance demand is notoriously 
difficult to investigate. Grislain-Letrémy (2015) tried to test it using insurance 
data from France’s overseas departments (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion and 
French Guyana). They represent an interesting natural experiment of sorts, as 
French legislation results in good (and heavily subsidized) supply of natural disaster 
coverage which is much-needed in these hurricane/cyclone prone areas. Clearly, 
perceived probability of government’s intervention is not observable and can only 
be tackled using a structural estimation based on strong parametric assumptions. 
Grislain-Letrémy found moral hazard to be one of two main obstacles on the demand 
side (the other being low quality of houses, making them ineligible for insurance).
Botzen and Van den Bergh (2012) investigated moral hazard more directly, 
albeit using declarative data. In a large survey of homeowners in the Dutch river 
delta, they elicited willingness to pay for flood insurance, manipulating inter alia 
the availability of public compensation for affected households. They observed a 
significant impact on reported willingness to pay for insurance. We are not aware of 
a study that directly tackles the link between the number of uninsured households 
and the probability of public intervention.
This review does not leave one with the impression that there are simple 
explanations for peer effects in insurance decisions. On the contrary, several 
mechanisms may be at work simultaneously and their relative strength depends in 
possibly subtle ways on the specific circumstances, institutional environment and 
study methodology.
8.4  EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY
Our own empirical effort builds upon design choices and experiences of cited 
researchers, particularly Friedl et  al. (2014). We wish to know to what extent 
findings from some specific empirical and experimental set-up will generalize 
across different situations. Studies based on field data as in Gallagher (2014), Viscusi 
and Zeckhauser (2015) and Browne et  al. (2015) have high external validity for 
the type of catastrophic risk under investigation. However, they typically have less 
control over the underlying mechanisms. For example, it is not clear whether higher 
insurance take-up in neighboring counties after a flood is caused by higher demand 
by homeowners, or by stronger or more successful marketing effort from the side of 
the insurance companies. The strong influence of peers on insurance decisions found 
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in some studies seems at odds with the neglect of peer information in the formation 
of expectations observed in others. It is clearly possible to have a utility function 
with social reference points while at the same time having beliefs that neglect others’ 
information. However, from a psychological perspective it is at first sight surprising 
that social influences would be restricted to a certain dimension only. Exactly which 
mechanism is behind specific peer effects is typically difficult to identify.
In the context of small probability losses, we therefore investigate the robustness 
of these empirical patterns in a uniform catastrophic loss insurance setting: How do 
decision-makers process probabilistic information in low probability-loss settings? 
What is the effect of peer outcomes on beliefs and insurance take-up? How are 
these effects moderated by the correlation of potential losses among people?
Low probability events are especially difficult to study in the field. Moreover, 
it is not easy to identify causal effects of peers’ behavior and experiences in non-
experimental settings (see the discussion in Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2015). As 
hinted before, because people may self-select into vulnerable areas (Page et al. 
2014), and because this self-selection may interact with insurance choices, few 
conclusions regarding the effect of exogenous policy changes can be drawn. We 
therefore conducted a controlled laboratory experiment to identify the causal 
effects of social information and risk-correlation (across people) on risk perception 
and insurance take-up.
8.4.1  General set-up
In a two-stage set-up, participants first worked on a task unrelated to insurance 
and earned a substantial income of PLN 80 (~EUR 20). In the second stage they 
were exposed to an uncertain loss of this income and performed two tasks: they 
were asked to assess the uncertain probability of the loss and to make a decision on 
whether or not to purchase insurance against this potential loss.
To study how subjects update information and incorporate these updates in 
their decisions, the second-stage loss-exposure task consisted of 40 decision-
making periods. Between these periods, the subjects received treatment-specific 
information. However, there were no dynamic changes in the subjects’ financial 
status across periods: each period involved a new exposure to the loss of the original 
PLN 80 and a new insurance offer, irrespective of earlier losses or insurance 
costs. Exactly one of the 40 periods was selected at the end of the experiment to 
determine the monetary payments to a participant. This design thus assures that 
there are no interdependencies across periods, apart from the learning effects that 
are the focus of the current study.
In each period, subjects faced an uncertain chance of losing their PLN 80 endowment 
that had been randomly selected from the interval (5%, 25%). This probability was 
identical for all subjects in a group (defined in more detail below) and for all periods, 
but it differed across sessions. The true value of the probability was never disclosed 
to the subjects, but they were aware of the interval from which the probability was 
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drawn. Keeping the probability constant over time allowed subjects to update their 
beliefs about the probability on the basis of past experiences and observations.
In each period subjects first made a prediction of the true underlying probability 
of the loss. These predictions were incentivized: If in this particular period the 
probability prediction task were selected for payment, they would receive PLN 
80 minus a penalty for incorrect prediction. This penalty was calculated as the 
absolute difference between their guess and the true probability multiplied by 
four zloty. For example, if a subject predicted a probability of 15% given a true 
probability of 10%, she would receive 80 - 4 * ⎪15 - 10⎪ = PLN 60. Note that this 
is not a typical subjective probability elicitation task, which is often incentivized 
using so-called proper scoring rules. In this case, the correct probabilistic answer 
was well defined, so that we were able to simplify the rule. It was incentive-
compatible (truthful reporting was optimal) for risk-neutral subjects, while (severe) 
risk aversion could draw subjects’ guesses somewhat towards the middle of the 
interval (15%). Adjusting for risk aversion would require further complication.
The second task in each period was the insurance decision. Each subject was 
given six offers (prices) for a full-insurance contract against the loss. The prices 
were determined by adding a random noise in the range (-3, +3) to each of six 
deterministic values 6, 11, 16, 22, 31, and 41 (the procedure made sure that the 
six offers were always monotonically increasing after the random noise had been 
added). These prices were selected on the basis of pilot tests to cover the possible 
range of values that subjects may hold for insurance of a PLN 80 loss that occurs 
with a probability in the range (5%, 25%). This procedure appeared to be easier and 
less repetitive (due to the random variations in prices across periods) than a direct-
matching elicitation of the certainty equivalent using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
mechanism or auction format.
Prices were identical for all members in a group, but they were newly determined 
for each period. For each price, subjects had to indicate whether they wished 
to purchase insurance or not. If the respective period and task was selected for 
payment, one of these six decisions would subsequently be selected to determine 
insurance status and earnings. Subjects’ willingness to pay for insurance (WTP) 
was defined as the midpoint between the highest price for which the person 
purchases insurance and the lowest price for which she prefers the sure loss. For 
example, for a subject who chooses insurance for prices 8, 11, and 16, but prefers 
to stay uninsured for prices 24, 33, and 43, we calculate a WTP of PLN 20. The 
structure of a typical round is illustrated in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1 A typical round.
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8.4.2  Treatments
Subjects participated in the second-stage task in groups of five. The identity of other 
group members was unknown to each subject. At the end of each period, subjects 
received feedback regarding their own and other group members’ choices and 
outcomes, depending on three treatment conditions discussed below. Additionally, 
there were two treatment conditions that differed in the way the group members’ 
losses were correlated. That is, the experiment implemented a 2 (risk correlation) × 
3 (information condition) treatment design that we explain in more detail next.
In the Uncorrelated Losses condition each subject’s loss was independently 
randomized in each period – the fact that any group member suffered a loss did not 
affect anybody else’s chance. In the Correlated Losses condition, individual risks 
in each five-person group were highly correlated within each round – typically 
either none or several of the group members were affected Specifically, we 
independently drew two loss events from the underlying probability distribution of 
the loss. For example, with a 0.2 probability of a loss, two losses would be selected 
with probability 0.04, one loss and one no-loss with probability 0.16, and otherwise 
(with probability 0.64), two no-losses would be selected. Then each subject would 
be randomly assigned one of these two events. In other words, if two losses were 
selected in the first stage, all subjects would incur a loss, if there was one loss 
and one no-loss, each subject in this group faced the probability of losing of 0.5 
and finally nobody would lose if two no-losses were selected in the first stage. As 
a result, loss experiences became correlated across subjects. For example, with 
the above underlying 0.2 probability of loss, the probability that none of the five 
subjects experienced a loss becomes 0.82 + 0.2 * 0.8 * 2 * 0.55 = 0.754, compared 
to only 0.328 in the case of uncorrelated losses. Subjects were only given a verbal, 
informal description of their condition.
The three information conditions varied as follows. In the Individual Information 
condition at the end of each period each subject would learn: (i) which of the six 
insurance contract offers was drawn and could be relevant if this period was selected 
for monetary payment; (ii) as a consequence, whether she would be insured in this 
period or not, and (iii) whether she suffered a loss in this period or not. Note that 
an insured loss would still be accounted as a loss experience on the information 
screen because it provides relevant information on the uncertain loss probability, 
similar to the information content of covered losses outside the lab. In the Social 
Information: Loss condition, the subject would have all information as given in 
the Individual Information condition, and would additionally learn how many 
other members of the group experienced a loss event in this period. In the Social 
Information: Loss and Choice condition, the subject would have all information as 
given in the Social Information: Loss condition, and would additionally learn how 
many other members of the group were insured in this period. Again, insured losses 
were included as experienced losses because they are informative on the uncertain 
loss probability (which was identical for all members of the group in all treatments).
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8.4.3  Lab details
Sessions were run in November and December 2013 in the Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics, University of Warsaw. Participants were recruited from 
the local subject pool. Because of the nature of the first stage of the experiment, it 
was emphasized in the invitations that the subjects had to be proficient in English 
and have some understanding of academic economics. However, the second stage 
of the experiment, as well as the instructions, were given in the Polish language. A 
session would have groups of four or five people each. In each session, all groups 
were either in the Correlated Losses or all in the Uncorrelated Losses condition. 
In contrast, the information treatment conditions were varied within a session. The 
experiment was computerized using z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions 
typically lasted almost two hours and subjects made nearly 70 PLN on average.
8.4.4  Predictions
Clearly, any other player’s experience of losses was as valuable by way of 
information about the probability of the loss as own experience. As for the impact 
of others’ choices, because subjects were provided with identical information and 
there was ample time to decide, there was little room for rational social learning. 
In other words, others’ decisions were not necessary to make optimal choices. 
Likewise, moral hazard was excluded by design. Conformism/imitation was 
probably limited, as players were not told the exact maximum willing to pay chosen 
by others. By contrast, social regret and inequity aversion predicted that observing 
higher insurance take-up among others would also trigger higher willingness to 
pay for insurance. Moreover, insurance take-up will be higher under uncorrelated 
than correlated losses, as in the other case other players are also likely to end up 
with a loss if it happens to the decision-maker. As we had no treatment in which 
insurance take-up would be involuntary (as in Lahno & Serra-Garcia, 2015), we 
cannot make a clear distinction between these two mechanisms.
8.5  EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: RESULTS
We first compare willingness to purchase insurance across treatments. Table 8.2 
reports WTPs derived from insurance take-up decisions as described before and 
averaged across all periods, by treatment. Additionally, we calculate a measure 
of risk aversion. To this end we subtract Subjective Expected Loss, SEL (possible 
loss, PLN 80, multiplied by participant’s assessment of its probability elicited in a 
given period), from WTP. High values correspond to high risk aversion.
Unlike Friedl et  al. (2014) we observe no effect of the correlation of risks: 
WTP (corrected for risk perception or not) is the same in the case of independent 
and correlated risks. This might be due to a lack of social comparisons of final 
outcomes made by the subjects; or it might be due to a low degree of social loss 
aversion despite salient social comparisons. Both the comparability with others 
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and the degree of social loss feelings might be stronger in classroom settings with 
a low degree of anonymity as in the experiments of Friedl et al. (2014). Obviously 
we would expect our anonymous laboratory setting to be a boundary condition for 
these effects: outside the laboratory people do often observe the outcomes of their 
peers, and consider them important for their own well-being. In any case, it is clear 
that this social comparison effect strongly depends on the details of the situation, 
and generalizations should only be made with much care.
Table 8.2  Insurance take-up depending on treatment.



































p = 0.741 p = 0.479 p = 0.111 p = 0.211 p = 0.562 p = 0.618
We now turn to investigating the impact of information available to a participant 
in a given period (rather than overall treatment effects). It was made clear to 
the participants that the unknown probability of the catastrophic loss was the 
same for all members of the 5-person group. Therefore observed losses of other 
group members should directly be used to update the estimate of the underlying 
probability. Importantly, equal weight should be attached to an update based on 
a subject’s own experience and an update based on another person’s experience.
To study the impact of observed losses on probability estimates and insurance 
choice (i.e., WTPs), we run fixed-effects panel regressions models (that is, we 
control for fixed individual-specific mean values). To check if the results are robust 
to the econometric specification, we take both actual values (levels) and changes 
(first differences) of the left-hand (dependent) variable and likewise for the main 
right-hand (explanatory) variables, that is, the historical frequency of losses. We 
restrict the analysis to the treatments with social information and uncorrelated 
risks. Table 8.3 reports regression coefficients for the probability estimates and 
Table 8.4 reports regression coefficients for insurance decisions (WTPs).
For the effect on probability estimates (Table 8.3) we find that the historical 
frequency of losses based on the outcomes of other participants has a stronger 
effect than a person’s own frequency of past losses; this effect is significant only for 
levels and is non-significant for changes in the level (first differences). However, we 
should adjust for the fact that frequencies for the other people in the group are based 
on four observations for each single observation for the person’s own experience. 
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When doing so, we find that own-experience based updates are stronger than those 
based on another person’s experience. For changes in frequencies, the effect points 
in the same direction, but does not reach statistical significance.
Table 8.3  Own experiences versus others’ experiences – effects of observed 












0.052** 0.052** 0.028** 0.028**
Historical frequency 
of others’ losses 
(4 people)
0.091** 0.091** 0.050** 0.050**
F-test testing own = 4 
othersa
(<) p < 0.01 (<) p < 0.01 (=) p = 0.277 (=) p = 0.277
F-test testing own = 1 
othera
(>) p < 0.01 (>) p < 0.01 (=) p = 0.129 (=) p = 0.129
Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. **Indicates 1% significance 
level. aSize of own effect versus effect of other indicted in parentheses.
When we look directly at the effect on behavior, that is, willingness to pay 
for insurance (Table 8.4), we find no significant differences between the effects 
of own experiences and the groups’ experiences for either levels or differences. 
However, controlling again for the fact that others’ experiences provide four times 
as many observations, we find significantly larger impact of the own experiences 
on insurance preferences (WTPs).
To summarize, we find evidence that people discount other people’s information 
in their raw beliefs, and in their insurance choices. A change in historical loss 
frequency based on a decision-maker’s own loss receives a much larger weight in 
her probability update and insurance decision than an equally large change based 
on experience of another individual. In the current settings this holds true despite 
both events being equally informative about the underlying event.
Finally, we look at the direct effect of others’ choices on own insurance choices. 
As a simple test, we compare WTPs depending on the number of subjects in the 
peer group of five that were insured in the previous period. Table 8.5 shows that 
there is no effect (with all p values of non-parametric statistical tests exceeding 
0.1). This holds true for the whole set of 40 periods, as well as for a restricted 
analysis based only on Period 2 (i.e., exactly one instance of learning). The same is 
true for the actual percentages of insured subjects given the different information 
sets. Clearly, other participants’ observed past insurance decisions had no effect on 
subjects’ insurance decisions.
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Table 8.4  Own experiences versus others’ experiences – effects of observed 












0.071** 0.073** 0.055** 0.054**
Historical frequency 
of others’ losses 
(4 people)
0.081** 0.086** 0.017 0.017
F-test testing own = 4 
othersa
(=) p = 0.765 (=) p = 0.678 (=) p = 0.398 (=) p = 0.391
F-test testing own = 1 
othera
(>) p < 0.01 (>) p < 0.01 (>) p = 0.029 (>) p = 0.028
Notes: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. **Indicates 1% significance 
level. aSize of own effect versus effect of other indicted in parentheses.
Table 8.5  Imitating others’ insurance choices?




All Periods Only Period 2
WTP (Mean) Insured (%) WTP (Mean) Insured (%)
0 23.62 57.14 20.5 46.15
1 24.24 61.46 24.76 61.11
2 22.92 55.80 24.72 62.96
3 22.06 56.16 21.5 50.00
4 23.80 57.19 19.1 60.00
Notes: Based on data from Social Information: Loss and Choice condition only. Entries 
indicate behavior of those who observe others’ decisions.
8.6  CONCLUSIONS
We identify a number of ways in which peers’ experiences and decisions may affect 
insurance take-up. Some of these mechanisms may contribute to explaining and 
potentially solving the problem of insufficient demand for catastrophic insurance. 
This is particularly important with regard to flood insurance. Indeed, coverage is 
typically limited, even with governmental subsidies.
The importance of social comparison for economic decisions has been widely 
acknowledged in the field (e.g., World Bank, 2015), and recent research suggests 
that it may be central to insurance take-up as well. Specifically, catastrophic 
events, such as floods, are well covered by the media, which may strengthen 
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peer effects. On the other hand, some authors have suggested that decision-
makers put too little weight on other people’s relevant information (Viscusi & 
Zeckhauser, 2015; see also Minson & Mueller (2012), for the case of groups 
exacerbating this effect). In our experiment we are able to study these effects 
in one uniform design, in a controlled laboratory environment that excludes 
alternative explanations which are typically possible in the case of field data. 
In particular, in our study the information regarding the other person is 
unambiguously relevant to the own insurance decision, and highly salient for 
the decision-maker.
We confirm previous findings that people discount experience of other decision-
makers: upon observing a loss incurred by another person they update their 
beliefs and behavior but not quite as strongly as they would if they experienced 
it personally. Notably, this happens despite the fact that others’ loss experiences 
are unambiguously equally informative in our setting as their own loss experience 
(which was not true in studies such as Viscusi & Zeckhauser (2015)). This means 
that, for example, potential buyers of houses in flood-prone areas will tend to 
underestimate the threat compared to the sellers.
The second key finding is that, unlike Friedl et al. (2014), we find no support for 
the hypotheses of social regret/inequity aversion. Indeed, our subjects do not seem 
to be directly affected by others’ decisions. Moreover, their willingness to insure 
does not depend on whether risks are correlated or not.
Our data may provide policy implications concerning efforts to encourage 
vulnerable populaces to purchase catastrophic insurance and otherwise take 
sufficient measure to reduce and transfer the risks they are facing. In view of our 
findings of underestimation of risk, providing correct probability estimates of such 
events may be effective. The same can be said of disseminating information about 
catastrophic losses suffered by others. On the other hand, providing information 
about others’ insurance decisions may have a very weak effect. Likewise, 
emphasizing possible losses relative to (insured) others may be less effective, in 
view of the negative findings of social regret/inequity aversion.
On a meta-level, our observations are in line with the broad picture found 
in existing literature: peer effects in insurance take-up do not seem to be very 
robust. On the contrary, they depend strongly on the respective setting. Clearly, 
future research combining theory, laboratory experiments, and field experiments 
will need to address interactions between features of the decision-making setting 
and particular channels through which peer effects in catastrophic insurance take 
up may operate. Until this is achieved, the benefit from these studies for policy-
making will be limited.
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9.1  INTRODUCTION
Lack of awareness of the possibilities and consequences of rare catastrophic 
events, among people that may be potentially affected by them, is a crucial 
factor that can drastically increase the negative consequences of disasters 
when they occur. As a rule, lack of awareness results in inadequate preventive 
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measures being taken against catastrophes and insufficient preparedness for 
them. In the case of large risks with low probabilities it is no surprise that most 
people are not sufficiently aware of a threat, having little or no experience with 
the event occurring. In this respect, the situation can be improved by educating 
those at risk about the danger and by taking precautionary measures – in 
particular, providing technical safety devices – at the population level. This, 
however, can have one potentially counterproductive effect: such provision can 
develop an excessive sense of safety among the people to be protected, making 
them eschew prudent behaviour and neglect the existing risk (e.g., by failing to 
purchase insurance). For instance, while building levees to protect a locality 
against flooding never reduces flood risk to zero – as pointed out by Kundzewicz 
and Kaczmarek (2000), ‘a flood protection system guaranteeing absolute safety 
is an illusion’ – it can make the inhabitants feel so (unrealistically) safe that 
they neglect making individual preparations for a flood that are desirable in any 
event. Thus, technical measures aimed at protecting against disaster may create 
an illusion of safety.
What level of feeling safe is unrealistic (i.e., what is the ‘illusion of safety’)? How 
can it be detected and measured? In our opinion, the illusion of safety comprises 
two interrelated effects. First, the very existence of technical measures aimed at 
disaster prevention can reduce people’s worry about the possibility of a disaster’s 
realization. Second, on a more cognitive level, they can excessively decrease 
people’s estimates of the probability of a catastrophe. Clearly, both effects can 
be expected to occur simultaneously (where people do think about probabilities). 
Here, we shall treat both degree of worry and the subjective probability of a 
disaster occurring as proxies for a sense of safety and compare them in different 
environments, in particular, in the presence versus absence of technical preventive 
measures.
Moreover, in the psychological literature the term ‘illusion of safety’ is usually 
used to denote a different though related phenomenon – namely, an increased sense 
of safety resulting from taking actions that in reality have nothing in common 
with real protection against prevailing threats. When expecting danger, or even 
facing uncertainty, superstitious people ‘keep their fingers crossed’, children (and 
some adults) take their teddy bears with them, etc., in the need to feel safe. There 
is abundant evidence (see, e.g., Schade & Kunreuther, 2002) of the often absurd 
‘precautions’ taken by New York’s inhabitants after the 2001 terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center. However, this phenomenon, while interesting, does not 
seem to occur en masse or to influence the decisions of many people threatened by 
catastrophic events.
On the other hand, the ‘illusion of safety’, when taken literally, is simply 
an unrealistic sense of being safe when a disaster is possible. Similarly to the 
phenomenon described above, it probably results from a general need for 
reassurance in the face of a large risk. Unlike the above phenomenon, it may 
lead to neglect in making necessary precautions and thus have serious practical 
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consequences, including insufficient preparedness for the risk and higher losses in 
the event of its realization. Each of the biases involved in safety illusions – whether 
this be inadequately low levels of worry or underestimations of probability – 
clearly influence another interesting and important variable: the willingness 
to protect oneself against risk. On the other hand, there are numerous possible 
determinants of illusion of safety, both individual (optimism, attitude towards 
risk, general tendency to worry) and external (available information about risks, 
methods of communicating probabilities, the existence of protective measures).
In this paper we focus on the role of technical measures designed to reduce 
risk. The risk homeostasis theory formulated by Wilde (1982) predicts less prudent 
behaviour of decision-makers in the presence of such technical measures than 
in their absence. There is also abundant anecdotal evidence of drivers behaving 
more riskily in safer automobiles on safer roads, and of increases in the number 
of accidents on mountain climbing routes subsequent to the installation of safety 
devices such as iron rungs, chains and cables. It seems then, that the vigilance of 
‘protected’ decision-makers is attenuated. Is this because of the illusion of safety? 
If so, is the illusion due to the provision of safety measures?
There have been few studies of the aforementioned effects thus far, and 
empirical results are mixed. Siegrist and Gutscher (2006) observed that inhabitants 
of flood-endangered areas in Switzerland gave lower estimates of flood probability 
than experts, and Wouter Botzen et al. (2015) observed overestimation of flood 
probabilities among residents of New York City as compared to probabilistic flood 
risk models developed for the city. Also, Ludy and Kondolf (2012) reported very 
low worry levels and verbal risk assessments among inhabitants of a new levee-
protected subdivision in California. However, it is unclear whether this was indeed 
a ‘levee effect’ or simply underestimation of the residual risk that might occur also 
in an unprotected area.
Systems of levees protecting flood-prone areas are a common and important 
example of a technical device reducing risk. We use these in our chapter to 
investigate whether and how the very existence of technical precautionary measures 
influences people’s sense of safety. To this end, two studies were conducted. The 
first one used two hypothetical scenarios evaluated by a diverse range of people 
completing a questionnaire on the Internet. The second was a field study conducted 
on inhabitants of flood-prone areas in Poland with differing flood histories and 
differing qualities of existing levees. Respondents in both studies declared their 
level of worry of possible flooding, and in the field study they also estimated the 
probability of flooding.
9.2  STUDY 1: THE ILLUSION OF SAFETY 
IN THE LABORATORY
A preliminary study was conducted on the Internet to test whether the existence 
of protective measures does, ceteris paribus, influence people’s perceptions of 
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security. We hypothesized that ‘protected’ decision-makers would display lower 
levels of worry and lower willingness to buy insurance than those ‘unprotected’. 
To test this, two groups of participants – one ‘protected’ and one ‘unprotected’ – 
were asked to assess their level of worry about the possibility of their house 
being flooded in a hypothetical scenario. We attempted to compensate for the 
obvious weaknesses of hypothetical studies by eliminating all real-life elements 
that differentiate situations and influence respondents’ answers in any field study: 
except for a single difference (the existence versus lack of levees) between the 
groups, the two scenarios were identical, making the decision situations of all 
respondents within a group identical, and those for the two groups indeed ceteris 
paribus. In particular, no information about the probability of flooding was given 
to participants, and the physical conditions for a flood’s occurrence were exactly 
the same in the protected and unprotected groups.
9.2.1  Participants
Seventy-three participants recruited on an Internet platform, 55 men and 18 
women, aged between 20 and 65 years (M = 34.1 years, SD = 9.7 years) took part 
in the study. Another 13 people completed the questionnaire but were rejected 
because they answered all of the questions in an unfeasibly short time (less than 3 
minutes), suggesting that they had not read the scenario carefully.
9.2.2  Procedure, scenarios and questions
Participants were randomly assigned to the unprotected group (n = 40) or 
protected group (n = 33) and read one of two scenarios about the flooding of a 
house recently bequeathed to them. They were then asked to answer a number 
of questions including one about their level of worry and one about their 
readiness to buy home insurance. Thereafter, they were asked about their real-
life experience of floods and completed an abbreviated version of the Worry 
Domain Questionnaire (WDQ; Stöber & Joormann, 2001). The whole study was 
conducted online in Polish. Participants were paid 6 PLN (around $2) for their 
participation.
Scenarios:
[ALL PARTICIPANTS] Your relatives had a house and informed you long ago 
that they were going to bequeath it to you. Now you have inherited the house 
and you can move in. It is a valuable and comfortable house located in a nice 
neighbourhood. However, it has one shortcoming: it has been built close to a 
river, in an area that is threatened by inundation. In the event of a very large 
flood your house will be flooded and seriously damaged – it will become 
unfit for living in and the cost of restoring it will amount to about a half of its 
present value, that is, about 250,000 PLN.
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[PROTECTED GROUP ONLY] The area has been recently protected by a 
new levee that will protect it against normal floods but not against extreme 
floods.
[UNPROTECTED GROUP ONLY] No means of protecting against floods are 
present in the area, nor are any planned.
[ALL PARTICIPANTS] On the way to your house there is a gauge on the river 
showing the current level of the water. You know that your house will be 
flooded if the water exceeds the highest point on the gauge’s scale by more 
than 1 metre. You also know that the last time such a flood happened was 30 
years ago.
Questions
(1) When living in the house, to what extent would you be worried about the 
possibility of your house being flooded?
 (5-point scale, from 0 – Not at all, to 4 – I would be very worried)
(2) There is the possibility of buying insurance against flooding. The insurance 
costs 850 PLN a year and covers all damage if your house is flooded. Would 
you buy the policy?
 (5-point scale, from 0 – Certainly not, to 4 – I would certainly buy)
(3) In your opinion, would other people in the same circumstances be less or 
more worried than you?
 (5-point scale, from -2 – Much less, to 2 – Much more, and ‘I do not know’)
9.2.3  Results
A comparison of levels of worry about the house flooding across the two groups 
strongly confirmed the existence of a safety illusion. The mean level of worry in 
the unprotected group (M = 2.58, SD = 1.06) was higher than that in the protected 
group (M = 2.00, SD = 1.03), and this difference was significant, t(71) = 2.34, 
p = 0.022 (two-tailed); Mann-Whitney U = 472, p = 0.030. Even though obtained 
in a purely hypothetical study, this result is of considerable interest. Moreover, 
this form of safety illusion can clearly be attributed to the difference between the 
two scenarios and not to individual propensities to worry among the respondents: 
these propensities, as measured by WDQ scores, were positively correlated with 
contextual worry about damage to the house caused by flooding, but the correlation 
was non-significant (r = 0.133, p = 0.399). Also, as expected, the WDQ scores did 
not differ between groups.
On the other hand, the difference in levels of worry (or, alternatively, in 
perceived degree of safety) did not translate to differences in willingness to 
purchase insurance. The mean willingness to buy a policy for a (realistic and rather 
moderate) price of 850 PLN, measured on a five-point scale from 0 to 4, was 3.43 in 
the unprotected and 3.21 in the protected group (SDs = 0.64 and 1.02 respectively). 
This difference was non-significant, t(71) = 1.09, p = 0.281 (two-tailed). In both 
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groups, a great majority of respondents, including most of those with low levels 
of worry, indicated they would ‘definitely buy’ or ‘rather buy’ the policy. Thus, 
it seems that the serious threat constituted by the flooding of one’s house makes 
people generally willing to insure themselves for a reasonable price, at least under a 
hypothetical scenario (where talk may be cheap). Presumably for the same reason, 
we did not observe the relationship between degree of worry and willingness to 
buy insurance that has previously been observed in many field and laboratory 
studies (e.g., Schade et al. 2012): for the present study the Pearson’s r correlation 
was positive but non-significant (r = 0.10, p = 0.403).
Only 19 out of 73 respondents reported any real-life experience of a house 
flooding (i.e., responded ‘Yes’ to the question ‘Has your house, or the house of 
a relative or friend, ever been flooded?’). These were mostly associated with the 
large flood of 1997 or 2010, and, of the 19 respondents, 4 stated that is was their 
own house which flooded. This number of respondents is too low to confirm 
any statistical impact of such an experience on the dependent variables in the 
study. However, there was virtually no difference in degree of worry between 
the experienced and unexperienced groups (M = 2.37, SD = 1.06 and M = 2.30, 
SD = 1.09, respectively). This showed that it was indeed the existence or lack of 
dikes in scenarios that accounted for level of worry about the house flooding. Thus, 
the illusion of safety seems to be a real psychological phenomenon deserving of 
further study in the field.
9.3  STUDY 2: THE ILLUSION OF SAFETY IN THE FIELD
While the laboratory study strongly confirmed the safety illusion phenomenon, 
its observation in real-life circumstances would emphasize its practical significance. 
Therefore, we also attempted to detect its existence in the field. The advantages and 
disadvantages of laboratory versus field studies are well-known, and a comparison 
of results observed for the same phenomenon in both contexts provides a very 
attractive research perspective, albeit that a field study does not allow replication 
of the precisely controlled conditions in a laboratory experiment. To study the 
illusion of safety in the field, face-to-face interviews were conducted in June 2016 
with inhabitants of a number of localities along the Vistula with various histories 
of inundation and various states of protective levees. To measure people’s sense 
of safety, respondents were asked about their level of worry associated with the 
possible flooding of their houses. We also asked them to estimate the probability of 
their house flooding within the next year and the next 20 years. Numerous real-life 
variables that could potentially affect participants’ sense of safety were controlled, 
including their experience of flooding.
As before, we hypothesized that people living in protected areas would worry 
less and estimate the probability of flooding as lower than those living in areas 
facing similar flood probabilities but not protected.
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 The illusion of safety 163
9.3.1  The participant sample
The study was conducted on a sample of 186 adults living in selected localities 
close to the Vistula river.
In addition to many of its tributaries, the Vistula – the largest river in Poland – 
rises in the Carpathian Mountains where heavy rainfalls occur relatively 
frequently, particularly in summer. This causes huge variations in its flow rate. 
Even in Warsaw, more than 500 km from its sources, the maximum recorded flow 
rate of the Vistula (5650 m³/s) is 10 times the average (561 m³/s) and above 50 
times the minimum. Almost every decade a serious flood occurs on the middle 
and/or upper Vistula, caused either by rainfalls in southern Poland or (nowadays 
less frequently) rapid snowmelts. Within the last two decades, catastrophic floods 
occurred in 1997, 2001 and 2010.
With the exception of some city areas and bridges, the Vistula flows in its natural 
bed and is not canalized. Almost all localities on the river that are potentially 
threatened by floods are protected by levees. The levees are normally designed to 
protect the terrain against ‘100 year’ floods but in practice are of different ages and 
qualities; some were broken during the last flood occurrence, which resulted in a 
large amount of damage, and some are known to be highly vulnerable or, in a few 
cases, lower than required.
All flood-prone areas in Poland, except the mountain regions, have been mapped 
by the Polish Institute of Meteorology and Water Management under the ISOK 
(Informatyczny System Osłony Kraju [IT System for the Country’s Protection 
against Extreme Hazards]) project. Using existing hydrologic data, mathematical 
modelling and the Digital Terrain Model, areas that would be inundated by a 10 
year, 100 year and 500 year flood (with equivalent yearly flooding probabilities 
of at least 10%, at least 1% and at least 0.2%, respectively) have been identified. 
These ISOK flood hazard maps – an analogue of United States FEMA (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency) maps – are now publicly available (ISOK, 
2015), and our study used them to select the localities in which interviews were 
conducted. For the purposes of the study it was assumed that areas situated in the 
same – for example, 1% – flood zone with similar levels of floodwater in the event 
of a 100 year flood faced the same risk of flooding.
In total, 186 people in 6 different localities were interviewed. All respondents 
lived in one-family houses, exactly half were female, and most (170) were heads 
of families. Their ages varied from 21 to 100 years (M = 55.4 years, SD = 14.9 
years).
Respondents were divided into six groups, corresponding to the localities of 
their residence. Within each locality we selected areas with the highest flood risk 
according to the ISOK maps, and instructed our pollsters to interview the inhabitants 
of these areas first whenever possible. As a result, we obtained (as desired) a high 
proportion of respondents aware of the threat, that is, people believing that they 
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lived in a flood-prone area (77% answered ‘certainly’ or ‘probably’ on a 4-point 
scale) and that their house was threatened by flooding (61%). Some of the localities 
are protected by levees and others not, and some, but not all, were flooded during 
the large flood of 2010. Data for the chosen localities are presented in Table 9.1, and 
their specific characteristics are in the appendix.
Table 9.1  Basic characteristics of localities in which the study was conducted.
Group Locality/Localities ISOK 0.2% ISOK 1% Protected Flooded in 2010
I Lucimia, Gniazdków + + No Yes
II Janowiec + - Yes Yes
III Borowa, Matygi + + Yes No
IV Połaniec + + No No
V Konstancin left bank + - Yes Partly
VI Konstancin right 
bank
+ - Yes No
9.3.2  Method and questionnaire
Interviews were conducted face-to-face at respondents’ homes, with the interviewer 
writing down respondents’ answers.
The questionnaire consisted of 27 questions, some of them conditional on earlier 
responses. Along with declaring their intensity of worry about the possibility 
of their house being flooded, respondents were also asked to state a subjective 
probability of such an event occurring during the next year and within the next 20 
years. The answers to these three questions were used as measures of the safety felt 
by respondents and were central dependent variables in the study. The questions 
read as follows:
(P1yr): Please give the chance, in per cent, that your house will be flooded 
within the next year (0 denoting no chance at all, 100 denoting certainty of 
flooding)
(P20yrs): Please give the chance, in per cent, that your house will be flooded 
within the next 20 years (0 for no chance at all, 100 for certainty of 
flooding)
(Worry): To what extent do you feel worried about the possibility of your house 
being flooded?
[4-point scale, from 1 – I definitely do not worry, to 4 – I definitely do worry]
The questions about probabilities were asked in random order, and only to 
respondents who did not answer ‘certainly not’ to an earlier question on awareness 
of danger (see below).
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These questions were preceded by two others about awareness of flood risk:
(Awareness – area): Is the locality of your residence threatened by flooding in 
the event of a flood?
(Awareness – house): Is your house threatened by flooding in the event of a 
flood?
[both on a 4-point scale, from 0 – certainly not, to 4 – certainly, with 2 = Difficult 
to say]
We also checked respondents’ experience of past flooding, their opinions about 
the efficiency of protective measures (if they existed), their insurance status and 
their individual protective activities. The relevant questions read as follows:
(Own house flooded): Has your house ever flooded?
(A close person’s house flooded): Has the house of anyone close to you ever 
flooded?
(only asked of those who answered ‘no’ or ‘I don’t know’ to the preceding question).
(Protection): Do any protective measures against flooding exist in the area of 
your residence?
…and if ‘yes’ was the answer above,
(Protection efficiency): In your opinion, will they protect your house in the 
event of a flood?
(Insured): Do you have an insurance policy against your house flooding?
…and if ‘yes’ was the answer above,
(Obligatory): Is this insurance obligatory?
(Individual prevention): Do you take any action on your own to protect your 
house from flooding?
In the case of a ‘yes’ answer, the respondent was asked to enumerate these actions.
Three ordinal variables with three possible values each were derived from the 
responses to the questions about past experience, efficiency and insurance:
Personal experience of flooding: ‘own’, ‘of a close person’ or ‘none’,
Perceived efficiency of protection: ‘non-existent’, ‘inefficient’ or ‘efficient’
(‘efficient’ equating with answers of ‘certainly’ or ‘probably’ to the ‘efficiency’ 
question)
Insurance status: ‘voluntary’, ‘obligatory’ or ‘none’.
At the end of the procedure, respondents completed a short optimism 
questionnaire, which was a Polish adaptation of the LOT-R (Revised Life 
Orientation Test) questionnaire (Scheier et al. 1994) consisting of six relevant and 
four non-relevant items on a 5-point scale, with possible total scores ranging from 
-12 to 12. Respondents also supplied demographic data: age, marital status and 
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duration of residence at the present address. All respondents were offered a small 
gift for the time they devoted to their interview.
9.3.3  Results
9.3.3.1  Worry and subjective probabilities – intergroup comparisons
As mentioned previously, we measured feelings of safety by declared worry and 
subjective probabilities of the occurrence of a disaster. Therefore, the main dependent 
variables in the study were responses to the items Worry, P1yr and P20yrs. In this 
subsection we compare these variables across groups defined by locality of residence, 
and assume that localities situated in the same ISOK flood zone face approximately 
the same risk of flooding whether they are protected or not. It was hypothesized that 
both worry levels and subjective probabilities would be lower in protected localities, 
thus confirming the existence of the illusion of safety. In the next subsection we treat 
the dependent variables as functions of individual respondents’ characteristics.
It should be noted that, although respondents were not expected to use formal 
probabilistic reasoning, their answers to questions about 1-year and 20-year 
probabilities were reasonably consistent. While 15 out of 165 respondents asked 
about probabilities replied ‘50%’ to both questions, only two reported their 1-year 
probabilities as higher than their 20-year probabilities.
There were few significant differences between the groups with respect to 
worry. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for this dependent variable for 
the group independent variable revealed a significant main effect, F(5,161) = 2.56, 
p = 0.029, but pairwise comparisons of worry levels between groups revealed only 
significant differences between group I on the one extreme (M = 2.93, SD = 0.98) 
and groups IV (M = 2.24, SD = 0.52) and VI (M = 2.15, SD = 1.05) on the other, 
with t(52) = 3.12, p = 0.002, and t(52) = 2.86, p = 0.006, respectively.
A somewhat more transparent picture was obtained when restricting analysis 
to four 2 × 2 combinations of the protected x flooded factors. This could be 
done using groups I, II, IV and VI or, alternatively, groups I to IV. A graphical 
representation of these worry levels is presented as Figure 9.1, with flooding record 
and protection status of localities shown. Two-factor ANOVAs demonstrated that 
in both cases it was the flooding factor that had a significant impact on worry 
(p < 0.001, and p = 0.016), while both the effect for the protection factor and the 
interaction between the two factors were non-significant. So, residents of areas that 
had been flooded were more worried by the possibility of flooding than those of 
other areas, regardless of whether their localities were protected by levees or not. 
A psychological interpretation of this would be that experience of a disaster in 
one’s locality, being an order of magnitude stronger than the ‘experience of being 
protected’, affects the highly emotional variable, worry.
The very strong impact of a locality’s flooding record also pertained to the more 
cognitive dependent variables: subjective probabilities of future flooding (see Figure 
9.2). However, these probabilities were also influenced by protection status, although 
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not always directly. Somewhat surprisingly, this held mainly for the short-term P1yr 
dependent variable. One-year probabilities were influenced significantly by both 
a locality’s flooding record (flooded versus not flooded) and its protection status 
(protected versus unprotected), and by their interaction (in a two-way ANOVA, 
p < 0.001, p < 0.001 and p = 0.005, respectively for groups I, II, IV and VI, and 
p = 0.012, p = 0.035 and p < 0.001 for groups I to IV). On the other hand, 20-year 
probabilities (P20yrs) were highly influenced by flooding record and the interacting 
factors (p < 0.001 for both, regardless of the groups used) but not directly by 
protection status alone (p = 0.056 or p = 0.528, depending on the ‘protected and 
not flooded’ group chosen). It seems that inhabitants of protected localities perceive 
levees as providing reliable short-term protection, but not necessarily long-term 
protection (possibly in some cases due to past experience of levee failures).
Figure 9.1  Worry levels in groups I, II, IV and VI (left) and I to IV (right).
Some pairwise comparisons between groups supported this conjecture. Groups 
V and VI resided on the opposite sides of a minor tributary (the Jeziorka); both 
areas are threatened by the Vistula’s backwater but are protected by levees. In 
2010, several houses in group V were (moderately) flooded, and a few others in both 
groups inundated by ground water. After that, the dike protecting group VI was 
renovated. Group VI reported significantly lower estimates of one-year flooding 
probability than group V, t(49) = 2.01, p = 0.050, also, a number of its members 
were certain that they did not live in a flood-prone area, but the two groups do not 
differ in their 20-year probability estimates or their worry levels.
The relatively weak influence of protection status on worry and long-term 
subjective probabilities was clearly caused by group IV (Połaniec) which was not 
protected and was not flooded in 2010. This combination is strange at first sight 
since all the other unprotected localities on the Vistula which are classified as 
flood-prone have been flooded in the last two decades, mostly more than once. 
Despite this, the members of group IV worried relatively little and, moreover, 
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provided very low long-term flooding probability estimates, which was at variance 
from what might be expected from inhabitants of an unprotected area. They also 
displayed relatively low awareness of the threat to their houses (though not to their 
locality), and only one respondent in this group reported personal experience of 
her house being flooded. This indicates that personal previous experience of the 
realization of a threat may be another important factor influencing sense of safety.
Figure 9.2  Subjective probabilities (P1yr and P20yrs) for groups I, II, IV and VI 
(left) and I to IV (right).
It can also be argued that a sense of safety is formed by one’s own beliefs in the 
efficiency of protective measures rather than their simple physical existence. We shall 
discuss the influence of these beliefs, and of past personal experience of a disaster, 
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on sense of safety proxies in the next subsection, conducting analyses on the entire 
sample of respondents, that is, with no division by location of residential groups.
Generally, the field results at the group level were ambiguous. Ceteris paribus 
conditions could be only very roughly approximated. Inhabitants of protected 
localities, whether flooded or not, worried less and provided lower disaster 
probability estimates than those of unprotected and flooded localities, but in general 
not than people in unprotected and non-flooded localities. For all three proxies of 
sense of safety, the impact of the flooding record of a locality was stronger than 
that of the existence of levees.
9.3.3.2  Worry and subjective probabilities – individual differences
In this subsection we place all respondents in one group and consider the impact of 
some individual characteristics of respondents on worry and subjective probabilities. 
The ‘individual’ counterparts of variables characterizing localities are personal 
experience of flooding (PExF) and perceived efficiency of protection (PEP) as 
defined in Section 9.3.1 (recall that each of these variables takes values 0, 1 or 2).
Both of the above variables, and their interaction, were strong predictors of 
worry, a two-two ANOVA yielding significance levels of p = 0.004, 0.003 and 
0.016, respectively, R2 = 0.256. For 1-year probabilities, a 3 × 3 ANOVA showed a 
significant main effect of perceived efficiency of protection (p = 0.002) and only a 
marginally non-significant PEP x PExF interaction (p = 0.051) but, interestingly, no 
significant main effect of personal experience (p = 0.244). The factors accounted 
for a moderate proportion of variance, R2 = 0.119. (This was consistent with the 
observation in the previous subsection on levees possibly perceived as a short-term 
protective device.) A similar R2 of 0.118 was obtained for the 20-year probability 
dependent variable, but in contrast here only personal experience was a significant 
predictor (p < 0.001, with p > 0.14 for both PEP and the interaction).
Moreover, the significant main effect of personal experience on the P20yrs and 
worry dependent variables was caused primarily by the ‘none’ (0) group: both 
worry and 20-year probabilities in this group differed greatly from those in other 
groups, while differences between the ‘own’ and ‘close’ groups were minor. Thus, 
experience of a disaster affecting a close person seems to be a good substitute 
for one’s own experience. Efficient protection decreased worry in comparison to 
both inefficient protection (Tukey’s HSD [honest significant difference], p < 0.001) 
and no protection (p = 0.009), and decreased P1yr estimates in comparison to no 
protection (p = 0.003) but not to inefficient protection (p = 0.487).
Apart from PExF and PEP, two other variables at the individual level had an 
influence on sense of safety, whether measured by worry or by probability estimates. 
As shown in Table 9.2, simple correlation analysis (Pearson’s r) indicated strong 
links between these variables and general optimism (measured using a short 
questionnaire, see Section 3.1) and duration of residence at current address (in 
years).
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Table 9.2  Correlation of some individual variables with sense of safety measures.
Variable Correlation with
Worry P1yr P20yrs
Optimism r -0.222 -0.190 -0.276
p 0.002 0.007 <0.001
Duration of residence r 0.191 0.091 0.161
p 0.007 0.123 0.020
Performing linear regression for each of the three main dependent variables with 
optimism and duration of residence as independent variables, we confirmed the 
conclusions drawn from the ANOVA analyses above and, in some cases, found that 
optimism was another important predictor, particularly of long-term probabilities.
Table 9.3  Linear regression analysis for proxies of sense of safety.
Dependent Variable: Worry B Std. Error Beta t p
Constant 2.409 0.179 13.453 <0.001
Experience of flooding 0.366 0.088 0.307 4.180 <0.001
Perceived prevention -0.210 0.080 -0.186 -2.621 0.010
Optimism -0.033 0.017 -0.139 -1.915 0.057
Duration of residence 0.005 0.004 0.103 1.397 0.164
Dependent Variable: P1yr B Std. Error Beta t p
Constant 18.944 3.584 5.286 <0.001
Experience of flooding 3.241 1.753 0.145 1.849 0.066
Perceived prevention -5.287 1.639 -0.241 -3.226 0.002
Optimism -0.699 0.348 -0.155 -2.006 0.047
Duration of residence 0.031 0.072 0.034 0.429 0.668
Dependent Variable: P20yrs B Std. Error Beta t p
Constant 35.725 5.865 6.091 <0.001
Experience of flooding 10.840 2.868 0.290 3.779 <0.001
Perceived prevention -0.555 2.662 -0.015 -0.207 0.836
Optimism -1.563 0.570 -0.207 -2.742 0.007
Duration of residence 0.054 0.118 0.035 0.453 0.651
It might be suspected that optimism itself could be a function of individual 
experience of flooding and perceived efficiency of protection, and although there 
was indeed a relationship it was rather weak, a two-factor 3 × 3 ANOVA with 
optimism as the dependent variable revealing a marginal interaction between 
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PEP x PExF (p = 0.050), but both the main effects of PEP and PExF being non-
significant, and R2 being rather low (0.059).
The results in this subsection are concordant with those obtained at the group 
level but offer a clearer picture. Again, individual perceptions of prevention were 
the most important determinants of 1-year probability estimates and completely 
irrelevant for 20-year probability estimates, but they also affected level of worry. 
Individual experience of flooding affected all three dependent variables but had a 
relatively small impact on short-term probability estimates. A possible explanation 
of this is that experienced people realize that flooding does not occur each year and 
use a kind of contrarian reasoning.
9.3.3.3  Decisions about insurance and individual prevention
The importance of safety illusion effects lies in the fact that they can negatively 
influence willingness to take actions preventing and/or mitigating a threat, 
particularly whether to purchase insurance and take individual precautions to 
prepare for the threat (e.g., in the context of flooding, maintaining drainage or 
insulating house walls).
With respect to insurance, respondents possessing obligatory policies (in 
particular, farmers in Poland are legally obliged to insure their property) were 
excluded from all analyses with insurance status as a dependent variable. With 
such people excluded, our data clearly showed that relatively few people insured 
their houses against flooding: in five of the six groups, ‘no insurance’ was the 
modal response, but buying insurance was relatively more common in the areas 
that had suffered from floods (47% insured versus 27% in other areas).
Elementary analysis indicated which groups of respondents tended to purchase 
insurance. In comparison to those uninsured, (voluntarily) insured respondents…
were more aware of the danger of their house flooding,
had more experience of flooding, χ2(2) = 9.65, p = 0.008,
were slightly more confident in the efficiency of protection, χ2(2) = 5.33, 
p = 0.069,
and provided higher 20-year probability estimates, t(139) = 2.45, p = 0.015,
…but did not differ from uninsured respondents with respect to worry, 1-year 
probability estimates, optimism or duration of residence. This result is of some 
interest since it confirms Tyszka and Konieczny’s (2016) finding that worry does not 
matter in insurance decisions, contrasting with the results of Schade et al. (2012).
Moreover, relatively few inhabitants of unprotected areas possessed insurance 
against flooding if they were not obliged to. Only 12 out of the 53 respondents 
in the unprotected localities (groups I and IV) who had a choice to purchase 
insurance did so, while in all protected localities the number of voluntarily 
insured respondents was above 30% (however, it only exceeded 50% in the 
recently-flooded group II).
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First cursory observations revealed that few respondents take any individual 
protective actions, the answer ‘definitely not’ being modal in almost all groups. The 
number of respondents who reported taking individual precautionary actions was 
too small for any meaningful statistical analyses. Such activities were somewhat 
more frequent in the unprotected and flooded group I (28%, versus less than 20% 
in all other groups) and among people who had experienced flooding of their houses 
(20% versus 12%), but even in these potentially more active groups they occurred 
unexpectedly rarely.
We attribute the above somewhat surprising result to the fatalistic nature of 
floods on large rivers, which are infrequent but catastrophic when they occur and 
very difficult to mitigate. When asked an open question about the first things 
to do in the event of an immediate flood threat to their house most respondents 
suggested evacuation or simply escaping, and quite a few stated that nothing can 
be done.
9.4  CONCLUSIONS
The safety illusion phenomenon in the context of natural hazards, understood 
as an unrealistic sense of safety resulting merely from the existence of technical 
preventive measures, is potentially important and calls for detailed study. We 
were able to clearly confirm its existence in an Internet survey with hypothetical 
scenarios where the level of worry of flooding in a group protected by levees was 
significantly lower than in an unprotected group even though all other details, 
in particular the necessary and sufficient condition of potential serious flooding 
of a house (exceeding a fixed and given level by the river) was identical in both 
scenarios. This shows that the very existence of a levee makes people feel safer 
than in a situation with the same objective exposure to danger but without levees. 
Thus, ‘the levee effect’ is a real psychological phenomenon.
Attempts to confirm its existence in the field face serious problems, the main one 
being difficulty in finding groups with differing technical protection status but the 
same objective exposure to a threat. We used the ISOK flood hazard maps to select 
localities with exposures that were theoretically similar, but it has to be borne in 
mind that this can only serve as a coarse approximation. In particular, these maps 
offer (approximate) probabilities of flooding due to high water exceeding a levee’s 
level but not due to levee defects, and the majority of flood losses on the Vistula in 
the last few decades were caused by levee breaches.
Moreover, as expected and as confirmed in our study, the flooding history of a 
locality impacts feelings of safety even more strongly than a levee’s existence, so 
this also has to be taken into account when choosing areas to study. In particular, 
it is necessary to include a locality that is not protected and has no flooding record 
when making comparisons. But almost all of the (few) unprotected localities shown 
as being exposed to risk have been flooded, and the only exception on the Vistula – 
parts of Połaniec (group IV) – produced highly specific findings, presumably 
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because its location on a high bank of a minor tributary of the Vistula made its 
inhabitants feel as if they were protected.
Generally, the results obtained in the field study are ambiguous, and only 
some of them suggest occurrence of the safety illusion as understood in this 
paper. Still, let us summarize them to see how they relate to the illusion of safety 
hypothesis.
(1) A large majority of respondents were aware of living in flood-prone areas. 
This held for all localities, protected or not, and for those not flooded for 
decades. It seems clear from our data that living in the vicinity of a large 
river precludes the most naïve form of safety illusion: denial of the very 
exposure to danger. (However, this finding contrasts with that observed 
during the great flood on the Oder in 1997; and reported in Chapter 1 of this 
volume, where the flood was unanticipated by most people.)
(2) While it is difficult to derive precise flood probability estimates for specific 
localities, it seems that those reported by respondents were generally not 
biased downwards. Almost all estimates of one-year flood probabilities 
were higher than 1%, most exceeded 10% and many exceeded 20%. This 
is in accordance with the overestimation of small probabilities observed 
by, for example, Wouter Botzen et  al. (2015), and in Chapter 3 of this 
volume. Similarly, in all groups except IV, mean estimates of 20-year 
flood probabilities were well above 30%, while the theoretical probability 
of flooding within 20 years in the ISOK 1% areas is less than 0.18. It was 
only group IV, with an average estimate of 12.77, which displayed a type of 
safety illusion caused by its specific geographic location rather than by the 
existence of dikes. (However, it could well be argued that such a location 
offers more reliable protection than do levees.)
(3) In all comparisons between groups defined by locality of residence, the 
flooding record of the locality was the crucial predictor of all measures 
of feelings of safety (worry, and 1-year and 20-year probability estimates). 
This is in perfect agreement with the results of many studies, including 
those of Tyszka and Konieczny (2016, this volume). In particular, it can be 
concluded that the flooding of a protected locality cures its inhabitants of 
any safety illusion, as evidenced by group II in our study.
(4) In intergroup comparisons as in (3), the ‘protection’ factor is a significant 
predictor of one-year subjective probabilities only. Thus, at least for 
this measure of feelings of safety, one can speculate about the existence 
of a safety illusion. It has to be kept in mind that, since ceteris paribus 
conditions were not achieved, we cannot discern whether this impact of 
protection status was indeed due to the illusion of safety or the protected 
localities simply enjoying lower objective one-year flooding probabilities 
than unprotected localities. (However, the ISOK maps may suggest the 
first possibility.) Whether this is the illusion of safety or a rational belief 
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in levees as providing reliable short-term protection, it disappears when 
we move to long-term expectations: for 20-year probabilities the effect of 
protection status became non-significant.
(5) In an analogy to (3), individual experience of flooding was a very strong 
predictor of worry and long-term probabilities when we analysed sense of 
safety proxies’ dependence on personal experience and PEP.
(6) In an analogy to (4), individual perceptions of efficiency of protection were 
a strong predictor of one-year probability estimates. This can be interpreted 
in terms of a safety illusion: people may simply overestimate the efficiency 
of existing protective measures. Moreover, high beliefs in this efficiency 
also reduced worry.
(7) There were strong negative correlations between all measures of feelings of 
safety and individual optimism. However, although optimism levels largely 
differed among groups, these differences cannot be attributed to protection 
status, so this seems not to contribute to illusions of safety, if present. Rather, 
optimism together with a safety illusion leads to underestimation of risk.
(8) The illusion of safety may have serious practical consequences because 
of decreasing willingness to purchase insurance or to prepare for danger. 
In this study we could not confirm this for two reasons. First, two of 
our measures of feeling safe did not differentiate between insured and 
uninsured respondents, and the third one that did, long-term probability, 
did not exhibit a safety illusion effect. Second, we could not find a set 
of individual characteristics determining willingness to take protective 
actions since only a few respondents reported such actions. We attribute 
this last result to the fatalistic nature of floods on large rivers rather than to 
a safety illusion.
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APPENDIX
Characteristics of localities investigated in the field study
Group I: P ≥ 1%, unprotected, flooded in 2010 (Lucimia, Gniazdków; n1 = 32) – 
two small villages on the Vistula, where some fragments of dikes are still 
missing.
Group II: P ≥ 0.2%, protected but flooded in 2010 because of a Vistula levee 
breach; the dike was reconstructed thereafter (Janowiec; n2 = 33).
Group III: P ≥ 1%, protected, heavily flooded by the Vistula and Wieprz in 
1960s, but not flooded since then (Borowa, Matygi; n3 = 35).
Group IV: P ≥ 1%, unprotected, not flooded in 2010 (Połaniec; n4 = 26) – a small 
town on the high bank of the Czarna, a minor tributary of the Vistula that did 
not suffer from the 2010 flood. All respondents’ houses in this locality were 
situated within the ISOK 100 year flood area.
Group V: P ≥ 0.2%, protected, small parts flooded in 2010 by backwater on 
the Jeziorka, a small tributary of the Vistula; the Jeziorka dike is in need of 
renovation (Konstancin left bank, n5 = 31).
Group VI: P ≥ 0.2%, protected, not flooded in 2010 (Konstancin right bank; 
n6 = 29); the Jeziorka dike was recently renovated.
The ‘left’ and ‘right’ bank in Konstancin refer to the sides of the Jeziorka river.
P is the one-year probability of flooding according to the ISOK maps. All 
selected localities would be flooded by a once in 500 years water level, and 
none by a once in 10 years water level.
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Judging by the increasing flood damage in nearly every country, one can state 
that no country copes satisfactorily with floods. Hence, flood risk reduction is an 
extremely important need, and flood-related education plays an essential role in 
development of flood risk management plans.
The importance of flood-related education has grown with the change of 
flood risk management strategies in recent decades. In the past, when society 
was convinced that engineers were able to free the nation from flood risk, 
flood-related education and awareness were of minor significance. Engineers or 
experts clearly knew what to do, and society expected to benefit from their work. 
However, over time, it turned out that despite the huge investment in structural 
flood defenses, the damage occurring has not declined. Quite the opposite, it 
has been growing, for at least two reasons. First, the ability of embankments 
and reservoirs to provide complete flood protection has been overestimated 
and only the illusion of safety remains. Second, flood-prone areas have been 
increasingly developed as a consequence of the illusion that structural defenses 
offer adequate protection. However, many specialists express the opinion that 
floods cannot be eliminated from our lives. One can only reduce the damage 
that floods cause.
In the light of the above-mentioned paradigm change, we assert that the 
present volume shows numerous weaknesses people have when it comes to an 
awareness of the risk, a knowledge of how the risk can be limited, the motivation 
for protection against the flood, etc. People often take a substantial risk by 
building on flood plains, yet inhabitants of vulnerable areas are hesitant to 
purchase even subsidized insurance products. They do not know how to prepare 
for a flood or how to behave when a flood strikes. And they do not know how 
to lobby for adequate flood preparedness. There is no doubt that both residents 
of vulnerable areas as well as local and central administrators strongly need 
education on issues of flooding (and other natural hazards). Unfortunately, the 
main trigger for improvement of flood risk management is the occurrence of a 
large flood. And during periods when no large floods occur, improvements in 
flood preparedness get lower priority. The same scheme applies to interest in 
education among vulnerable communities. Thus, an obvious challenge is what 
to do during a period without large floods (that come rarely) in order to maintain 
interest in flood preparedness.
Figure 10.1 clearly illustrates the effect of a large flood as a reminder to invest 
into flood preparedness using as an example funding flood-related research in 
Poland. There were few flood-related projects starting every year before the 
occurrence of the Millennium Flood (1997) because of the preceding flood-free 
period. In fact, there were no flood-related projects commencing in 1997 at all. 
But the number soared in the year after the flood, only to gradually decrease 
thereafter.
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Figure 10.1  Number of flood-related research projects in Poland funded by KBN 
(Committee of Scientific Research) commencing in particular years. In 1997, when 
no new flood-related project was initiated, a very dramatic flood event occurred.
10.2  ACTORS IN THE FLOOD RISK EDUCATION AND 
COMMUNICATION PROCESS
There are many groups of potential actors in the process of flood risk education 
and communication: those who initiate action (‘broadcasters’) as well as those who 
receive information and knowledge (‘receivers’), including those who are directly 
affected. Some stakeholders are formally required to manage the risk or mitigate 
the impact of floods. Others do not have such a formal obligation but are interested 
in the process because of the objectives of their institutions. Yet another group 
can be labelled ‘communication intermediaries.’ The number of process-related 
entities is huge, especially when also considering the administrative level of these 
institutions (national, regional or local). Brief characteristics of the main groups of 
participants in this process are given below.
10.2.1  Broadcasters
10.2.1.1  Institutions responsible for flood risk management
There is no single model of flood risk management worldwide. Various institutions 
are responsible for flood risk management strategies and their implementation. 
There can be water agencies, financially independent from the state (e.g., in 
France), institutions within the standard administration structure (e.g., in Germany 
and Poland), environment agencies (e.g., in England and Scotland), or specialized 
institutions such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the 
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USA. Usually these institutions have a huge impact and high competence in the 
fields of education, promotion, and public participation in strategy building.
10.2.1.2  National weather services
Weather services operate in each country. Their tasks include the gathering of data 
on weather parameters (rainfall, temperature, wind strength and direction, etc.) and 
water levels and, using these data, preparing forecasts of precipitation and water levels 
in rivers. This information is important for the safety of citizens and the economy.
10.2.2  Communication intermediaries
10.2.2.1  Non-governmental organizations
In different countries there are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which are 
active in the process of risk education and communication with the public. Some of 
them cooperate with schools, providing knowledge about the rivers, their significance, 
and the importance of the environment. There are also organizations that assist local 
governments in the preparation of local flood plans and flood-related education.
10.2.2.2  Schools
Schools communicate a basic understanding of natural phenomena, including floods 
and their causes and effects. Schools, together with traditional media (radio, TV, 
press) or social media are considered to be the main intermediary in the transmission 
of knowledge and awareness to prepare for a variety of disasters, including floods, 
and to shape safe behavior during and after a flood. This applies not only to the 
education of pupils but also to the education of adults through the children – with 
many school programs being addressed also to the families of pupils.
10.2.2.3  Mass media
The media (press, radio, TV, Internet) play many different roles, related to information, 
explanation, entertainment, education, and control. Local media focusing on a small 
area are necessarily closest to the problems of the local community which is the 
principal recipient. Hence they are willing to cooperate in this field with specialized 
organizations such as crisis teams or water institutions (Podraza, 2003). Regional 
or national media focus more attention on general problems and perform control 
functions in relation to public institutions more often than local media.
10.2.3  Receivers
10.2.3.1  Threatened residents
As can be seen from surveys and interviews conducted in various locations in 
regions where floods occur relatively frequently, the residents are quite familiar 
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with this hazard. They also try to prepare for it and undertake preventive measures 
on their own initiative. However, in many other regions where floods occur only 
occasionally, residents are taken by surprise and learn about the threat only when 
a flood occurs. Generally, although not always, local governments efficiently 
inform residents about the threat and the local response and evacuation plan. In 
some countries, knowledge of the subject is for the most part low. But there are also 
countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) where access to such information is very good.
10.2.3.2  Administration
This category embraces national and local governments. The task of flood protection 
is carried out by the water administration (water agencies) while the tasks related 
to preparation for the flood response and after-flood recovery are performed 
by the state administration and responsible governments at all levels. In crisis 
management plans prepared within this structure, floods hold an important place 
in the context of warning, preparedness, flood management during the event and 
after-flood recovery. In some countries there are regulations, according to which 
plans do not require cooperation with local communities. Some governmental 
entities at the regional level undertake educational activities addressed to schools 
and local governments.
Unfortunately, often both the regional and the local administrations have 
relatively little knowledge about flood risk management. They need at least as 
much information and education as residents.
The general categories of actors in the education process as described above may 
overlap, in that representatives of each of them also play a role in other categories.
In practice, the situation is much more complex, so that a rigid division between 
those who have knowledge and disseminate it and those who do not have it and 
wish to receive it is deceptive. The flood education system should be viewed 
differently than a traditional hierarchical system of basic education, whose aim 
is a one-way flow of knowledge and information from professional institutions to 
ordinary people (Kuhlicke et al. 2011). Individual entities have, in fact, their own 
experiences, without which others could not successfully perform their tasks. For 
example, the experiences of people who have suffered a flood provide valuable 
information for local emergency services and planners due to the fact that they 
include actual information about the sources of flooding, its course, and its 
consequences. All this information is essential for effective planning. In turn, the 
emergency services and planners can potentially provide the affected parties with 
knowledge about appropriate methods of reducing flood risk in all phases of crisis 
management. Consequently, one can state that to some extent all the actors are 
both broadcasters and receivers of the knowledge. Such a situation means that the 
system of flood education should be based on two-way communication, taking into 
account the knowledge and experience of those at risk and allowing the exchange 
of experience and participation in raising awareness.
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10.3  OBJECTIVES OF FLOOD-RELATED EDUCATION
The goal of flood-related education is to improve the awareness of threatened 
entities and their activation in the process of preparation for a flood. This can be 
achieved by providing access to information and balanced knowledge to the main 
actors who can contribute to flood risk reduction and by enhancing the exchange of 
experiences and various forms of cooperation among them.
The realization of these objectives naturally brings problems. For example, it 
is often more and more common that property owners are educated by NGOs, but 
they are neither understood nor supported by their local self-government, who lack 
relevant knowledge and continue to work on the basis of traditional risk management 
rules (e.g., in Poland). Similarly, it happens that local governments which are trained 
may attempt to change the strategy, but they are restricted by rules created and 
controlled by the central administration. Regardless of these difficulties there are 
three crucial education aims to be achieved. These are to ensure that stakeholders:
• Are aware and have knowledge of the local flood risk, its sources and the 
scale of the hazard, and its consequences;
• Are aware that they have the ability to take measures to limit the threat to 
life, health, and property, both at the individual level and the level of the 
community in which they live or work;
• Know the institutions that can assist them at different stages of preparation 
or response to the flood and are willing to participate in the preparation 
and implementation of measures to increase the resistance and resilience of 
communities.
10.4  CONTENT OF FLOOD-RELATED EDUCATION
Knowledge useful for coping with flood risk and reducing losses covers many 
different topics. A number of them have been raised in earlier chapters of this 
book. The change of paradigm of risk management considerably broadens the 
scope of the assistance needed by vulnerable subjects.
So far, the dominant paradigm in disaster risk management has focused on 
the physical course of phenomena that threaten people and on finding methods to 
protect them against the threat. Scientific knowledge and engineering have been 
used, aiming to subordinate the forces of nature to man and to help reduce flood 
losses. This was a top-down approach – decisions being taken by representatives of 
authorities and experts – and the residents had to obey. The new philosophy of risk 
management assumes that the danger cannot be eliminated, so all one can do is to 
limit its adverse effects. The perspective from below should be taken into account 
(a bottom-up approach) through the participation of vulnerable communities in 
deciding on issues of concern to them. This also will take into account useful local 
knowledge. In this new paradigm, the key actions respect nature, making use of 
natural strategies (e.g., reducing the risk by protecting natural retention, especially 
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the riverside areas, and reducing exposure by avoiding managing floodplains), 
reducing the vulnerability of buildings and communities at risk, and increasing the 
resistance of the residents of areas at risk through individual preparedness (Mercer 
et al. 2008; Fordham et al. 2013).
Proposed new strategies of coping with floods resulting from the new 
paradigm make use of knowledge from various disciplines, ranging from the area 
of engineering to the social and economic domains. This requires integrating 
knowledge from many different areas (natural, social, psychological, technical and 
economic sciences as well as climatology and many others). But it is not enough 
to simply conclude here that employees of the administration themselves should 
possess more knowledge in these areas than ever before. It is also necessary that 
they are capable of monitoring the situation ‘at the bottom’ in their work and making 
use of the information. They should be able to gather and analyze assessments and 
experiences of affected communities, especially those concerning the causes of 
losses and the effectiveness of various methods of risk reduction. Only then they 
will be able to effectively discharge their responsibilities.
Basic flood-related education should incorporate:
• The main characteristics of the flood hazard;
• Knowledge of local causes of floods;
• Flood risk reduction measures.
The scope of information in each of these areas of expertise should be different 
depending on to whom it is addressed. For example, residents should get information 
about the threat (flood risks and the water depths), while local administration or 
government should get information on the type and number of objects in individual 
zones, the estimated amount of losses etc.
10.4.1  Main characteristics of flood hazard
Many residents and users of floodplains are not aware of the threat of flood risk 
and its possible extent and size (probability of incidence, depth of the inundation, 
and velocity of water). This information is naturally the basis of all necessary 
preparatory measures.
One can assert that the means for improving the awareness of people today is much 
better than a few years ago. Currently, many countries ensure public access to the maps 
of flood extent for several incidence probabilities. In the European Union countries 
such maps, for floods of different probabilities of severity (labeled as rare, medium 
rare, and common) have been available since 2013, according to the requirements of 
the Floods Directive (Directive 2007/60/EC, 2007). They allow ordinary people to 
see whether they live or work in areas at risk of flooding. A separate product available 
in the EU countries is a collection of maps showing the development in these areas and 
the potential losses that may result if flooding arises. This is necessary information for 
the purpose of building a strategy and creating plans for flood risk reduction.
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Such maps – especially those showing the flood extent of varying probabilities of 
incidence – can facilitate the process of education, communication, and planning. 
Maps are very effective educational tools, sparking one’s imagination, and they 
may lead to a completely new perspective on the problems. The main issue is to 
ease access to maps for ordinary people. In some countries access to maps for 
non-experts is very difficult. Examples of user-friendly solutions can be found in 
England and Scotland, where the map covering the area of interest can be searched 
in the system in a user-friendly manner by place of residence or by postal code.
A completely different form of information on flood hazards in an area of 
concern entails collecting and sharing historical information about past floods and 
their effects and the use of flood (high-water) marks to communicate with people. 
For ordinary people, the historical high-water marks can be more trustworthy than 
maps of water depths and their probabilities of being exceeded. However, gradual 
changes in land development and the construction of technical flood protection 
structures (dikes, reservoirs, etc.) could considerably change the flow regime (and 
the stage-discharge relationship).
This traditional way of presenting historical data seems to be communicated 
well; indeed, some risk management institutions actively support it. The American 
FEMA launched a program of co-financing the placement of high-water marks 
by local communities (FEMA, 2016). In Kraków, the City Council funded the 
revitalization of the existing historical high-water marks indicating how high 
historical flood levels were and publishing a guide to such flood marks.
10.4.2  Knowledge of local causes of floods
There are common myths and misconceptions about floods and other natural hazards. 
For example, people generally consider that flooding is a phenomenon closely related 
to the river when in fact there are many other types of flooding. Contrary to common 
belief, research run in Poland in 2013 (Analiza obecnego systemu …, 2013) on several 
hundred municipalities showed that the greatest losses related to water abundance 
include the runoff of rain water on the land surface (63%) and a rising groundwater 
level (61%), with river flooding only ranking third (45%).
People also envisage floods as natural disasters caused by forces of nature, 
although human influence on flood risk (deforestation, land surface sealing, river 
channelization, inappropriate drainage) has long been known. The selection of 
appropriate methods of prevention or response depends on understanding both the 
type and the cause of flooding.
Education should convey the message that floods can be caused by various 
mechanisms and that each of them may have a different – and often unique – 
set of measures to limit its impact on the health and lives of people and on the 
economy. There is no single, coherent, and agreed upon taxonomy of floods. Most 
common classifications refer to the origin (rainfall, storm, snowmelt, ice jam). 
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But for education aimed to aid in reducing flood risk, one could distinguish five 
categories: river floods (including dike breaches), land surface flooding, flash 
floods, groundwater floods, and sewer floods.
Two of these types of floods are quite different from the risk reduction viewpoint: 
flash floods require the cooperation of many institutions in order to limit losses, 
while sewer floods can be prevented in a simple manner.
In many countries, flash floods are separated from the category of river floods 
and are especially dangerous and can cause numerous fatalities. They are defined 
as floods which result from short-term, rapid precipitation. The time between the 
occurrence of precipitation and the maximum water level can be less than 4–6 
hours.
In southern Poland, flash floods play havoc, for example in July 2003 on the 
Wilsznia Creek (a tributary of the Wisłoka) when a local flood lasting several 
hours killed six people traveling in two cars. The property owners in the 
area suffered virtually no losses, and those who died were incomers who did 
not know the area and the threats. Counteracting the effects of flash flooding 
requires special measures (accurate forecasts and the development of rainfall and 
water level monitoring systems) and the close cooperation of many institutions 
ranging from meteorological and hydrological services to local governments and 
residents.
Another special kind of flooding worth noting is a sewer flood, being the effect 
of reversing the wastewater or rainwater sewage network. Contrary to common 
knowledge, such events are not rare. According to a report of floods in 1993 in the 
USA (Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee [IFMRC], 1994), 
only half of the objects damaged by the floods were caused by water flowing 
over the land surface. The others were flooded by groundwater and sewers. Most 
important is that sewage floods can easily be addressed by installing low-cost 
measures (sewer pipe shutters or non-return valves).
In some countries, most of the flooding, including frequent inundation by 
small watercourses and common flooding of roads because of blocked ditches or 
defective drainage systems, is ignored. Damage is so small that it is not interesting 
to decision-makers or the media. However, these small losses add up over the 
years, such that total global losses from small floods are comparable to those from 
large ones.
Finally, floods and their frequencies are commonly attributed to natural factors; 
however, the truth is that the increasing flood losses are often caused by human 
factors such as the mismanagement of natural areas (elimination of wetlands, 
removing trees and shrubs in watersheds). In areas at risk, the intensification of 
development, sealing of surfaces, and lack of preparedness of constructions to 
inundation (e.g., via rigorous building codes and their enforcement) contribute to 
increased flood risk. The causes of flooding classified into natural and anthropogenic 
factors are shown in Figure 10.2.
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Figure 10.2  Examples of causes of flooding, divided according to mechanism 
(natural versus anthropogenic).
10.4.3  Flood risk reduction measures
The new paradigm, according to which flood risk management relies largely on 
limiting the potential effects of floods, opens up a wide range of different (new) 
methods of application. Figure 10.3 presents a list of measures which reduce flood 
risk together with the responsibilities for their implementation.
The first group of measures concerns the reduction of the extent of flood 
hazards. The hazard and extent of flooding can be limited by applying measures 
to increase water storage (natural or artificial). It is advantageous to use natural 
methods – protecting green areas, wetlands and swamps, allowing sufficient space 
for the river, and avoiding the sealing of surfaces. Engineering structures such 
as reservoirs, levees and relief channels are commonly used for this purpose. To 
control smaller floods, regulating river channels reduces the extent of floods. This 
is a strategy of ‘keeping water away from people’.
The second group of measures concerns the reduction of exposure to floods. 
Losses can be reduced by taking actions to restrict the development of floodplains 
by banning the construction of some types of structures (e.g., hospitals, nursing 
homes, chemicals warehouses, landfills), specifying the conditions for constructing 
other types of buildings, and possibly buying out and decommissioning the most 
vulnerable structures. This is a strategy of ‘keeping people away from the water’.
Finally, there are measures for reducing vulnerability to floods. The 
vulnerability can be limited by effective preparedness. Contrary to widespread 
opinion, individuals, communities and governments can do a lot to limit the adverse 
effects of floods. The options range from retrofitting houses, to effective early 
warning systems and response teams to flooding, to flood insurance. An important 
aim of flood-related education is to disseminate knowledge about the simple ways 
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of limiting the effects of floods. They require neither special efforts nor significant 
costs. Usually they are common sense methods – if we know which way the water 
can get into the house and why, we can take precautions. For example, closing 
windows and doors to the basement and closing the aforementioned valves on 
the sewage system or other such arrangement in a house can mean that the flood 
water is only able to destroy things of small value (with valuable things placed 
permanently on the upper floors). This is a strategy of ‘learning to live with floods’.
Figure 10.3  Methods of flood risk reduction and responsibilities for their 
implementation. (N – national level, R – regional level, D – district level, C – community 
level, I – individual level).
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The term ‘responsibility’ used in Figure 10.3 means the responsibility imposed 
on the actor by law or by unwritten rules or customs applied in practice. It does 
not include such activities as the design and implementation of instruments for the 
implementation of risk mitigation measures, which are usually the responsibility 
of the national or state government and perhaps to some extent local government.
It is worth noting that only very few of the activities described in the framework 
of the strategy are in the hands of the government. This applies generally, but 
not exclusively, to measures to reduce exposure and vulnerability. This is 
because those implementing this system are independent of each other. The 
state administration, obliged to draw up flood risk management plans, does not 
have the tools or the coercive measures with which it may affect them. In such 
cases, parametric management systems are useful, where those objectives can be 
achieved using various so-called ‘soft’ instruments of encouraging the individual 
parties to undertake specific actions. These instruments may include financial 
incentives and penalties along with organizational and informational measures. 
The role of the state and other decision-making bodies in the system is limited 
mainly to the creation of these instruments and to monitoring the results of their 
implementation. Flood-related education and access to information about floods 
and methods of damage reduction are key instruments which, while not limiting 
the risks themselves, do facilitate or encourage different groups of actors to take 
appropriate actions in line with the established objectives.
10.5  PROBLEMS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE
A sample of issues presented below should be important in education on floods, but 
they have more to do with a change of awareness and habits than with the transfer 
of relevant knowledge. They require a special approach, that is, special methods of 
presenting them within the education process. These are:
• Responsibility for safety;
• Illusion of safety;
• Communication of risk.
10.5.1  Responsibility for safety
Responsibility for flood risk reduction should be shared by multiple constituencies, 
including the residents of the flood risk prone areas (who should prepare their 
homes for flooding).
The traditional system of flood risk reduction sends a clear signal to those at 
risk that the protection of their health, life, and belongings during the flood is being 
dealt with by the state. This belief began to weaken when, after many years of large 
investments made by administrators in technical flood defenses (storage reservoirs, 
embankments, relief canals and channelization of rivers), it turned out that losses 
were still rising. People began to notice that the dikes were often ineffective (they 
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could be overtopped or breached), reservoirs were not always able to ‘catch the 
flood,’ and channelization of rivers did not protect against flooding but just against 
(bank or bottom) erosion. Regardless of these failures, acceptance of the philosophy 
that everyone is responsible for their own family, employees and property is not 
widespread. Consequently, despite the many discussions and publications and despite 
the new way of managing flood risk introduced in many countries, many people at 
risk are still convinced that the state is responsible for their safety. According to a 
report prepared after the catastrophic floods in 2007 in the UK (Learning lessons …, 
2008), 46% of the surveyed residents stated that they did not intend to take specific 
safety measures because the state should protect them. There is a common belief 
that structural defenses are the most effective flood protection measures, and these 
lie within the domain of administration, beyond the reach of individuals. Hence, 
many individuals feel that flood protection does not fall within their purview.
Even more troubling results were obtained in Poland, where after the flood in 
1997 in Brzesko only 28% of people responded that they themselves can protect 
their assets against flooding (which does not mean that they in fact did). The rest 
expected this from the community (85%) or the state (37%) (Konieczny et al. 1999; 
Działek et al. 2013). Consequently, even experiencing disaster, loss of property, 
and/or traumatic memories does not encourage most people to take action. 
Research shows that such measures are taken on their own initiative by only about 
10% of the people at risk. This is confirmed by research carried out in Poland and 
Germany (Kreibich et al. 2005; Konieczny et al. 2016). Clearly, where flooding 
occurs often, homeowners tend to invest in security.
This should ultimately be specifically delineated in the law, as it is in England 
and Scotland. In the flood-related information on its website (Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency [SEPA], n.d.), the Scottish Environmental Agency states bluntly: 
‘It is your responsibility to manage your own flood risk and protect yourself, your 
family, property, and business’.
An American initiative, the so-called Community Rating System, encourages 
owners of property to take preventive action, and it rewards those who do so with a 
reduction in their premiums for flood insurance offered by FEMA.
10.5.2  Illusion of safety
In many countries, protection from river floods relies heavily on structural defenses – 
dikes and water storage reservoirs – often built for multiple purposes in addition 
to flood protection. Existence of a structural defense is perceived by the riparian 
population as a guarantee of safety, so that considerable wealth is accumulated 
in apparently protected, but in fact flood-endangered, areas. Even if dikes are in 
place, they offer limited safety only – losses soar when extreme flooding overcomes 
structural barriers. Every dike can be overtopped and/or breached. Hence, flood 
damage in a levee-protected landscape is likely to be higher than it would have 
been in a natural (levee-free) state, where damage potential is significantly lower. 
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For example, most of the damage caused by great floods that occurred in Poland in 
the last 20 years occurred in areas protected by dikes.
Structural defenses are treated as flood protection measures that guarantee 
security, whereas in reality these defenses are designed based on statistical analyses. 
It is common to assume that they should be able to withstand river discharge up to 
a certain magnitude (e.g., a 100-year flood, with a return period of 100 years and a 
1% probability of occurring in a single year). Statistical design means that a levee 
may fail if the flood is more extreme than the design value. Hence, even a perfectly 
maintained dike designed to withstand a 100-year flood does not, by definition, 
guarantee absolute protection. It is simply not possible to build structural flood 
protection that is sufficient for extremely rare events. No matter how serious a 
flood the dike is designed for, there is always a possibility a greater one occurring. 
So should dikes be designed to withstand a 100-year flood or should a much more 
robust dike be built, withstanding a 500-year flood? The latter solution should give 
a better protection, but at a much higher cost. Even that one would likely turn out to 
be insufficient if a 2000-year flood arrives. Dikes are effective and offer adequate 
protection against small and medium floods – and the number of damaging floods 
in this range is indeed decreasing as a result (Kundzewicz, 1999) – but in the case 
of large floods dikes give us only more time to escape.
Figure 10.4 presents the four-stage cycle (positive feedback) of the phenomenon 
known as the ‘levee effect’ (Tobin, 1995). It starts with the construction/
strengthening of levees along the river. This results in improved protection of 
areas behind the levees against small and medium floods, so that property owners 
feel safer and undertake development behind the levees. However, if a flood is 
much higher than the design flood, the levee is likely to fail – hence the notion 
of illusion of safety. Due to development of areas behind the levees, residual 
flood risk increases, which eventually leads to another round of construction/
strengthening of levees as per the cycle illustrated in Figure 10.4. Bearing in mind 
the illusion of safety provided by structural means, the ‘levees-only’ solution has 
been challenged by advocates of nature-based solutions, described by the slogans: 
‘living with floods’, ‘giving room back to the rivers’, or ‘moving out of harm’s way’ 
(retreating from unsafe areas).
Of course these all sound very good, but it is much easier to pay them lip service 
than it is to take meaningful action to implement them. After all, they can be 
costly and inconvenient. It is imperative, then, to ‘strike when the iron is hot,’ 
that is, to put such proposals into practice when the public is most likely to be 
actively supportive. A serious flood in the Midwestern United States provided 
just such an opportunity to relocate residents away from vulnerable locations in 
the Mississippi River Basin flood plain. In fact, such a relocation program has 
been implemented in the USA after the Midwest flood of 1993. The US IFMRC 
(IFMRC, 1994; Galloway, 1999; Kundzewicz, 1999) issued a recommendation that 
the authorities (federal and state) should fund the acquisition of properties at risk 
in the flood plain. The number of families voluntarily relocated from vulnerable 
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flood plain locations in the Mississippi Basin reached 20,000. The success of this 
relocation program can be interpreted by consideration of several aspects. The 
scale of the 1993 flood was disastrous. Some of these properties had been flooded 
before, so that their owners were convinced to leave and relocate to a safe place, 
even more so if the proposed price was fair (it was indeed, corresponding to pre-
flood conditions). Moreover, there was a good coordination of actions of various 
federal, state, and local agencies.
Figure 10.4  Flood safety illusion scheme.
10.5.3  Communication of risk
A very important problem in flood-related education is the selection of an 
appropriate vocabulary to describe the philosophy of risk reduction methods, 
including illustrating the likelihood of flood occurrence.
At first, the term ‘100-year flood’ was used, but it turned out that a significant 
percentage of people treated it as information about the incidence of flooding rather 
than an average frequency of its occurrence. Hence, experts began to look for a 
different narrative. The US National Academy of Sciences (National Research 
Council [NRC], 2000) and FEMA (2009) suggested the use of other terms, such as 
‘flood of a 1% probability of occurrence within a year’ or ‘flood with a probability 
of occurrence of 26% over 30 years’ (the interval of 30 years is a standard 
repayment period of home mortgages in the US). Another form of communication 
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used today is a map of flood risk. However, studies show that each of these forms 
of uncertainty communication has both advantages and disadvantages.
• The term ‘flood with a 1% probability of occurrence during one year’ is 
probably the most straightforward and is understood better than other terms. 
It communicates uncertainty to a layman, but at the same time the audience 
tends to underestimate the probability of the phenomenon and does not 
undertake preventive actions.
• The term ‘100-year flood’ makes non-experts believe that this is a flood that 
occurs exactly every hundred years (i.e., periodically) rather than once every 
hundred years on average, so it leads to underestimation of the likelihood of 
the phenomenon.
• The term ‘flood with a probability of occurrence being 26% in 30 years’ causes 
ordinary people to underestimate the probability of flooding. Furthermore, 
it is so difficult to understand that some researchers have suggested to stop 
using it as a means of communication (Bell & Tobin, 2007).
Thus, research shows that the communication of flood risk encounters many 
difficulties and can lead to serious misconceptions and misunderstanding. 
Therefore for the time being, descriptive messages are used in communication with 
non-specialists. The narrative includes the magnitude (small, medium or large) of 
the odds of flooding. It is not until later in the message that information about the 
likelihood of flooding is presented.
A solution used by the Environmental Agency in the UK (watermaps.
environment-agency.gov.uk/) can serve as an example: flood risk maps for non-
experts do not show the range of floods of different probabilities, but risk level 
expressed verbally: very low, low, medium, high (Figure 10.5). In further steps, the 
user gets information what should be done to reduce adverse flood effects.
Research shows that verbal expressions of probabilities are perceived as easier to 
understand and communicate than numerical probabilities (Budescu & Wallsten, 
1985; Wallsten et al. 1993). People prefer to express risk in verbal rather than in 
numerical form (Brun & Teigen, 1988; Renooij & Witteman, 1999) and prefer to 
receive verbal rather than numerical probabilities (Erev & Cohen, 1990; Ohnishi 
et  al. 2002). However, using exclusively verbal expressions can be misleading, 
because verbal labels are interpreted in a very ambiguous way (Brun & Teigen, 
1988). Thus, some researchers suggest that verbal expressions should be used to 
support the numbers and assist in the evaluation of quantitative information in 
order to improve comprehension of the probabilistic character of the event (Burkell, 
2004).
Another well-known psychological tendency is that when no flood disaster 
occurs for several years, people are subject to a so-called sampling error – they 
rely on the recent small sample and underweight the probabilities of a future 
flood, tending to ignore the small probabilities of a serious flood. (see Chapter 2 
entitled ‘Overweighting versus ignoring of small probabilities’). One can improve 
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the assessment of flood probabilities by presenting descriptive statistics based on 
a longer history of floods in the region. On the other hand, when a disaster has 
occurred recently, people tend to overweight the probability of its reoccurrence 
in the future. In such a situation, risk managers may try to lessen their sense of 
danger.
Figure 10.5  Flood map for city of London presenting, in a simple way, flood risk for 
selected point (Environmental Agency UK – https://www.gov.uk/check-flood-risk).
10.6  FACILITATING ACCESS TO IMPORTANT 
INFORMATION ON FLOOD RISK
Information is the basis of all action, and currently there is a lot of information 
available for people exposed to floods and other natural hazards. However, access 
to this information can be quite difficult. This section of the chapter deals with the 
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
194 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
question of how to ease this access for people exposed to floods. Three topics are 
of particular importance:
• Improving the transfer of basic information;
• Providing people with guidebooks, brochures, and manuals addressed to 
vulnerable constituencies;
• Supporting social action and grassroots initiatives.
10.6.1  Improving the transfer of basic information
Access to various information materials and guidebooks on natural hazards, risk 
management, and prevention plans is becoming broader and better. This applies to 
hazard maps, risk management plans, and guidelines for the preparation of crisis 
management plans, for securing a home against flood, etc. Along with these are 
documents containing information on risk for particular areas, crisis management 
plans related to floods etc. This information is provided by the institutions that 
are responsible for flood risk management. Unfortunately, this information is not 
always easy to obtain. Furthermore, in some cases non-expert stakeholders are 
prevented from accessing such information.
Documents relevant to planning should be provided with so-called non-
technical summaries about what can be found in them. The descriptions, of flood 
risk management plans in particular, despite claims that they are non-technical, 
are often written in technical jargon. And it is common for their actual content to 
have little to do with the descriptions of the content. Hence, the content of some 
documents described as non-technical flood risk management plans is illegible 
to non-experts. Other information such as the hydro-meteorological observations 
available on the Internet often lack keys that would facilitate their understanding 
and use.
In contrast, a good example of a document targeted at the public is the Flood 
Action Plan (Executive summary) for the area of the Somerset Levels and Moors 
prepared by the Environmental Agency in England (The Somerset … 2014). It is 
an attractive brochure with material written in simple language, richly illustrated, 
and available in versions for the blind (Braille alphabet) and for the elderly (printed 
in large font) and in an audio version and in different languages.
New technologies offer interesting possibilities. Applications for smartphones 
are becoming increasingly popular. A good example here is the ‘Flood Warning 
App’ for King County in the US (Flood warning App, 2014), which complements 
the local warning system and provides important flood-related education regarding 
simple ways to limit the effects of floods and information about the flood stage 
of the local rivers, updated every 10 minutes. The application uses data collected 
by various institutions and presents it in an attractive graphical form, making it 
easy for users to evaluate the situation and consequently to decide on appropriate 
actions.
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10.6.2  Providing people with guidebooks, brochures, and 
manuals addressed to vulnerable constituencies
Basic information about potential flooding and descriptions of what can be done 
before, during, and after the event may be provided to stakeholders by guidebooks, 
brochures, manuals and so on.
These are useful for local governments and for residents. All flood risk 
management institutions should contribute to this effort, although it is advisable 
for one institution to play a coordinating role. The preparation of such guidebooks 
ensures access to basic, standardized information.
One can benefit from the experience of Australia, where the Australian 
Institute for Disaster Resilience (AIDR) (www.aidr.org.au) was launched in 2015 
with the purpose of ensuring the coordination of the work of experts from many 
institutions, each having different responsibilities and competencies, such as the 
Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities. The AIDR’s functions 
include professional training related to various disasters and supporting in-school 
and volunteer training.
Another Australian institution – the Australian Emergency Management Agency – 
has extensive experience in publishing guides addressed to local governments, NGOs 
and threatened populations. Since 1986 it has issued over 40 extensive manuals in 
two series related to different types of disasters, covering a wide range of topics (e.g., 
Health Disaster, Flood Warning, Managing Exercises). Some of these publications 
have subsequently been updated and are available at no cost at the AIDR web 
portal (https://www.aidr.org.au/publications/manual-collection/).
Indeed, many countries in the world undertake similar publishing activities, 
albeit on a smaller scale, and it is worth paying attention to the content of such 
publications. They are typically fairly general guidance materials outlining what 
can and should be done. Less common are materials that tell also how to do it. 
An interesting example is the manual on constructing and securing facilities in 
flooded areas, prepared by FEMA in the US, called the ‘Homeowner’s Guide to 
Retrofitting. Six Ways to Protect Your Home from Flooding’ (FEMA P-312, 2014).
Increasingly frequent are specialized handbooks targeted to selected groups 
of users of flood-prone areas. A very interesting document was published by the 
Environmental Agency in England and Wales (although it is an initiative of many 
institutions) for the owners of caravan and camping sites, of which there are around 
1500 in England and Wales. This Handbook is entitled ‘Flooding–minimizing the 
risk. Your caravan/camping site is in a flood risk area. Practical advice on keeping 
you and your visitors safe in a flood’ (Flooding …, 2011). It informs the readership 
on how to make a flood plan covering key issues for such situations: how to improve 
communication with camping users before, during and after a flood, how to be sure 
that the right people are in the right place at the right time, how to protect the 
people, how to save time and resources, how to use the experiences of people from 
previous floods, and how to reduce loss and stress by helping people after the flood.
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Recently, electronic flood simulation games are becoming increasingly 
common. For example, the German SimFlood on the role of flood insurance, 
the international (United Nations) Stop Disasters supporting the construction of 
communities resistant to disasters, or the English FloodSim (http://playgen.com/
play/floodsim/) challenging its players to simulate the substantial task of creating 
flood control policy for the United Kingdom. Players must decide how much funds 
they allocate for flood protection, where houses can be built and where not, and 
what to do in order to inform the people. A survey, carried out in 2009 (Rebolledo-
Mendez et al. 2009) among over 20,000 players demonstrates that the game does 
what it is supposed to, making users strongly committed to flood preparedness 
and significantly improving their awareness of flooding as a complex problem for 
which there are no simple solutions to reduce losses.
10.6.3  Supporting social action and grassroots initiatives
Endangered constituencies should be included in the process of independent flood 
and other natural hazard problem solving. This will involve several topics: problem 
identification, mutual assistance during a flood and after the flood, and consultation 
plans of a higher order, which is one of the most effective forms of education. It is 
practically the only opportunity for planners to have access to information about 
the actual process of flooding in the area, about the local causes of losses, and 
about the methods that can effectively reduce them. ‘The people who live with 
flooding know as much, if not more, than scientists like me’ said one professor 
at Oxford University who is a member of the Rydedale Flood Research Group 
(Joining forces …, 2014). Therefore, many countries support local action groups 
in various forms (e.g., UK, USA, Australia), in this way enhancing education and 
building teams to cooperate in the preparation of flood risk reduction plans. On 
the other hand, administrators at all levels, if such a process is not specifically 
demanded by regulations, treat public consultation as an obligatory evil and 
cumbersome formality.
In England, Wales and Scotland, national flooding forums were created 
along with local action groups in villages threatened by floods (http://www.
scottishfloodforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Guidelines-for-setting-
up-Community-Flood-Groups-12.10.15.pdf). The tasks of these groups include 
coordination of the local community responses during floods, strengthening 
preparations in these communities for the next flood, and exploiting the assistance 
and expertise of others. Now in Scotland there are over 60 such groups, and the 
Scottish Flood Forum is preparing a special newsletter for them, providing them 
with knowledge and materials, and ensuring the participation of specialists in 
meetings with the residents.
In Australia (http://firefoxes.org.au/) after a huge bushfire in Victoria which 
killed 173 people, a group of women created an organization, the aim of which in 
the first phase was to deal with the trauma of the so-called Black Friday. It is now 
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one of the most active organizations in terms of training people in disaster-prone 
areas. These women share their experiences and knowledge with other communities 
regarding preparation, response, and reconstruction after fires and other disasters.
A similar initiative was undertaken in Poland after the 2010 flood by the 
Association of Residents of Bieruń and Cities Endangered by Flood located in the 
Upper Vistula Basin (Poland), ATLANTYDA, which was formed by the citizens 
who were themselves affected by the floods in 2010. This small group provides 
training to inhabitants and helps local governments to prepare for future events.
Another initiative of 70 residents from 31 households was established in Japan 
in a place where landslides and avalanches may occur during the rainy season. The 
Harunasan Disaster Preparedness Committee (Total disaster …, 2008) mobilizes 
every June, just before the rainy season. When a warning about the possibility of 
landslides is issued, cliff residents prepare to evacuate, and when notification of 
potential avalanches is sent, everyone evacuates to a designated location – the local 
museum. It is interesting that every house is equipped with a simple precipitation 
gauge, which is used to get every family in the habit of monitoring heavy rains that 
often cause avalanches around their houses.
10.7  INSTRUMENTS STRENGTHENING THE FLOOD-
RELATED EDUCATION SYSTEM
Besides legal structures which address the obligations of specified institutions to 
undertake actions and engage in inter-institutional cooperation, it is necessary to 
develop effective mechanisms for motivating other stakeholders, independent of 
administrators, to undertake actions oriented towards the defined objectives. This 
applies, for example, to local training and educational activities.
One could envisage the creation of a system of grants for the creation of centers 
of flood-related education, whose task would be to promote actions at the local and 
individual levels, providing materials and expertise as well as undertaking training 
and educational activities addressed to residents and other groups of stakeholders. 
Grant proposals could relate to training for local governments, to information 
campaigns addressed to citizens, or to training of teachers.
A very simple and interesting way to support local activity is an Australian 
initiative to allocate yearly prizes for the most innovative activities protecting local 
communities from disasters. The purpose of this system of rewards – the Resilient 
Australia Awards (2016) – is to monitor the activities of various organizations and 
to support those that strengthen local communities and render them more resilient 
and better prepared for future risks. The initiative covers a wide range of activities 
in this field: risk assessment, research, training and education, information and 
knowledge management, prevention, preparation, response, and recovery. Prizes are 
allocated in the following categories: local communities, administration, business, 
schools, and journalism, and they are financed by the national government as well 
as the governments of individual states and territories.
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A more sophisticated system of motivation for action was proposed several 
years ago by the American FEMA. It is a Community Rating System (FEMA, 
2015) which encourages local communities to undertake long-term activities to 
increase effective responsiveness to flooding. It is addressed to local authorities 
which joined the National Flood Insurance Program, and it promotes taking actions 
in the following areas: improving communication and better informing the local 
community, improving the protection of new buildings in flood plains, reducing 
the risk for existing facilities, and enhancing flood preparation (e.g., improving 
warning systems, safety of structures such as dikes, etc.). The reward for these 
activities is the reduction of up to 50% of flood insurance premiums for private 
owners in areas whose local authorities earned the appropriate number of points 
for prevention.
Including all institutions and residents in the process of problem solving is of 
crucial importance. Supporting local activism leads to effective reduction of flood 
losses.
10.8  CONCLUSIONS
Floods and other natural disasters cannot be completely eliminated from our 
lives. One can only reduce the damage that they cause. Not only experts but also 
many other actors can contribute to flood risk reduction. They include central 
governments, local governments, and the endangered entities themselves. The goal 
of flood-related education is to improve the awareness of threatened entities of all 
issues related to flooding and enlist them in the process of preparation for a future 
flood. Three crucial aims of the flood-related education include:
• A broad recognition of the responsibility to protect one’s own property and 
own safety by people at risk. This has important consequences; a broader 
range of knowledge to accomplish it is needed than is currently provided in 
educational materials, which focus attention almost exclusively on behavior 
during floods.
• Having access to information on local flood risks, to knowledge of the 
preventive methods to protect the property and possessions, to knowledge of 
the appropriate behavior before, during, and after a flood.
• Essential knowledge of the institutions that can help in different phases of risk 
management and in the reduction of all elements of the risk (hazard, exposure, 
and vulnerability). It is important to acknowledge that responsibility taking 
by people at risk does not imply exemption from action by other institutions 
for the benefit of those people at risk. The task of such institutions is to 
promote and support (through various avenues) the actions of endangered 
entities and to create conditions allowing individual actions to be successful.
Thus, flood-related education should describe the general characteristics of 
flood hazards, provide knowledge of local and global causes of floods, and – what 
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is most important – explain flood risk reduction measures. Educators should pay 
special attention to the problem of personal responsibility for safety (not only 
the state is responsible for it), of the illusion of safety (a mistaken sense of safety 
caused by the existence of technical means that reduce risk but do not eliminate it 
completely), and of effectively communicating risk (even when the public does not 
ask for an assessment of probability, it is worthwhile to give it to them because they 
can benefit from this information).
Currently there is a lot of information available to people exposed to flooding 
and other natural hazards. However, access to this information can be quite 
difficult. Of particular importance are: (1) how to improve the provision of basic 
information to vulnerable entities, (2) how to provide people with guidebooks, 
brochures, and manuals addressed to vulnerable entities, and (3) how to support 
spontaneous social activity by citizens in affected areas.
REFERENCES
Analiza obecnego systemu ochrony przeciwpowodziowej w Polsce (2013). Raport opracowany przez 
Zakład Gospodarki Wodnej i Systemów Wodnogospodarczych IMGW PIB, Krajowy Zarząd 
Gospodarki Wodnej, Warszawa. (Analysis of the present state of flood protection in Poland 
(2013). Report made by the Department of Water Management and Water Management Systems 
IMGW PIB, National Water Management Board, Warsaw.)
Bell H. M. and Tobin G. A. (2007). Efficient and effective? The 100-year flood in the communication 
and perception of flood risk. Environmental Hazards, 7(4), 302–311.
Brun W. and Teigen K. H. (1988). Verbal probabilities: ambiguous, context-dependent, or both? 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 41(3), 390–404.
Budescu D. V. and Wallsten T. S. (1985). Consistency in interpretation of probabilistic phrases. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 36(3), 391–405.
Burkell J. (2004). What are the chances? Evaluating risk and benefit information in consumer health 
materials. Journal of the Medical Library Association, 92(2), 200.
Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the 
assessment and management of flood risks, Official Journal of the European Union (2007). 
Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007L0060&
from=EN (accessed 11 August 2016).
Działek J., Biernacki W. and Bokwa A. (2013). Challenges to social capacity building in flood-
affected areas of southern Poland. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 13(10), 
2555–2566.
Erev I. and Cohen B. L. (1990). Verbal versus numerical probabilities: efficiency, biases, and the 
preference paradox. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 45(1), 1–18.
FEMA (2009). Guide to Flood Maps. Using the Flood Map to Improve Your Understanding of Risk. 
Available at: water.ohiodnr.gov/portals/soilwater/pdf/floodplain/guide_to_floodmaps_Draft_
Dec2009.pdf (accessed 11 August 2016).
FEMA (2016). High Water Mark Initiative. Available at: https://www.fema.gov/high-water-mark-
initiative (accessed 11 August 2016).
FEMA B-573 (2015). National Flood Insurance Program. Community Rating System. A Local 
Official’s Guide to Saving Lives Preventing Property Damage Reducing the Cost of Flood 
Insurance. Available at: www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1444398921661–5a1b30f0f8b60a79
fb40cefcaf2bc290/2015_NFIP_Small_Brochure.pdf (accessed 17 August 2016).
FEMA P-312 (2014). Homeowner’s Guide to Retrofitting. Six Ways to Protect Your Home from 
Flooding, Third Edition. Available at: http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/480 
(accessed 17 August 2016).
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
200 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
Flood Warning App (2014). King County, Washington, Available at: http://www.kingcounty.gov/services/
environment/water-and-land/flooding/warning-system/app.aspx (accessed 17 August 2016).
Flooding–minimizing the risk (2011). Your caravan/camping site is in a flood risk area. Practical advice 
on keeping you and your visitors safe in a flood. Environment Agency, Bristol BS1 5AH, Available 
at: http://nationalfloodforum.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/FloodingMinimisingTheRisk_v2.pdf 
(accessed 17 August 2016).
Fordham M., Lovekamp W. E., Thomas D. S. and Phillips B. D. (2013). Understanding social 
vulnerability. Social Vulnerability to Disasters, 2, 1–29.
Galloway G. E. (1999). Towards Sustainable Management of River Basins: Challenges for the 21st 
Century. Proc. RIBAMOD Meeting, Wallingford, UK, 25–27 February 1998.
IFMRC (Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee) (1994). Sharing the Challenge: 
Floodplain Management into the 21st Century. A Blueprint for Change. IFMRC, Washington, 
DC, USA.
Joining forces against flooding (2014). University of Oxford. Available at: https://www.socsci.ox.ac.
uk/research/casestudies/joining-forces-against-flooding (accessed 17 August 2016).
Konieczny R., Rataj C. and Siudak M. (1999). Badanie percepcji zjawisk powodziowych przez 
mieszkańców na terenach zalewowych, Instytut Psychologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk i Instytut 
Meteorologii i Gospodarki Wodnej Oddział w Krakowie, raport wewnętrzny. (How inhabitants 
in floodplain areas perceive the flood, Institute of Psychology of the Polish Academy of Sciences 
and Institute of Meteorology and Water Management, Krakow Office, internal report.)
Konieczny R., Działek J., Siudak M. and Biernacki W. (2016). Działania właścicieli domów dla 
ograniczenia skutków powodzi oraz ich motywacje, w: ‘Problemy planowania w gospodarce 
wodnej i oceny stanu hydromorfologicznego rzek’, Monografie Instytutu Meteorologii i 
Gospodarki Wodnej PIB, IMGW Warszawa. (Activities of homeowners to reduce the effects 
of flood and their motivations, in: ‘Problems of planning in water management and assessment 
of hydromorphological condition of rivers’, Monographs of Institute of Meteorology and Water 
Management PIB, IMGW Warsaw) (in press).
Kreibich H., Thieken A. H., Petrow T., Müller M. and Merz B. (2005). Flood loss reduction of private 
households due to building precautionary measures—lessons learned from the Elbe flood in 
August 2002. Natural Hazards and Earth System Science, 5(1), 117–126.
Kuhlicke, Ch., Steinfuhrer A., Begg, Ch., Bianchizza, Ch., Brundl M., Buchecker M., De Marchi B., 
Di Masso Tarditti M., Höppner C., Komac B., Lemkow L., Luther J., McCarthy S., Pellizzoni 
L., Renn O., Scolobig A., Supramaniam M., Tapsell S., Wachinger G., Walker G., Whittle R., 
Zorn M. and Faulkner H. (2011). Perspectives on social capacity building for natural hazards: 
outlining an emerging field of research and practice in Europe. Environmental Science & Policy, 
14(7), 804–814.
Kundzewicz Z. W. (1999). Flood protection – sustainability issues. Hydrological Sciences Journal, 
44(4), 559–571.
Learning lessons from the 2007 floods. An Independent Review by Michael Pitt (2008), Cabinet 
Office, Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034 701 /http:/archive.
cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview/final_report.html (accessed 11 August 2016).
Mercer J., Kelman I., Lloyd K. and Suchet-Pearson S. (2008). Reflections on use of participatory 
research for disaster risk reduction. Area, 40(2), 172–183.
National Research Council (NRC) (2000). Risk Analysis and Uncertainty in Flood Damage Reduction 
Studies. National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
Ohnishi M., Fukui T., Matsui K., Hira K., Shinozuka M., Ezaki H. and Shimbo T. (2002). Interpretation 
of and preference for probability expressions among Japanese patients and physicians. Family 
Practice, 19(1), 7–11.
Podraza U. (2003). Współpraca z mediami. Poradnik, Instytut Meteorologii i Gospodarki Wodnej, 
Warszawa. (Cooperation with the media. Handbook, Institute of Meteorology and Water 
Management, Warsaw.)
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Education and information as a basis for flood risk management 201
Rebolledo-Mendez G., Avramides K., de Freitas S. and Memarzia K. (2009, August). Societal Impact 
of a Serious Game on Raising Public Awareness: The Case of FloodSim. Proceedings of the 
2009 ACM SIGGRAPH Symposium on Video Games (pp. 15–22). ACM.
Renooij S. and Witteman C. (1999). Talking probabilities: Communicating probabilistic information 
with words and numbers. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 22(3), 169–194.
Resilient Australia Awards (2016). On the portal of Australian Government. Attorney-General’s 
Department. Available at: https://www.ag.gov.au/EmergencyManagement/About-us-emergency-
management/Resilient-Australia-awards/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 17 August 2016).
SEPA (n.d.) Responsibilities for flooding, Available at: http://www.sepa.org.uk/environment/water/
flooding/responsibilities-for-flooding (accessed 11 August 2016).
The Somerset Levels and Moors Flood Action Plan (2014). Executive summary. ‘We cannot let this 
happen again’. Prime Minister, David Cameron, 13th February 2014.
Tobin G. A. (1995). The levee love affair: a stormy relationship. Water Resources Bulletin, 31(3), 
359–367.
Total disaster risk management: Good practices (2008). Asian Disaster Reduction Center. Available 
at: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/9052_TDRM08.pdf (accessed 17 August 2016).
Wallsten T. S., Budescu D. V. and Zwick R. (1993). Comparing the calibration and coherence of 
numerical and verbal probability judgments. Management Science, 39(2), 176–190.
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
A




Alpers, G. W., 135
Amelung, D., 22
Amir, M., 53
Ancker, J. S., 60
Anderson, L. R., 34
Anderson, N. D., 10




Axelrod, L. J., 83
Ayton, P., 145
B
Baan, P. J., 83
Babin, B. J., 90
Baker, E. J., 35
Bär, A. S., 6, 25, 28, 29, 33
Barilli, E., 62
Barnes, K., 17, 107, 116
Baron, J., 83, 84, 88
Barron, G., 11, 12, 48, 49, 51, 53
Bateman, J. M., 5
Bechara, A., 121
Begg, Ch., 181
Bell, H. M., 192
Berg, H., 13
Berke, P. R., 15
Beutter, C., 6, 22, 32
Bevere, L., 141
Bianchizza, Ch., 181
Biernacki, W., 177, 189
Bishop, S. R., 10
Black, W. C., 90
Bobiński, E., 2
Boehm, S. G., 135
Böhm, G., 84, 85, 87, 91, 98
Bokwa, A., 189
Bonk, W. J., 6
Bonnefon, J. F., 62
Borenstein, M., 30
Borkan, B., 42, 46
Borkowska, A., 120, 131
Bostrom, A., 60
Bot, I., 22, 33
Botan, C., 97
Botzen, W. J. W., 46, 47, 147
Boucher, R. J., 83
Bower, G. H., 42
Boyce, R. R., 84
Brem, A. K., 135
Bridges, M. W., 165
Bromley, D. W., 83
Brookshire, D. S., 45, 47
Brown, G., 84
Brown, T. C., 84
Browne, M. J., 122, 147
Author Index
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
204 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
Brun, W., 68, 192
Brundl, M., 181
Buchecker, M., 181







Camerer, C. F., 13, 15, 60
Cameron, L., 145
Camilleri, A. R., 51, 53
Cantor, R., 82, 83
Carlson, L., 10
Carmody, J., 10
Carver, C. S., 165
Cavallo, E. A., 142
Chabris, C. F., 5
Chandler, C. C., 63
Charness, G., 26
Chater, N., 49, 51, 53, 145
Chiu, A., 42
Choi, Y., 23
Chua, H. F., 65
Cialdini, R. B., 143
Cialdini, R., 5
Clancy, N., 13
Clark, L. A., 132
Clore, G. L., 42
Cohen, B. L., 192
Cohen, J., 32
Combs, B., 8, 46, 82, 88, 98, 120
Condit, C., 65
Cooper, D. J., 143, 145
Corrigan, B., 46, 120
Cosmides, L., 76
Coursey, D. L., 43
Covello, V. T., 8, 60, 82–84
Cremonesi, L., 62
Crozier, M., 60
Cutter, S., 17, 107, 116
D
Damasio, A. R., 121
Damasio, H., 121
Darlington, J. D., 107, 116
Davids, S. L., 61
de Bruin, W. B., 23
de Freitas, S., 196
De Marchi, B., 181
De Miranda, K. L., 146, 147, 151, 
152, 155
de Vries, N. N. K., 60–63, 68, 76
Demes, K. A., 49, 53
Dent, J., 145
Derby, S. L., 82
Desvousges, W. H., 43
Di Masso Tarditti, M., 181





Drain, E. M., 5
Drottz-Sjöberg, B.-M., 83














Fidell, L. S., 91
Fiedler, S., 54
Fielding, J., 48
Finucane, M. L., 10, 61, 83, 121
Fischbacher, U., 151
Fischer, H. W., 5






by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Author Index 205
FitzGerald, G., 65
Flynn, J. H., 83
Fontaine, J. R. J., 87
Fordham, M., 183
Forgas, J. P., 9, 42
Fox, C. R., 12, 48, 51
Fox, M., 77
Fox-Glassman, K. T., 82
Frey, B. S., 46
Friedl, A., 146, 147, 151, 
152, 155





Gaissmaier, W., 61, 62
Galesic, M., 66
Gallagher, J., 145, 147
Galloway, G. E., 190
Ganderton, P. T., 45, 47
Garcia-Retamero, R., 66
Garofalo, R. F., 83
Gawryluk, K., 21, 157
Gigerenzer, G., 42, 43, 61, 62, 66
Ginsberg, R., 42, 46
Glik, D. C., 5
Glöckner, A., 54
Glozman, I., 53, 54
Gneezy, U., 26
Goebel, R., 135
Goldstein, N. J., 143
Gonzalez, R., 13, 44










Gutscher, H., 16, 68, 106, 115, 122, 123, 
135, 159
Gutteling, J. M., 107
H
Hadar, L., 12, 51
Haidt, J., 84
Hair, J. F., Jr., 90
Hammond, F. N., 48
Harris, C. C., 84
Harris, T., 65
Hasher, L., 76
Hau, R., 49, 51, 53, 54, 55
Hawley, S. T., 66
Hayes, A. F., 94, 127
Healy, D., 135
Hedges, L. V., 30
Henneman, L., 60, 61, 66
Henninger, F., 54
Henrich, L., 60
Hertwig, R., 11, 12, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
54, 55
Hess, R., 60, 66
Hess, U., 84
Higgins, J. P. T., 30
Hilbig, B. E., 54
Hills, T. T., 52
Hilton, D. J., 68
Hira, K., 192
Holen, A., 97
Hollands, J. G., 63
Holmes, E. A., 135
Holt, C. A., 25
Höppner, C., 181
Horney, J. A., 15
Hoyt, R. E., 122
Hsee, C. K., 22, 45, 83, 84, 107, 121
Hu, T.-Y., 60
Huang, S. K., 5, 35
Huber, J., 42, 60
Huber, O., 6, 7, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32, 
33, 121
Huber, O. W., 6, 7, 22, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33
Huettel, S. A., 108
Hung, H., 122
Hurd, B., 42, 46
I
Idzikowska, K., 41–56, 59
Imas, A., 26
Izard, C. E., 87
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
206 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
J
Jacobson, A. R., 83–85, 88, 97
Jacowitz, K. E., 85
Jancovic, A., 66
Janmaimool, P., 83
Jardine, C. G., 68
Jiang, X.-W., 60
Johnson, B. B., 8, 18
Johnson, S. M., 83




Kadosh, R. C., 135
Kahneman, D., 11, 13, 15, 43, 44, 47, 54, 
55, 85, 121
Kakimoto, R., 4
Kassam, K. S., 107, 121
Katz, N., 42, 46
Kaufman, J. S., 15
Keeney, R. L., 82
Keller, C., 66, 67, 122, 135
Keller, L. R., 83
Kelman, I., 183
Keltner, D., 84, 121
Kiefer, J., 49, 51, 53–55
Kievik, M., 107
Klein, W. M. P., 63
Klijn, F., 83
Knoller, C., 147
Koellinger, P., 16, 107, 116, 128, 
134, 171
Kogan, N., 83
Kołodziej, S., 41–56, 59
Komac, B., 181
Kondolf, G. M., 159
Konieczny, R., 10, 105, 122, 131, 171, 173, 
177, 189
Kousky, C., 145
Kozol, H. L., 83
Krasovskaia, I., 13
Krawczyk, M. W., 141, 142
Kreibich, H., 50, 189
Kuhlicke, Ch., 181
Kukafka, R., 60
Kundzewicz, Z. W., 158, 177, 190
Kunreuther, H. C., 106, 107, 116, 142, 171
Kunreuther, H., 11, 13–16, 42–44, 46–48, 









Lahno, A. M., 146, 151
Lamond, J. E., 48
Landmann, H., 84
Langer, E. J., 33
Lathrop, J., 42
Lau, M. A., 10
Laury, S. K., 25
Lave, L. B., 11
Lave, L., 60
Lave, T. R., 11
Layman, M., 83
Leiserowitz, A. A., 82
Lemkow, L., 181
Lerner, J. S., 9, 84, 98, 107, 121
Levenbaum, E., 135
Li, J., 85, 91, 97
Li, Y., 107, 121
Lichtenstein, S., 8, 43, 46, 82, 88, 98, 120
Lindell, M. K., 4, 5, 15, 35, 82, 115, 
116, 120
Linden, D. E. J., 135
Lion, R., 22, 33
Lipkus, I. M., 63, 65, 66
Lloyd, K., 183
Loewenstein, G. F., 22, 83, 84, 121, 107




Lynch, C. R., 83–85, 88, 97
M
Ma, X.-Q., 60
MacDonald, P. D., 15
MacGregor, D. G., 10, 61, 121
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Author Index 207
Mack, P. B., 108
MacKay, C., 5
Macko, A., 81
Magat, W. A., 42, 60
Major A. M., 107, 116
Malawski, M., 157






Mazzocco, K., 61, 62
McAuliffe, T. L., 61, 65
McCalley T., 16, 106
McCarthy, G., 108
McCarthy, S., 181
McClelland, G. H., 42, 43, 46, 60, 84
McClure, J., 60
McDaniels, T., 83
McGoun, E. G., 59
McHugh, S., 121
McKee, M., 45, 47
McLuckie, B., 6
Meertens, R. M., 22, 33, 60–63, 68, 76
Meijnders A., 16, 106




Mertz, C. K., 61, 62
Merz, B., 50, 189
Meyer, R. J., 13
Miceli, R., 122
Michailova, J., 16, 21, 81
Michel-Kerjan, E. O., 13, 46, 47, 141, 142, 
145, 159, 173
Midden C., 16, 106
Miesen, H. W. J. M., 86
Mileti, D. S., 5, 6, 107, 116
Miller, L., 42, 46
Minsk, E., 84
Minson, J. A., 155
Moen, B., 82
Moiraghi, M., 83
Montoya, J., 6, 22, 32
Morera, O. F., 84




Mueller, J. S., 155
Mühlberger, A., 135
Müller, M., 50, 189
N
Nattinger, A. B., 61, 65
Nerb, J., 83, 85, 88
Newell, B. R., 49–51, 53
Nguyen, Y., 83
Noussair, C. N., 83













Papon, T., 122, 131
Paraschiv, C., 54
Parker, A. M., 60
Parrott, R., 65
Pascual-Leone, A., 135
Passchier, W. W. F., 60–63, 68, 76
Patt A. G., 68
Paul, B. K., 97
Pauly, M., 44, 47, 134
Pellizzoni, L., 181
Peperkorn, H. M., 135
Perry, R. W., 4, 15, 35, 82, 120, 115–116
Peters, E., 10, 61–62, 83–84, 121
Peterson, G. L., 84
Petrow, T., 50, 189
Pfister, H. R., 84, 87, 98
Phillips, B. D., 183
Pighin, S., 62
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
208 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
Piskorz, Z., 120, 131
Pleskac, T. J., 49, 51, 53–55
Plott, C. R., 34
Podraza, U., 180
Poldrack, R. A., 48
Polec, A., 119
Prater, C. S., 5, 35
Proverbs, D. G., 48
R





Read, S., 8, 82, 88, 98
Rebolledo-Mendez, G., 196
Rege, M., 143, 145
Renn, O., 181
Renooij, S., 192
Richter, A., 145, 147
Ritov, I., 85
Ritov, L., 83, 88
Roberts, R. C., 84
Robison, L. J., 63
Rød, S. K., 97
Rogers, B., 141
Roth, E., 60
Rothstein, H. R., 30
Rottenstreich, Y., 45
Rudski, J. M., 83–85, 88, 97
Rundmo, T., 82
S
Sælthun, N. R., 13
Sagi, P., 42, 46
Sandman, P. M., 83
Sandman, P., 82–84
Santarnecchi, E., 135
Sarin, R. K., 83
Savadori, L., 62
Savage, D. A., 148
Sawicki, P., 10, 22, 68
Schade, C., 16, 107, 116, 128, 134, 171
Schapira, M. M., 61, 65
Scheier, M. F., 165
Scherer, K. R., 87
Schiller, J., 145
Schlesinger, H., 145
Schmidt, K. M., 144
Schmidt, U., 146–147, 151–152, 155
Schrag, D. P., 68
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., 22, 26
Schulze, W. D., 42–43, 46, 60, 84
Schwartz, J. S., 65
Schwartz, L. M., 61–62
Schwarz, N., 42
Scolobig, A., 181
Seabury, S. A., 13
Segal, Z. V., 10
Seidl, R., 68
Seligman, M. E. P., 116










Siebeneck, L. K., 5
Siegrist, M., 16, 60, 66–67, 83–85, 
88–89, 97, 106, 115, 122, 123, 
135, 159
Silk, K., 65
Simons, D. J., 5
Siudak, M., 177, 189
Sjöberg, L., 69, 82–84, 87
Sleboda, P., 84
Slovic, P., 10, 42–43, 46, 60–62, 82–84, 88, 
98, 120, 121, 145
Slovic, P. E., 8
Slovto, P., 43
Small, D. A., 9, 98
Sobkow, A., 119, 135
Sokolowska, J., 84
Sorensen, J. H., 6
Soriano, C., 87
Sotgiu, I. M., 122




by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Author Index 209
Starmer, C., 48, 54
Stefanek, M. E., 63
Stein, G. F., 5
Steinfuhrer A., 181
Stewart, N., 49, 51, 53
Stewart, S., 45, 47
Stöber, J., 160
Stoker, B. L., 5





Sütterlin, B., 83–85, 88–89, 97
T
Tabachnick, B. G., 91
Taleb, N. N., 42
Tapsell, S., 181
Tarr, M. J., 135
Tatsuoka, M., 6
Teigen, K. H., 68, 192
Tellegen, A., 132
Teoderescu, K., 53
Thieken, A. H., 50, 189
Thomas, D. S., 183
Thompson, T., 135
Thrush, D., 48
Thurston, H., 45, 47
Tierney, K. J., 82
Timmermans, D. R. M., 60–61, 
66, 68
Tobin, G. A., 190, 192
Tooby, J., 76
Torgler, B., 148
Traczyk, J., 119, 121, 135
Tranel, D., 121
Trautmann, S. T., 141–142, 144
Trowbridge, M. L., 5
Tversky, A., 13, 15, 43–44, 
54–55, 121
Tyszka, T., 1, 6, 10, 16, 21, 22, 35, 68, 
105, 119, 121, 122, 131, 171, 173
U
Ubel, P. A., 65–66
Ungemach, C., 49, 51, 53
V
Valdesolo, P., 107, 121
van de Kuilen G., 141, 142
van den Bergh, J. C., 147
van der Pligt, J., 107
van Schaik, P., 145
Van Willigen, M., 15
Västfjäll, D., 10, 61–62
Vining, J., 84
Viscusi, K., 42
Viscusi, W. K., 60, 83, 135, 145, 147, 
148, 155
Visschers, V. H. M., 60–63, 66, 
68, 76
von Neumann, J., 120
von Winterfeldt, D., 60
W
Wachinger, G., 181
Wakker, P. P., 54
Walker, G., 181
Walker, M. E., 84
Wallach, M. A., 83
Wallsten, T. S., 192
Wang, M., 85, 91, 97
Wärneryd, K. E., 34
Warren, W. H., 135
Watanabe, T., 83
Watson, D., 132
Weber, E. U., 11, 12, 22, 48–49, 51, 53, 60, 
68, 82–84, 107, 121
Weiner, B., 85
Weinstein, N. D., 16, 106, 114–115, 
122, 131
Welch, N., 22, 83–84, 107, 121
Weseley, A. J., 60
Whittle, R., 181
Wider, R., 6–7, 22, 32
Wiedemann, P. M., 68
Wilde, G. J. S., 107




Worth, M. F., 6
Wouter Botzen, W. J., 159, 173
Wu, A., 60
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
210 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
Wu, G., 13, 42, 44
Wu, H.-C., 5
X




Yamagishi, K., 11, 62
Yates, J. F., 60, 65
Yu, Q. Y., 85, 91, 97
Yuchtman, N., 146
Z
Zaalberg, R., 16, 106
Zacks, R. T., 76
Zajonc, R. B., 84
Zaleskiewicz, T., 6, 22, 35, 120, 121, 
131, 135
Zeckhauser, R. J., 135, 145, 147, 148, 155
Żelaziński, J., 2
Zhang, R.-G., 85, 91, 97
Zielonka, P., 1, 41




by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk







illusion of control, 33
illusion of safety, 157–174, 178,  
189–191, 199
mere presentation effect, 51, 53–54
optimism, 159, 169, 170, 171
peer effects, 17, 141–155









controllability, 8, 9, 22, 32
D
decision
decision from description, 49, 53
decision from experience, 49, 53, 54
decision making, 4, 9, 12–17, 22, 42, 47, 
53, 84, 120, 121, 143, 155, 188
decision theory, 14, 15, 22, 107, 116, 
120–121
decision under risk, 37, 38
decision weights, 15
naturalistic decision making, 22
disaster
man-made disaster, 34
natural disaster, 7, 9, 22–23, 184
E
education
flood education, 177–179, 181
emotions
emotional reactions, 45–46, 84, 85, 
89, 90–92, 92–96
fear, 45, 87, 120
negative emotions, 87, 134
other condemning emotions, 84, 
91, 92
other suffering emotions, 91, 92
positive emotions, 87
worry, 17, 71, 111, 121–122, 






experts, 8, 42, 82, 191
exposure
exposure to danger, 172, 173
Subject Index
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
212 Large Risks with Low Probabilities
F
flood
experience of flooding, 162, 170–171, 174
flood communication, 184, 195
flood defenses, 178, 188–189
flood education, 177–179
flood prevention, 114–115, 171, 184
flood response, 181
flood risk, 123, 159, 178, 179–181, 
186–188, 193–197
flood risk awareness, 165, 178, 182
flood risk communication, 179–181, 
191–193
flood risk education, 179–181
flood risk management, 177–199
flood risk mitigation, 188
flood risk reduction, 3, 178, 182, 
186–188
flooding record, 166, 167, 172–173
G
gamble, 22, 45, 145–146
H
hazard, 3, 8
natural hazard, 3, 8, 46, 64, 85, 193
human-made hazard, 10, 85
moral hazard, 144, 147, 151
I
inequality aversion, 143–144, 146
information, 3, 4
active information search, 22
information search, 4–7, 25, 32, 34
information transfer, 194
insurance, 13, 16
insurance decisions, 121, 129, 147, 171
reassurance, 158
L
levee, 14, 86, 97, 98, 101, 102, 108, 114, 
115, 163, 167, 190
levee breach, 172
levee effect, 159, 172, 190
LOT-R questionnaire, 165
lottery, 22, 25–26, 32, 45
N
natural disaster, 5, 7, 9, 10, 21–35, 64, 
122–123, 184
natural hazard, 2, 7, 10, 11, 13, 46, 56, 60, 
64, 67, 85, 97, 120–122, 194
P
personal experience, 8, 11, 16–17, 51, 106, 
109, 115, 120, 122–123, 129–131, 165
precautionary measures, 106, 107, 115, 
158, 159
probability, 27, 30–31, 35, 45, 46–48, 53, 
54–55









sensitivity to probability variations, 
75–76




prospect theory, 44, 49, 50, 121
probability weighting function, 
54–55




catastrophic risk, 8, 142
man-made disaster, 34
preparedness for risk, 159
residual risk, 14, 159
risk attitude, 24, 26, 32, 34
risk awareness, 144, 157, 165, 178
risk aversion, 16, 24, 26, 31–32, 142, 
149, 151
risk defusing operator (RDO), 7, 22, 31
risk homeostasis theory, 14, 107, 159
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
 Subject Index 213
risk perception, 8–10, 15, 81–83, 




safety, 108, 115, 158–159, 188–189
small probabilities
overweighting of small probabilities, 
41–55
underweighting of small probabilities, 
41–55











by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
Downloaded from https://iwaponline.com/ebooks/book-pdf/651189/wio9781780408606.pdf
by IWA Publishing, publications@iwap.co.uk
on 14 August 2020
LARGE RISKS  
WITH LOW 
PROBABILITIES
Perceptions and willingness to take  
preventive measures against flooding



























ISBN: 9781780408590 (Hardback)  
ISBN: 9781780408606 (eBook)
‘The present volume makes a significant scientific contribution to our knowledge about 
how to improve a society’s resilience against natural hazards in general and flooding in 
particular.’ Ola Svenson, Professor emeritus at Stockholm University
‘Intelligent analysis and the perception of risks along with exploring the emotional page  
of the society when perceiving threats make this book my number one specialist literature.’  
Veit Stutz, CEO of Allianz Poland
‘By offering thoughtful insight into the ways people deal with highly improbable big  
impact events, this noteworthy book will be of exceptional importance to policy makers  
and entrepreneurs.’ Tomasz Modzelewski, CEO of Paged
This volume contains studies of one particular category of risky situations, namely, those 
involving highly negative consequences with low probabilities. Situations of this type involve 
both natural and man-made disasters (e.g. floods, technological hazards, economic crises, 
epidemics, etc.). Such risks are characterized by two features: (1) they occur relatively 
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book is devoted to protection and insurance against risk. Thus, it includes studies answering 
the following questions: What determines a person’s willingness to take preventive actions in 
areas susceptible to severe flooding? How do people form their own risk estimates?
Research presented in the book extends our knowledge of human behavior in situations 
characterized by large risks and low probabilities, leading to better comprehension of 
the functioning of cognitive and affective processes in perception and decision making in 
situations where uncertainty and risk are accompanied by highly negative consequences.
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